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A NEW
SYSTEM OF PAPER
CURRENCY.
BY
LYSANDER SPOONER. ______________ BOSTON:
________ PART FIRST
________
NOTE. ___ THE
subscriber believes that the
right of property in ideas, is
as valid, in the view both of
the Common and constitutional
law of this country, as is the
right of property in material
things; and that patent and
copyright laws, instead of
superseding, annulling,
or
being a substitute for, that
right, arc simply aids to it. In
publishing this system of Paper
Currency, he gives notice that
he is the inventor of it, and
that he reserves to himself all
the exclusive property in it,
‘which, in law, equity, or
natural right, he can have; and,
especially, that he reserves to
himself the exclusive right to
furnish the Articles of
Association to any Banking
Companies that may adopt the
system. To
secure to himself, so far as he
may, this right, he has drawn up
and copy. righted, not only such
general Articles of Association
as will be needed, but also such
other papers as it kill be
necessary to use separately from
the Articles. Even
should it be possible for other
persons to draw up Articles of
Association, that ‘would
evade the subscriber’s
copyright, banking companies,
that may adopt the system, will
probably find it for their
interest to adopt also the
subscriber’s Articles of
Association; for the reason that
it will be important that
Companies should all have
Articles precisely, legally, and
verbally alike. If their
Articles should all be alike,
any legal questions that may
arise, when settled for one
Company, would be settled for
all. Besides,
if each Company were to have
Articles different from those of
other., no two Companies could
take each other’s bills on
precisely equal terms; because
their legal rights, as bill
holders, under each other’s
Articles, would not be precisely
alike, and might be very
materially different. Furthermore,
if each Company were to have
Articles of Association peculiar
to itself, one Company, if it
could take another’s bills at
all, could not safely take them
until the former had thoroughly
examined, and satisfactorily
ascertained, the legal
meaning
of the latter’s Articles of
Association. This labor among
banks, if Companies should he
numerous, would be intolerable
and impossible. The necessity of
studying, understanding, and
carrying in the mind, each
other’. different Articles of
Association, would introduce
universal confusion, and make it
impracticable for any
considerable number of Companies
to accept each other’. bills,
or to cooperate in furnishing a
currency for the public. Each
Company would be able to get
only such a circulation as it
could get, ‘without having its
bills received by other banks.
But if all banks have precisely
similar Articles of [*vi]
Association, then one Company,
so soon as it understands its
own Articles, understands those
of all other Companies, and can
exchange bills with them
readily, safely, and on
precisely equal terms. Moreover,
if each separate Company were to
have its peculiar Articles of
Association, it would be wholly
impossible for the public to
become acquainted with them all,
or even with any considerable
number of them. It would, therefore,
be impossible for the public to
become acquainted with their
legal rights, as bill holders,
under all the different
Articles. Of course they could
not safely accept the currency
furnished by the various
Companies. But if all the Companies
should have Articles precisely
alike, the public would soon
understand them, and could then
act intelligently, as to their
legal rights, in accepting or
rejecting the currency. The
subscriber conceives that the
Articles of Association, which
he has drawn up, and
copyrighted, are so nearly
perfect, that they will never
need any, unless very trivial,
alterations. In them he has
intended to provide so fully for
all exigencies and details, as
to supersede the necessity of
By-Laws. This object was
important, not only for the
convenience of the Companies
themselves, but because any
power, in the holders of
Productive Stock, to enact
By-Laws, might be used to
embarrass the legal rights of
the bill holders under the
Article, of Association. Besides,
as the holders of Productive
Stock are liable to be
continually changing, any power,
in one set of holders, to
establish By-Laws, would be
likely to be used to the
embarrassment, or even injury,
of their successors. It
is obviously important to all
parties, that the powers of the
Trustees, and the rights of all
holders, both of Productive and
Circulating Stock, should be
legally and precisely fixed by
the Articles of Association, so
as to be incapable of
modification, or interference,
by any body of men less than the
whole number interested. LYSANDER
SPOONER. Boston,
1861. [*9] A NEW
SYSTEM -OF- PAPER CURRENCY. ___________ CHAPTER
I. OUTLINE OF THE SYSTEM THE
principle of the system is, that
the currency shall represent
an invested dollar,
instead of a specie dollar. The
currency will, therefore, be
redeemable by an invested
dollar, unless the bankers choose
to redeem it with specie. Theoretically
the capital may be made up of
any property whatever. But, in
practice, it will doubtless be
necessary, in order to secure
public confidence in the
currency, that the capital
should be property of a fixed
and permanent nature, liable to
few casualties and hazards, and
yielding a constant, regular,
and certain income, sufficient
to make the PRODUCTIVE
STOCK, hereafter
mentioned, worth ordinarily par
of specie in the market. The best
capital of all will probably be
mortgages; and they may perhaps
be the only capital, which it
will ever be expedient to use. This
capital is to be put into joint
stock, held by Trustees, and
divided into shares, of one
hundred dollars each, or any
other sum that may be thought
best. [*10] This
Stock may be called the PRODUCTIVE
STOCK, and
will be entitled to the
dividends. The
dividends will consist of the
interest on the mortgages, and
the profits of the banking. Another
kind of Stock, which may be
called Circulating Stock, will
be created, precisely equal
in amount to the PRODUCTIVE
STOCK,
and divided
into shares of one dollar
each. This
Circulating Stock will be
represented by certificates,
scrip, or bills, of various
denominations, like our present
bank bills - that
is to say, representing one,
two, three, five, ten, or more
shares, of one dollar each. These
certificates, scrip, or bills of
the Circulating Stock will
be issued for circulation as a
currency, by discounting notes,
&c., as our bank bills are
now. This
Circulating Stock will be
entitled to no dividends; and
its value will consist wholly <fn1>
in
its title to be received, at its
nominal value, in payment of
debts due to the bank, and to be
redeemed by PRODUCTIVE
STOCK, unless
the bankers choose to
redeem it with specie. In law,
the Circulating Stock will
be in the nature of a lien upon
the PRODUCTIVE
STOCK. _________ Such
are the general principles of
the system. The
following provisions, although
perhaps not essential to the
system, will yet serve to keep
the currency at a uniform value,
and make the system operate
without friction. _______ The
original owners of the PRODUCTIVE
STOCK,
and all who hold it through purchase
from them, (instead of by
transfer in redemption of
bills,) may be called PRIMARY
STOCKHOLDERS. [*11] Those,
who hold PRODUCTIVE
STOCK, by
transfer in redemption of bills,
may be called Secondary
Stockholders. All
the resources of the bank -
that
is, the interest on the
mortgages, and the banking
profits -
should be
pledged to pay the Secondary
Stockholders precisely six
per centum per annum (or such
other per centum as the Articles
of Association may fix for them
to receive) on their Stock; no
more, no less. After these
dividends shall have been paid to
the Secondary
Stockholders, the
remaining dividends should be
divided among the PRIMARY
STOCKHOLDERS -
whether
such dividends shall be more, or
less, than those received by the
Secondary Stockholders. The
effect of securing to the Secondary
Stockholders precisely six
per centum (or any other given
per centum) on their Stock, will
be to make the bills represent,
to the public, either
invested capital, yielding
precisely six per centum per
annum (or precisely any other
per centum, which it may be
designed to represent)
or
specie; because
the bills may, at pleasure, be
converted into such capital,
unless the bankers prefer to
redeem
them
with specie. Whenever
PRODUCTIVE STOCK shall
have been transferred, in redemption
of bills,
the
bankers will
have the right to buy it back, at
pleasure, on paying its face in
specie, with interest, (or dividends,)
at the prescribed rate, for the
time it shall
have been in
the hands
of
the Secondary
Stockholders.
<fn2> It
may be desirable, for various
reasons, that the currency,
representing the invested
dollar, should, at all times,
be, as nearly as
may be,
on a par with the specie dollar;
neither rising above,
nor falling below it,
in value. This object, nearly
enough for all
practical purposes, can be
accomplished in this way, to
wit: The
rate of dividend, secured to
be paid to the Secondary
Stockholders, on their
PRODUCTIVE STOCK, should be
fixed so high
as to make that Stock worth, in
their hands, par of specie.
[*12] (Under an abundant
currency, such as this system
would furnish, six per centum
would probably be sufficient for
this purpose). This would keep
the bills up to par with
specie; because they could, at
pleasure, be converted into
either PRODUCTIVE
STOCK, or
specie. On
the other hand, the facts, that
the bankers may, if they please,
redeem their bills
with specie, rather than by PRODUCTIVE
STOCK, and
that they will
have the right, at any time, to
buy back the PRODUCTIVE
STOCK, from
the Secondary Stockholders,
by paying its face in
specie, will generally keep the
bills down to par with
specie. <fn3> So
long as the banking business
shall yield sufficient profit to
pay expenses, and the PRODUCTIVE
STOCK shall
remain in the hands of the original
owners, there will be no
necessity for the interest on
the mortgages being paid;
because what would be paid in by
each Stockholder as interest,
would come directly back to him
as dividend. The payment of the
interest to the bank, and
of the dividends (so far as they
shall be made, up of such
interest) by the bank,
will therefore be merely nominal
transactions on the books of
the bank, without either being
actually made.
If
an original Stockholder should
sell
his
PRODUCTIVE
STOCK outright,
it would then be necessary that
he should pay his interest.
[*Inserted Page] Although
the banks make no absolute
promise to pay specie on
demand, the system
nevertheless affords a much
better practical guaranty
for specie payments, than our
present system; for these
reasons, viz. 1.
The banks would be so
universally solvent, and so
universally known to be
solvent, that no runs would ever
be made upon them for specie,
through fear of their
insolvency. They could,
therefore, maintain specie
payments with much less amounts
of specie,
than our present banks can. 2.
In
ninety-nine times in a hundred,
the alternative redemption would
probably be preferred to specie,
by the bill-holders. This
would still
further lessen the
amount
of specie necessary to be kept
on hand. 3.
The banks would probably
find it for their interest, as
promoting the circulation of
their bills, to pay, at all
times, such small amounts
of
specie, as
the public convenience might
require. 4.
Whenever specie should not be
paid on demand, no dividends
could be paid to the bankers,
until all claims for specie,
with interest, should have been
paid in full; that is to say,
until all Circulating Stock, presented
for redemption, and not redeemed
by PRODUCTIVE
STOCK, should
have been redeemed by specie;
and all PRODUCTIVE
STOCK, that
should have been transferred in
redemption of circulation,
should have been repurchased, by
specie, and restored to the
original holders. (For
particulars on this point, see
Articles of Association,
especially Articles 13, 20, 23,
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and
29.) 5.
If there
should
he any suspensions of specie
payments, they would be only
temporary ones, by here and
there a bank separately.
and
not by all the banks
simultaneously, as now. No general
public inconvenience
would therefore be felt from
that cause. [*13] If,
when any PRODUCTIVE
STOCK
shall
have been transferred, in
redemption of the bills, the
banking profits should not be
sufficient to pay the dividends,
.to
which such transferred
Stock will always be
entitled, it will be necessary
for the original Stockholders to
pay interest pro rata on
their mortgages, sufficient,
with the banking profits, to pay
the dividends on such
transferred Stock. If
any original Stockholder
(mortgagor) should wish, at any
time, to take his capital out of
the bank-that is, release his
estate from the mortgage -
he has only
to request the Trustees to
cancel an equivalent amount of his
own
PRODUCTIVE
STOCK, and
also an equivalent amount of Circulating
Stock. They can then
discharge his mortgage, without
injustice to any one; and his
rights in, and liabilities to,
the bank are at an end; he having
first paid all
dues that may have previously
accrued. Minor
details of the system will be
seen in the Articles of Association. N.
B. In the Articles of
Association, the system appears
much more clear, simple, and
exact, than it can be made to do
in any brief description of it. [*14] CHAPTER
II. ADVANTAGES
OF
THE
SYSTEM. 1.
THE system would furnish, at all
times, an abundant currency.
It would furnish currency equal to
one
third, or one half, the value of
all the real estate in the
country -
if so much
could be used. 2.
The currency would be stable
in value. The system is
Capable of furnishing so much
currency, that a large demand
could be supplied as easily as a
small one, and without causing
any variation in the market
value of the currency, or
raising the rate of interest. The
presence or absence of specie in
the country, would have no
effect, either upon the amount
of currency, or upon the
stability of its value. The
prices of property would be
stable, so far as their
stability should depend upon the
stability of the currency. 3. The currency
would be solvent. It
would be absolutely incapable of
insolvency; for there could
never be a dollar of the
currency in circulation, without
an invested dollar (Productive
Stock) in bank, which must be
transferred in redemption of it,
unless redemption be made in
specie. All losses, therefore,
fall upon the bankers, and not
upon the bill holders. If the
original Stockholders should all
fail- that is to say, if they
should be compelled to transfer all
their Productive Stock in
redemption of their circulation
- the result would simply be,
that the original capital
(Productive Stock) would pass, undiminished,
into the hands of a new set
of holders, who would proceed
to bank upon it (re-issue
the bills, and redeem them, if
necessary, by the transfer of
Productive Stock) in the same
way that their pre- [*15] decessors
had done. And if they, too,
should lose all their
Productive Stock (capital) by
the transfer of it in redemption
of the circulation, the Stock
itself would pass, unincumbered
and unimpaired, into the
hands of still another new set
of holders, who would bank upon
it, as the others had done
before them. And this process
would go on indefinitely, as
often as one set of bankers
should fail (lose all their
Productive Stock). The holders
of the Productive Stock, for the
time being, would always be the
bankers, for the time being. And
whenever one set of bankers
should have made such losses as
to compel a transfer of all their
Productive Stock, that Stock
would pass into the hands of a
new set of holders, and the
bank, as a corporation, would
be just as solvent as at first.
So that, however badly the
banking business should be
conducted, and however
frequently the bankers might
fail, (if transferring all their
capital, or Productive Stock, in
redemption of their circulation,
may be called failing,) the bank
itself, as a corporation, could
not foil. That is to say,
its circulation could never fail
of redemption. Its capital would
forever remain intact; forever
equivalent to the circulation;
and forever subject to a
compulsory demand in redemption
of the circulation. In this way
all losses necessarily fall upon
the bankers (in the loss of
their Productive Stock) and not
upon the bill holders. (See
Article XXI, of the Articles of
Association.) 4.
The solvency of the currency
will be known by all,
both in the neighborhood of the
place of issue, and at a
distance from it (if the bankers
should choose to make its
solvency known at a distance).
These results will be
accomplished in this way. The
mortgages, composing the capital
of the bank, will be matter of
public record, and every body, in
the neighborhood, will have
the means of judging for himself
of the sufficiency of the
property holden. If the property
should be insufficient, the bank
would be discredited at once;
for the abundance of solvent
currency would be so great, that
no one would have any
induce-[*16] ment to take that
which was insolvent or doubtful.
In this way the credit of a bank
would be established at home. Its
credit abroad would be
established in this way,-
Suppose
a bank, at Chicago, should wish
to establish the credit of its
bills in New York. All that
would need to be done would be
to make arrangements with some
bank in New York to redeem them.
<fn4>
And to induce the New York bank
to redeem them, it would not be
necessary, as now, that the
Chicago bank should keep a
deposit of specie in New York.
All that would be necessary
would be to satisfy the New York
bank of its (the Chicago
bank’s) solvency - that is, of
the sufficiency of the property
holden. This could be done by
the New York bank’s sending a
commission to Chicago to
investigate the question. And
when the New York bank should
have once become convinced of
the solvency of the Chicago
bank, the credit of the latter
is established forever. The
New York bank would not need to
be continually investigating the
condition of the Chicago bank;
because, under this system, a
bank, once solvent, is forever
solvent. It
would, therefore, be perfectly
easy for banks, in remote parts
of the country, to make their
bills redeemable in the great
commercial centres, or any where
else they might please, without
keeping deposits of specie at
those points. One
important result, among others,
of this system would be, that
when a merchant, from Chicago,
for example, should come to New
York to make purchases, he would
not buy on his own Credit; but
would get his credit, at bank,
in Chicago; bring Chicago bank
bills to New York, and make his
purchases with them. Or else the
bills of New York banks would be
so abundant at Chicago, that he
would there exchange his Chicago
bills for New York bills, and
bring the latter home, and
exchange [*17] them for goods.
Thus all the jobbing business of
the country would be done for
cash, instead of on credit, as
now. 5.
The currency would be cheap
(afforded at a low rate of
interest) and for two reasons.
1. Because the capital costs
nothing: That is, its use as
banking capital costs nothing;
because its use as banking
capital, does not interfere with
its use for other purposes. 2.
The system admits of competition
limited only by the real
property of the country. These
two facts would bring the rate
of interest, at all times, down
to the lowest point, at which
the simple business of banking
could be profitably done. 6.
The basis of the currency could
not, like specie, be carried out
of the country, so as to leave
our own people destitute of a
currency. 7.
The system stands wholly on
common law principles; requiring
no aid from the government, in
the way of charters of
incorporation; amid (in the
United States) constitutionally
admits of no prohibition from
the government. <fn5> 8.
It gives the Stockholders all
the benefits of an act of incorporation,
so far as to shield them from
individual liability. At the
same time, it avoids all
necessity for privileged
legislation. It also avoids all
injustice to, and all liability
of throwing any losses upon, the
bill holders, because they are
certain to get the [*18] precise
thing they bargained for; that
being set apart, and made
legally incapable of being
applied to any other purpose. 9.
The system would be a free one.
That is, the right of furnishing
currency, instead of being made
a legalized monopoly, would be
open equally to every man, who
had the necessary property. 10.
The system would be adapted to
distribute credit equally as
possible through the community. 11.
Currency and bank credits would
be so abundant, cheap, and
generally diffused, as nearly or
quite to supersede all other
forms of temporary credit
between man and man, and
introduce a general system of
cash payments. This would be the
result, for this reason. The
banks could generally, if not
always, afford credit cheaper
than individuals engaged in
trade. The banks would be so
numerous, that a man deserving
of credit at all, could
generally obtain it at bank. And
the result would soon come
about, that nearly all temporary
credit would be obtained
at bank, and cash payments would
be made in nearly all
transactions between
individuals. The hazards of
trade would thus be greatly
diminished; every man’s
business would stand on its own
basis; his solvency or
insolvency would be an
independent matter, instead of
being complicated, as now, with
the solvency or insolvency of
so many others. 12.
It would tend to diversify
industry to the greatest
possible extent, by affording
the best possible facilities,
which a mere currency system can
furnish, for engaging in the
production of all new
commodities as fast as they
should be invented. 13.
The system would liberate specie
for the uses of international
commerce. 14.
The system would greatly enhance
the value of real estate, not so
much by reason of the banking
profits derived from it, as of
the activity it would give to
agricultural, manufacturing, and
commercial industry. 15.
The proposed system would tend
to graduate the prices of
property throughout the country,
according to one common [*19]
standard. To illustrate this
point, we will suppose that, in
Massachusetts, an acre of land,
which yields a net income of six
dollars per annum, over all
charges, is worth $100. Why is
it worth $100? Because the rate
of interest, in Massachusetts,
is six per centum per annum. The
acre of land, therefore, yields
the same annual income as $100,
at interest. But, in Illinois,
we will suppose, an acre of
land, that yields $12, or $18,
net income per annum, (two or
three times as much as the acre
in Massachusetts,) is worth but
$100, the same as the acre in
Massachusetts. Why is it worth
no more? Because the rate of
interest, in Illinois, is twelve
or eighteen per centum per
annum; two or three times more
than in Massachusetts. The acre
of land, in Illinois, therefore,
although it yields two or three
times as much income as the acre
in Massachusetts, brings only
the same price in the market,
because it will yield no more
annual income than $100, at
interest, in Illinois. But the
proposed system, by making
currency abundant, and reducing
the rate of interest, in
Illinois, to nearly or quite the
same rate as in Massachusetts,
would raise lands, in Illinois,
to a price corresponding the
income they yield. It would
raise them to substantially the
same standard of price with the
lands in Massachusetts; so that,
if an acre of land yielded $12,
or $18, net annual income, the
market price of the land would
be $200, or $300, instead of
$100, as now. In
this way, this system, by making
currency abundant, and the rate
of interest low, throughout the
country, would tend to graduate
the prices of property by one
common standard throughout the
country, according to the net
income, or real value, of the
property. 16.
It would benefit the condition
of poor men in various ways, to
wit: First, those wino
should labor for wages, would
receive their wages promptly,
and in money (currency). They
would thereby be enabled to make
their purchases with cash, and
thus make them more
advantageously than now. Secondly,
there would be no
stagnations in business, by
which they would [*20] be thrown
out of employment, and compelled
to consume their accumulations,
and perhaps fall in debt. Thirdly,
there would be a much
greater diversity of industry
than now, and as a consequence,
all labor would be better paid
than now. Fourthly, those
who should wish to hire capital,
and establish themselves in
business of their own, would be
much better able to do so than
now, because when all traffic
should be done for cash, it
would be much more safe to loan
capital to a poor man, than it
is now, when he is obliged to
give, as well as to get, credit.
Fifthly, men of wealth
would retire, earlier than now,
from active business, and make
way for, and loan their capital
to, younger men; because they
could certainly loan their
capital more safely than now,
and probably more
advantageously. By loaning their
capital first on mortgage, and
thus getting one income from it;
and then converting the
mortgages into bank capital, and
thus getting another income from
it, they would probably do
better with their capital, than
to remain in business. At any
rate, the management of their
capital would thus be attended
with less anxiety and risk, than
if they were to remain in
business themselves. 17.
As a standard of value, the
currency would be much more
uniform than it is now, because
a dollar, invested for twenty or
thirty years, where it is sure
to yield, say, six per cent.
income each year - never more,
and never less - would obviously
maintain a more uniform value
than the dollar now does, which
brings, say, four per cent.
income this year, and ten,
fifteen, or twenty next year.
[*21] CHAPTER
III. SECURITY
OF THE SYSTEM. SUPPOSING
the property mortgaged to be
ample, the system, as a system,
is absolutely secure. That is to
say, the currency is absolutely
sure of redemption. Thee capital
cannot, in any possible event,
be reduced below the amount
necessary for the redemption of
the entire circulation. The
only question, then, is - what
assurances have the public, that
the property mortgaged will
always be ample? The
answer is, that they have
abundant assurances, as follows: 1.
The mortgages will all be on
record, where any body
interested can examine them, and
judge for himself whether the
property holden is sufficient. 2.
Each bank will find it expedient
to print a large number of
copies of its Articles of
Association, including copies of
its mortgages. Appended to these
copies, may be copies of the
certificates of appraisers, as
to the value of the property.
These certificates, if they come
from men of known character and
judgment, will be entitled to
confidence. Certificates also of
the assessed value of the
property, on the tax lists of
the town, may be appended; and
these, coming from disinterested
and honest men of good judgment,
as the assessors of taxes
usually are, will be worthy of
reliance. Copies
of the Articles of Association,
with these certificates
appended, will be sent, by the
bank, to other banks, and given
to individuals, with whom the
bank wishes to establish its
credit. 3.
The Trustees of a bank will be
generally known as men of
character and judgment - for
otherwise a bank would be discredited
at once. If they are thus known,
their acceptance of [*22] the
office of Trustees, will be a
reasonable guaranty for the
sufficiency of the property
holden; for such men would not
be likely to become Trustees,
except for a solvent bank. 4.
The abundance of undoubted
currency would be such, that the
public would be under no
necessity to take doubtful
currency; and therefore doubtful
currency could get no
circulation at all. 5.
Mortgages upon the real property
of the country, at one third, or
one half, its value, would
probably furnish a great deal
more currency than could be
used. No one company, therefore,
could expect to get out a
circulation of more than one
third, or one half; the value of
the property mortgaged. It would
be of no use for them,
therefore, to mortgage their
property for more than that
amount. If they should mortgage
their property for more, and
attempt to get out more
circulation, they would thereby
discredit their bank, and thus
either fail of getting any
circulation at all, or
certainly fail of getting as
much circulation as they might
have got, if their property mad
been mortgaged only for a proper
amount. It, therefore, would not
be for the interest of a
banking company to mortgage
their property at a higher rate
than one third, or one half, its
value. And at this rate, the
mortgages would be safe for a
long series of years, (unless in
very extraordinary cases,)
because, under a system of
abundant currency, real estate
would always be rising in value,
rather than falling. The
mortgages, therefore, would be
growing better all the while,
instead of growing worse. 6.
By the Articles of Association,
all the mortgages, which make up
the capital of a bank, are made
mutually responsible for each
other; because, (see Articles
XXIX and XXXVII,) if any one
mortgage proves insufficient, no
dividend can afterwards be paid
to any PRIMARY STOCKHOLDER,
until that deficiency has been
made good by the company. The
effect of this provision will
be, to make all the founders of
a bank look carefully to the
sufficiency of each other’s
mortgages; because no man will
be willing to put in a good
mortgage of his own, on equal
terms with a bad mortgage of
another man’s, when he knows
that his [*23] own mortgage will
have to contribute to make good
any deficiency of the other. The
result will be that the
mortgages, that go to make up
the capital of any one bank,
will be either all good, or
all bad. If they are all
good, the solvency of the bank
will be apparent to all in
the vicinity; and the credit
of the bank will at once be
established, at home. If
the mortgages are all bad, that
fact also will be apparent to
every body in the vicinity; and
the bank is at once discredited,
at home. From
all the foregoing
considerations, it is evident
that nothing is easier than for
a good bank to establish its
credit, at home; and that
nothing is more certain than
that a bad bank would be
discredited, at home,
from the outset, and get no
circulation at all. It
is also evident that a bank,
that has no credit at home,
could get none abroad. There is,
therefore, no danger of the
public being swindled by bad
banks. 7.
It would be easy for a good bank
to establish its credit abroad -
for it could do it by
establishing its credit with
other banks. This it could do,
partly by means of its credit at
home, and partly by making
arrangements with other banks to
redeem its bills. In order to do
this, it must be at the
necessary expense and trouble of
satisfying these other banks of
its solvency - that is, by
furnishing them satisfactory
evidence of the sufficiency of
the mortgaged property; a thing,
that is obviously very easy to
be done, if the mortgaged
property be really sufficient. 8.
In addition to the security of
each individual mortgage, and of
the mutual responsibility of the
mortgages for each other, there
is the still further security of
all the debts due to the banks;
debts a little more than
equivalent (by the amount of
interest on the loans) to the
amount of bills in circulation.
In this connexion it may
be added, that under the system
proposed, the banking business
will be a much safer business
than it is now; and consequently
the debts due to the bank
will be a much better security
for the solvency of the bank,
than such debts now are;
because, under a system, which
furnishes, at all [*24] times, a
constant and ample supply of
currency, industry and trade
will be subject to none of those
revulsions and stagnations,
which cause extensive or general
bankruptcies; the debtors of
banks will all make their sales
for cash, instead of giving
credit. For these reasons the
credits, given by the banks,
will obviously be much more
uniformly safe than they now
are; and consequently the debts,
due the banks,, will afford a
much better security, than they
now do, for the solvency of the
banks themselves. 9.
The banks themselves would act
as guardians to the public
against frauds by each other.
This would be done in this way.
Bank A (a solvent bank) would
not receive the bills of bank B,
unless bank B had first
satisfied bank A of its
solvency. And bank A would be
satisfied only by personal
examination of the mortgages of
bank B. In this way any
unsound bank would be
discredited by the surrounding
banks, and thus discredited in
the eyes of the community. But
it has been said that under the
New York free banking law,
mortgages are deposited with the
State Comptroller, (or
Superintendent of Banks,) as
security for the redemption of
the currency; and that when
these mortgages come to be sold,
the lands often fail to bring
the amount of the mortgage. And
the question Inns been asked,
whether, under the system here
proposed, the mortgaged
property might not prove
insufficient, as~ well as in New
York? The
answer is, that the mortgages in
New York may have proved
insufficient for either or both
of two reasons. 1.
They may have proved
insufficient, because the lands,
being sold for specie, at a
time when specie had mostly left
the country, could not bring
what was not to be lead - that
is, specie. But this is no
proof that the lands were not, in
ordinary times, and under
an abundant currency, a
sufficient security; but only
that, when specie has gone out
of the country, lands are
affected like all other
property, and will not, any more
titan other property, bring
their true value in specie.
[*25] But
under the system proposed, the
absence of specie would occasion
no contraction of the currency,
and no depression in the price
of lands. And therefore a
mortgage, that was sufficient at
one time, would be sufficient at
all times. No forced sales
would be made; but the
mortgages would run (if only the
interest were paid) until
the final winding up of the
bank. If the interest were not
paid, the bank would take
possession, and apply the rents
to the payment of the interest.
Or, at worst, they would sell
the property. And it could
always be sold advantageously,
because, there never being a
scarcity of currency, property
in general would never be
depressed. 2.
The other reason, for the
failure of the New York mortgages,
may have been fraudulent
appraisals. The
facilities for fraudulent
appraisals are much greater
under the New York system, than
they would be under the system
proposed, and for these reasons. Under
the New York system, all that is
necessary to get a bank in
operation, is, that mortgages,
satisfactory to the State
Comptroller, or Superintendent
of Banks, should be deposited
with him. And he accepts the
mortgages on the simple
appraisal of men, appointed by
himself; or satisfactory to
himself. This being done, the
currency is then issued, and the
public receive it, because
the State has thus virtually
certified that it is well
secured. Now,
it is evident that all that is
necessary to get up a swindling
bank, under this system, is
simply to secure the approval of
one man the Comptroller,
(or Superintendent of Banks,)
who knows nothing of the land
himself- to the appraisal of
the land mortgaged. If but this
one man can either be cheated,
or be induced to become himself
a cheat, all the other
consequences follow; because the
currency is then issued under
his authority, and is received
by the public, on the strength
of his virtual indorsement. Now,
as it cannot be a very difficult
matter to cheat this one man,
or perhaps to induce him to
become himself a cheat, in [*26]
such a case as this, it is
evident that the system affords
little security for the
sufficiency of the mortgages. But
under the system proposed, no
such facilities for fraud would
exist, because the credit of the
bank would not rest upon the
certificate of any one man, nor
upon any indorsement of the State.
The
State would not indorse the
currency at all, any more than
it now indorses the notes or
mortgages of private persons.
Each bank would, therefore, have
to stand on its
own
merits, subject to the scrutiny
of the whole community. CHAPTER
IV. PRACTICABILITY
OF THE SYSTEM. THE
system is plainly practicable, provided
the currency will pass. The
only question, then, is, whether
the currency will pass? Whether
men, if left to do as they
please, will buy and sell it, in
exchange for other commodities,
as they now buy and sell gold
and silver coin, and bank notes,
in exchange for other commodities? To
answer this question, it is
necessary to ascertain what it
is, that makes any hung pass
as a currency. What,
for example, is it, that makes
gold and silver coin pass as a
currency? The
answer is, that five conditions
are necessary to make any thing
pass readily as a currency. First,
that the thing should have
much value, and yet be of small
bulk and weight; secondly, that
it should be divisible into
small, parcels; thirdly, that
the quantity and quality of each
of these parcels should be
accurately measured, and then
reliably marked upon the parcels
themselves; fourthly, that
these parcels should be
convenient for being manipulated,
counted, transported, &c. ;
and, fifthly, that the
currency should have a publicly
known market value. <fn6> These
are the only conditions,
that are necessary to make any
thing pass readily as a
currency. The
paper currency proposed - the
mortgage stock currency- fulfils
all these conditions. First, it
would have much value in small
bulk and weight. Secondly, it
would be conveniently [*28]
divisible into small parcels,
that is, parcels as small as one
dollar. Thirdly, the
quantity and quality of these
parcels would be accurately
measured, and reliably marked
upon the parcels themselves. Fourthly,
the parcels would be
convenient for being
manipulated, counted,
transported, &c. And, Fifthly,
the currency would have a publicly
known market value. Its
market value, in comparison with
other commodities, would certainly
be as well known, as is the
market value of gold and silver
coins, or bank notes. There
is no reason, then, why it
should not pass, as a currency
- at its market value -
whatever that may be. Its
market value may be greater or
less than that of gold and
silver; but this would not
prevent its passing, at its
market value. Indeed the market
value of any thing is only
that value, at which the thing will
sell readily in the
market. So that, to say that a
thing has a market value
- a publicly known market value
- is equivalent to saying that
it will pass as a
currency, provided it be convenient
in all other respects. Secondly. But
would this paper currency be as
much in demand, in the
market, as gold and silver coins
now arc? That is, would it sell
as readily as the
coins now do, in exchange for
other commodities? To
answer this question, we must
ascertain why it is that
the coins are in demand at all,
as currency; why it is that
they have a market value; why
it is that every man will
accept them in exchange for any
thing he has to sell. The
solution of these queries is,
that thee original, primal
source of all the demand for
them, as currency - the
essential reason why they have a
market value, and sell so
readily in exchange for all
other commodities - is because
they are wanted, to be taken
out of circulation, and
converted into plate, jewelry,
and other articles of use. [*29] If
they were not wanted, to be
taken out of circulation, and
wrought into articles of use,
they could not circulate at
all, as a currency. No
one would have any motive to buy
them; and no one would give any
thing of value in exchange for
them. The
reason of this is, that gold and
silver, in the stale of coin,
cannot be used. <fn7>
Consequently, in the state of
coin, they produce nothing
to the owner. A man cannot
afford to keep them, as an
investment, because that
would be equivalent to losing
the use of his capital. He must,
therefore, either exchange them
for something that he can use
- something that will be
productive - yield an income; or
else he must convert them into
plate, jewelry, &c., in
which form he can use them,
and thus get an income from
them. It
is, therefore, only when gold
and silver coins have been
wrought up into plate, jewelry,
&c., that they can be said
to be invested; because
it is only in that form, that
they can be used, be
productive, or yield an income. The
income, which they yield, as
investments - that is, the
income, which they yield, when used
in the form of plate,
jewelry, &c., - is yielded mostly
in the shape of luxurious
pleasure - the pleasure
of gratified fancy, vanity, or
pride. The
amount of this income we
will suppose to be six per
centum per annum, on their whole
value. That is to say, a person,
who is able, and has tastes that
way, will give six dollars a
year for the simple pleasure
of using one hundred dollars
worth of plate, jewelry, &c. This
six dollars worth of pleasure, then,
or six dollars worth of
gratified fancy, vanity, or
pride, is the annual income from
an investment of one
hundred dollars in gold and
silver plate, jewelry, &c. This,
be it noticed, is the only
income, that gold and silver
are capable of yielding; because
plate, jewelry, &c., are the
only forms, in which they
can be used. So long as
they remain [*30] in coin, they
cannot be used, and
therefore cannot yield an
income. It
is, then, only this six per
centum annual income - this
six dollars worth of pleasure -
which gold and silver yield, as
investments, that is really
the cause of all the demand for
them, in the market, and
consequently of their passing as
a currency. This
fact may now be assumed to be
established, viz. that the
origin of all the demand for
gold and silver, as a
currency -the essential
reason why they have a market
value, and sell so readily in
exchange for other commodities -
is because they are wanted, to
he taken out of circulation, and
converted into plate, jewelry,
&c.., in which form only
they arc capable of being used,
or of yielding an income. By
this it is not meant that every
man, who takes a gold or silver
coin, as currency, takes
it because he himself wants
a piece of gold or silver plate,
or jewelry; nor because lie himself
intends or wishes to work it
into plate or jewelry; for such
is not the case, probably, with
one man in a thousand, or
perhaps one man in ten thousand,
of those who take the coin. Each
man takes it, as currency, simply
because he can sell it again.
But he can sell it again solely
because some other man wants it,
or because some other man will
want it, in order to convert it
into articles for use, lie
can sell it, solely because the
goldsmith, the silversmith, the
dentist, &c., will sometime
conic along amid buy it, take
it out of circulation, and
work it up into some article for
consumption - that is,
for use. This
final consumption, or use, then,
is the mainspring that sets the
coins in circulation, and keeps
them in circulation, as a
currency. It
is solely the consumption, or
use, of them, in other
articles than currency, that
creates any demand for them, in
the market, as currency. It
is, then, only the value, which
gold and silver have, as
productive investments, in
articles of use, in plate,
jewelry, &c., that
creates any demand for them, and
enables them to pass, as a
currency. [*31] This
fact, then, being established,
the following proposition is an
inevitable deduction from it,
viz. : that the activity of
the demand for gold and silver
coins, as a currency, depends
wholly upon the activity of the
demand for them, to be taken
out of circulation, and
converted into plate, jewelry,
&c. To
illustrate this point, let us
suppose a community of one
million of people, shut out from
the rest of tire world, having
among them one million dollars
of gold and silver coins, and
having no gold or silver among
them, except in coins. If but one
dollar of these coins were
to be taken out of circulation
each year, and converted into
plate, jewelry, or other
articles of use, the demand for
all the remaining coins, as a
currency, would wholly, or
substantially, cease. And why?
Solely because the stock of
coins on hand, (or the stock of
gold and silver on hand,) would
be equal to a million years’
consumption. The consequence
obviously would be that gold and
silver would have no value in
the market; any more than cotton
or iron would have a value in
the market, if there were a
million years’ stock on hand. But
if, instead of one dollar, an
hundred thousand dollars were
annually taken out of
circulation, and converted into
plate, jewelry, or other
articles of use, (even though
their place were annually
supplied by an equal amount
taken from the mines,) this
demand for the coins, to be
take out of circulation, would
create a corresponding demand
for them, as a currency. And
why? Solely because the stock of
gold and silver on hand, would
be equivalent only to ten
years’ consumption. This would
give them a value, where before
they had none; and enable them
to circulate, as a currency,
where before they could not. Thus
it is evident that the whole
demand for gold and silver, as
a currency, depends upon the
demand for them for consumption,
as plate, jewelry, &c. And
consequently the activity of
the demand for them, as a
currency, depends upon the activity
of the demand for them, for
consumption. In other words,
the activity of the demand for
the coins, as a currency, depends
upon the activity of the demand
for them as investments, in
articles of use. [*32] And
what is true of the coins, would
be true also of the paper
currency proposed. The activity
of the demand for the Circulating
Stock, as currency, would
be just in proportion to the
demand for the mortgages, or
Productive Stock, as
investments. As the coins
would be in demand, as a
currency, solely in proportion
to the demand for them, to be invested
in plate, jewelry, &c.,
so the paper currency would be
in demand, as currency, solely
in proportion to the demand for
it, to be invested in
mortgages, or Productive Stock.
The demand for these two
different kinds of investments,
would govern the demand for
the two different kinds of
currency. Now,
in order to determine whether
the paper currency proposed would
be in as much demand, in the
market, as the gold and silver
coins circulating in competition
with it, we have only to
determine whether the community
at large would wish to make
annually as many investments,
in the mortgages proposed, as
they would in plate, jewelry,
&c. Or, perhaps, rather,
the true question is, whether as
large a proportion of the
whole stock of paper currency,
in the market, would be annually
taken out of circulation, and
invested in the mortgages, as of
the gold and silver coin in
plate, jewelry, &c. If such
would be the case, then one kind
of currency would be just as
much in demand as the other. To
illustrate this point, suppose
that, in this country, one
hundred millions of coin, and
one hundred millions of the proposed
paper currency, were in
circulation, in competition with
each other. And suppose that ten
millions of the coin - that is,
ten per centum of the whole
stock 0f coin - were
annually wanted to be taken out
of circulation, and invested
in plate, jewelry, &c., and
that, ten millions also of the
paper currency - that is, ten
per centum of the whole stock of
paper currency- were annually
wanted, to be taken out of
circulation, and invested
in the mortgages, the market
demand for these two kinds of
currency would be precisely
alike. Or
suppose that one hundred
millions of coin, and five
[*32] hundred millions of
the paper currency, were in
circulation, in competition with
each other; and that ten
millions of the coin (ten
per centum of the whole stock of
coin) were annually wanted, to
be taken out of circulation, and
invested in plate,
jewelry, &c., and that fifty
millions of the paper
currency (ten per centum on the
whole stock of paper currency)
were annually wanted, to be
taken out of circulation, and invested
in mortgages, the demand, in
the market, for each of the two
kinds of currency would still be
precisely equal, in point of
activity. That is to say, one
kind of currency would circulate
just as readily as the other. On
this theory, it is very easy to
settle the question of the
comparative demand for the two
different kinds of currency;
for, although the amount of
paper currency might perhaps be
fifty or an hundred times
greater than the amount of gold
and silver, yet the demand for
the mortgages (Productive Stock)
as investments, would
probably be fifty or an hundred
times greater than the demand
for plate, jewelry, &c., as
investments. The
reason, why there would be this
greater demand for the
mortgages, as investments, is,
that they would yield their
income, in money, or
currency, which could be
appropriated to the supply of
any and all the various
necessaries, wants, comforts,
and pleasures, which money can
buy; while the plate, jewelry,
&c., as investments, yield
their income mostly in the shape
of a luxurious pleasure, which
most persons do not highly
appreciate, and which few
persons can indulge in, to any
considerable extent, without
being compelled to pinch
themselves in the matter of
common necessaries and comforts. Mankind,
therefore, desire to have the
great bulk of their property
invested so as to yield an
income in money; and only a very
small portion of it in such
articles of fancy as plate,
jewelry, &c. Under
these circumstances, it is
probable that if the paper
currency were in circulation in
competition with the coin, in
the proportion of fifty or an
hundred to one, the paper would
be just [*33] as acceptable a
currency as the coin; would be
just as much in demand; would
exchange just as readily for
other commodities; and would
equally well maintain its value
in the market. Thirdly. Would
the mortgages, or Productive
Stock, be so desirable a
form of investment, as to invite
capital into it, and thus create
a demand for the currency, with
a view to having it redeemed by Productive
Stock? The
answer is, that the Productive
Stock would be a desirable
investment, for the various
reasons of security, profit, and
convenience. 1.
As regards security, no kind of
investment would exceed it. 2.
As regards profit, the Productive
Stock would pay two
different dividends - one to Primary
holders, and the other to Secondary
holders. The
dividends to Primary
Stockholders would be made
up of the interest on the
mortgages, and the profits of
the banking. The rate of these
dividends, therefore, will
depend upon the rate of interest
on the mortgages, and the amount
of banking profits. Probably
the best rate of interest for
the mortgages to bear, would be seven
per centum. This would
probably be sufficient to make
the Productive Stock, in
the hands of Primary holders,
worth more than par of
specie, even though there
should be no profits at all from
the banking business. But if
there should be profits from the
banking business, they would go
to swell the dividends. So that
the dividends to Primary Stockholders
would never be less than seven
per cent. so long as the
banking business should simply
pay expenses; and they would
rise above that rate just in
proportion to the banking
profits. There can, therefore,
be no doubt of the desirable
character of the Productive
Stock, as investments, in
the hands of Primary holders.
[*34] In the
hands of Secondary holders,
the Productive Stock would
pay an unvarying rate of
dividend, fixed by the Articles
of Association. The
currency would represent the Productive
Stock, in the hands of Secondary
holders, and not in the
hands of Primary holders;
because the holders of the
currency, by returning it for
redemption, could generally
expect to make themselves only Secondary
holders of the Productive
Stock. They could rarely
expect to become Primary holders;
and, therefore, would not return
the currency for redemption,
with that view. Probably
six per centum would be
the best rate of dividend, to be
fixed for the Secondary Stockholders
to receive; for that is probably
the rate, that would put the
currency most nearly on a par
with specie. If the rate were
fixed at seven per cent.,
the Productive Stock, in
the hands of Secondary holders,
would be worth more than par
of specie; and the
consequence would be, that the
currency would be returned for
redemption, in the hope to get Productive
Stock, rather than specie. And
thus the currency could not be
kept in circulation. On the
other hand, if the rate of
dividend, for the Secondary Stockholders,
were fixed at only five per
cent., that might prove
insufficient to make the
currency worth par of specie.
Therefore six per cent.
is likely to prove a better rate
than either five or seven. Supposing,
then, the rate of dividend, for Secondary
Stockholders to receive,
to be fixed at six per
cent., the investment would be
sufficiently inviting to make
the currency worth par of
specie. It would certainly be
sufficient to attract much
capital, as every day’s
observation attests. As a six
per cent. stock, it would stand
on a par with United States
stocks, and State stocks,
(bearing six per cent.
interest,) which are, at nearly
all times, worth par of specie,
and oftentimes more than par of
specie, in the market. 3.
As regards convenience, the Productive
Stock would be equal to any
in the market; especially in the
hands of Secondary holders.
It being in shares of, say, one
hundred dollars each, [*36] and
its income (in the hands of Secondary
holders) being precisey
fixed, its value is precisely
known. The stock is, therefore,
in as merchantable forum as
capital can be invested in. It
is in as merchantable form as
United States stocks, or State
stocks, (bearing fixed rates of
interest,) whelm arc nearly or
quite as merchantable as bank
bills themselves. The
objections, heretofore
entertained against mortgages,
as an investment, have no
application whatever to stocks
of this kind. Those objections
have been as follows: 1.
The inconvenience of making the
investment, owing to the
necessity of investigating
titles, making valuations,
&c., all of which processes
are attended with delay, and
with some danger of mistakes or
frauds. In these bank stock
mortgages, these delays and
dangers would all be avoided;
because the soundness of the
titles, and the moderation of
the valuations, would be
notorious. It would be a
necessity, on the part of the
banks, to make them. so, as a
condition precedent to the
banks’ getting any circulation
for their currency. 2.
A second objection, to mortgages
heretofore, has been, that each
mortgage was in bulk, and could
not be broken. It was,
therefore, in a great degree, an
unmerchantable article; because
it was not always, nor even
often, an easy timing to find a
person wishing to make all
investment of that particular
amount. This objection, too,
which was really a very serious
one, is entirely obviated in
time case of the Productive
Stock; for here the
mortgages are divided into
shares of $100, or any other
amount that may be desired; and
thus put in as merchantable
form, as any investment can
possibly be in. 3.
A third objection, to mortgages
heretofore, has been, that
neither the interest nor the
principal of the investment
could be realized from them
(unless the debtor should choose
to pay) without a tedious delay;
taking possession of the
premises; looking after rents
and profits; giving the
mortgagor the (perhaps a long
time) for redemption; or
incurring delay, expense, and
trouble in advertising the
premises, and selling them.
In [*37] the case of the Secondary
holders of Productive
Stock, every objection of
this kind is obviated, for
substantially the whole
resources of the bank (which are
morally certain to be ample) are
pledged to the payment of the
dividends promptly. And even as
to the Primary holders,
they are not likely to be
personally troubled in the
matter, for the Trustees attend
to all business matters in
relation to the mortgages. The
only one, of the inconveniences
just mentioned, that the Primary
Stockholders are ever
likely to be subjected to, is a
delay in receiving some portion
of their dividends, if the
mortgagors should not be prompt
in the payment of interest. But
this would so rarely occur as to
prove a very slight objection,
if any, to the investment. The
result, then, obviously would
be, that these stocks would be
of the very first class, as
investments. Their safety, their
profit, and their merchantable
character, would all conspire to
make them preeminently
desirable. And the consequence
would be that the demand for
them would be sufficient to make
the currency constantly in
demand, as a means of obtaining
them. Under
an abundant currency, such as
the system would furnish, and
Under the low rates of interest
that would follow, the Productive
Stock would probably be much
more in demand than stocks,
paying similar dividends, now
are; because now, a very large
amount of loanable capital is
kept invested in promissory
notes, and other personal
securities, on account of their
paying a better interest than
stocks. But under the system
proposed, the banks would be so
numerous, and the rate of
interest at them so low, that
temporary loans would all be
obtained at the banks, rather
than in the street; and the
capital, which is now loaned in
the street, would then, as the
best alternative, seek
investment in bank stocks. [*38] Fourthly. The
next question is, would the
paper currency proposed,
maintain a par value with
specie? This
question has already been
discussed somewhat; but a few
more words need to be said. We
have already seen that the paper
would circulate, at its true
value, whatever that might be. It
is, nevertheless, an important
question, whether its value, in
the market, would be equal to
that of specie? The
answer is, that if the rate of
dividend, paid to Secondary holders
of Productive Stock, should
be six per cent., that would be
sufficient to make the currency,
at most times, if not at
all times, worth par of specie.
If it should not be at all
times, it would be because the
market value of specie would
fluctuate more than that of the
paper; thereby proving that the
paper was the most uniform
standard of value. The
paper currency could never rise above
the value of specie; because
the banks would have the right
to redeem their circulation
with specie, if they should so
please. If,
therefore, there should ever be
a difference between the value
of the paper, and that of
specie, it must be either
because the specie would stand constantly
above the paper, or because
it would occasionally rise
above it. Whether
the value of specie would stand constantly
above that of the paper,
would depend upon the rate of
dividend secured to the Secondary
holders of the Productive
Stock. If this rate should
be six per centum, that would
certainly be sufficient to
make the currency worth as much
as specie, at times; because
there are times, when there is
plenty of specie to be loaned at
that rate. The
only remaining question, then,
is, whether the specie would occasionally
rise in value above the
paper? The answer is, that it
would very rarely, if ever; and
for this reason, viz.: [*39]
that the supply of paper would
always be so abundant and constant,
that it is probable, if not
certain, that none of
those scarcities or
contractions, in the currency,
which alone cause a rise in the
price of specie, would ever
occur. And if they never should
occur, the paper would always
be on a par with specie. If,
however, the specie should ever
stand above the paper, that
would only prove, not that the
paper had fallen, but that the
specie had risen. In other
words, it would prove that the
fluctuation was in the specie,
and not in the paper; and,
consequently, that the paper was
the least variable standard of
value. Under
these circumstances, the paper
would constitute nearly all the
currency in circulation (unless
for sums below one dollar). It
would be the only currency
loaned by the banks. It would be
a legal tender in payment of all
debts due the banks. And it
would be sufficient for all cash
purchases and sales between man
and man. And if an individual
should want specie for any
extraordinary purpose - as, for
exportation, for example - he
would buy the specie as
merchandize, paying the
difference between that and the
paper. Still,
specie would probably, at all
times, be more abundant, as
a currency, in proportion to
the demand, than it is now;
because it would be so much less
needed. The supply would be
greater, in proportion to the
demand, than now, because the
greater supply of paper would
supersede the necessity for, and
the use of specie, as a
currency. If
the proposed paper currency
should be introduced throughout
the world, (as it sooner or
later would be, if found to be
essentially better than any
other system.) the coins would
become superabundant, unless a
greater proportion of them
should be consumed in the arts,
than now. And gold and silver,
whether in coin or not, if they
now stand above their value for
uses in the arts, would fall to
that value, and there
remain, as they ought. [*40] Fifthly. Could
the proposed system be
introduced in competition with
the existing system? Yes,
for various reasons, as follows
: - 1.
The proposed system would meet
with no material opposition
from any quarter, unless from
the stockholders in the existing
banks. Would it from them? No;
because it would probably
subserve the interests of four
fifths, or nine tenths, of them,
better even than the existing
system. Let us see. The
stockholders of the present
banks are made up of two
classes, viz. : those who hold
their stock in order to lend
money, and those who hold it in
order to borrow money. Both
of these classes would probably
be benefitted, rather than
injured, by the adoption of the
new system. Those,
who have money to lend, could
probably do better with it, by
investing it first in a
mortgage, and thus getting one
income from it; and then using
the mortgage as bank capital,
and thus getting another income
from it. Their
capital would thus be more safely
invested than it is now; and
would probably yield a larger
income. Those,
who own bank stock, in order to
borrow more than they lend,
would probably do better than
they do now, because, first, they
would keep their own capital
wholly in their own business;
and, secondly, if they
needed more, would easily borrow
it (if worthy of credit) on
account of the abundance of
banks, that would be seeking
borrowers. Thus they would be as
well supplied with capital as
now, and with less risk and
trouble; because they would
borrow only what they needed
over and above their own
capital; and this they would do
directly, and without complicating
their business, as now, with
that of a bank, by becoming
stockholders, and being
compelled to look after, and
take the risks of, all the
business of the bank. [*41] Another
reason, why the stockholders in
the present banks would be
benefitted by the new system,
is, that very many of these
stockholders are large owners of
real estate. The new system, by
enabling the owners of real
estate to get an income from it,
as banking capital, and still
more by furnishing increased
facilities for agriculture,
manufactures, and commerce,
would greatly increase the value
of real estate in general. This
increased value, given to real
estate, would be of more
importance to the owners
thereof, than any income or
advantage, derived by them from
the present system of banking,
over those to be derived from
the proposed system. The
opposition to the new system,
then, (if any there should be,)
on the part of stockholders in
the present banks, would be an
opposition of prejudice, and not
of interest; for there are few
or no stockholders in the
present banks, who would not
derive greater advantages from
the new system, than from the
present one. 1.
The new currency could be
introduced (brought into circulation)
in competition with the existing
paper currency, for the further
reason, that, if the existing
banks should receive the
currency of the new banks, at
par, the currency of the new
banks would thus be enabled to
circulate, in the community, on
a par with that of the present
banks. On the other hand, if the
present banks should not
receive, at par, the
currency of the new banks, the
new banks and their friends
would systematically, and to the
extent of their ability, run
upon the existing banks for
specie; and thus compel them to
suspend payments in specie. And
when the existing banks should
have suspended payment in
specie, the new banks would
stand better than the present
ones, in the estimation of the
community; because the existing
banks would then offer no
redemption of their bills,
except by receiving them in
payment of debts; whereas the
new banks would not only offer
that redemption, but also a
further redemption in Productive
Stock. If
the new banks, and their
friends, should systematically
run [*42] upon the existing
banks for specie, the existing
banks could not retaliate;
because the new banks could
redeem with Productive Stock,
instead of specie, if they
should so choose. Thus
the new banks, by drawing specie
from the existing banks, could
pay specie, to the public, as
long as the existing banks could
pay it; and thus the new banks
would put themselves on a par
with the existing banks, so far
as paying specie, to the
public, should be concerned.
But the difference between them
would be, that the present banks
would be compelled to pay
specie to the new banks; but the
new banks would not be compelled
to pay specie to the existing
banks. This
advantage, which the new banks
would have over the existing
ones, would enable the new banks
to coerce the existing ones,
either into a suspension of
specie payments, (when the new
ones would stand better than
their rivals,) or else into
receiving the currency of the
new banks at par - in which case
the new banks would stand at
least as well as the existing
ones. 3.
The new banks would have an
advantage over the existing
ones, in introducing their
currency into circulation, by
reason of the fact that,
inasmuch as their capital would
cost them nothing, (they not
being obliged to keep any
considerable amount of specie on
hand,) they would be able to
lend money at a lower rate of
interest. 4.
The currency of the new banks
would go into circulation, for
the further reason, that every
body would prefer it, (the currency,)
on account of its superior
safety, convenience, and
merchantable character, to
the credit of private persons. This
preference would be sufficient
to bring it into use in
substantially all those
purchases and sales, which are
now made on credit. And if the
currency were to go into use only
to that extent, it would be
a success. But if it were to go
into use to that extent, it
would obviously go into use to a
still greater extent, and supersede,
wholly or partially, the
existing currency, even in those
purchases and sales, which are
now made for cash. Doubtless
nine tenths, and perhaps
nineteen twentieths, of all
[*43] the persons, who now get
credit, get it elsewhere than at
the banks; in fact, never go to
a bank for credit. Yet these
persons are worthy of credit, as
is proved by the fact that they
get it of private persons, by
purchasing commodities on
credit. It would be far better
for them to get their credit at
bank, and make their purchases
for cash, for they would then
make them much more
advantageously. All this class
of persons, therefore, could be
relied on to introduce the new
currency. And they would have no
difficulty in introducing it -
that is, in making their
purchases with it - because it
would be preferred to their
private credit, even by those
who now give them credit. 5.
Under the existing system, when
the banks suspend specie
payments, we see that their
bills not only continue to
circulate, but that they
maintain a value, in the market,
very nearly on a par with
specie. Why is this? It is
principally, if not solely,
because the bills of each bank
are a legal tender in payment of
any debts due to that ban/c. Inasmuch
as the public always owe a bank
more (by the amount of interest
on loans) than the bank owes the
public, there is sure to be a
demand for all the outstanding
bills of a bank, to pay the
debts due to the bank - provided
the debts due to the bank be
solvent. It is this fact, that
keeps the bills of the bank so
nearly on a par with specie.
That is, the bills are worth very
nearly dollar for dollar, because
they will pay debts to the
banks, dollar for dollar, which
would otherwise have to be
paid in specie. This
fact, in regard to the
circulation of the bills of
suspended banks, under the
existing system, sufficiently
demonstrates that the paper
currency now proposed, would not
only circulate, but that it
would maintain a value very
nearly, if not quite, on a par
with specie; because it would
not only be a legal tender,
dollar for dollar, for all debts
due to the banks, but would also
be redeemable in Productive
Stock, which would always
maintain, very nearly or quite,
a par value with specie, in the
market. In this latter respect
(of being redeemable by Productive
Stock) the proposed currency
would have a clear, and very
important, [*44] advantage over
the bills of suspended banks,
which now circulate, and
maintain their value nearly on a
par with specie. There is,
therefore, no ground for saying
that the new currency would not
circulate, if it were offered,
when we see that a far
less safe, less redeemable, and
less desirable currency, to wit,
the bills of suspended banks,
under the present system, do not
only circulate, but maintain
their value so nearly on a par
with specie. 6.
It may be supposed, at first
view, that merchants, especially
importers, might reasonably
object to the proposed currency,
on the ground that their
interests require that the
currency of a nation be such as
can be converted into specie,
whenever they (the merchants)
may have occasion to export
specie. Admitting,
for the sake of the argument,
that the merchants might suffer
some inconvenience of this kind,
the effect would only be to make
them more careful to keep the
imports within the exports of
the country. And this benefit to
the country would counterbalance
a thousand fold any
inconvenience to the merchants. The
merchants have no claim that the
whole country shall depend, for
a currency, upon a commodity, or
commodities, like gold and
silver, which the merchants can
at pleasure carry out of the
country, leaving the nation
destitute of a currency. And it
is nothing but suicide for a
people to depend upon such
commodities for a currency. Under
the present system, whenever the
balance of trade is much against
us, the merchants export specie
in such quantities as to cause
sudden and severe contractions
in the currency, a great
reduction in the price of
commodities relatively to
specie, (that is, a great rise
in the price of specie,) general
bankruptcy among persons
in debt, general stagnation in
industry and trade, and immense
distress and ruin on every hand.
This state of things
checks importations for a while,
until the balance of trade turns
in our favor; when the specie
returns, currency expands,
credit revives, industry and
trade become active, and, for a
time, we have what we call
prosperity. But in a few years,
the [*45] merchants again export
the specie, and the same
catastrophe is acted over again.
And such must continue to be our
experience, until our present
vicious system of currency and
credit shall be corrected. This
no one seems to doubt. Certainly
such evils are not to be endured
by a whole nation, from no
motive but to maintain a
currency, which the merchants
can export, whenever they shall
have imported more goods than
the legitimate exports of the
country will pay for. It
is the proper function of
merchants to conform their
business to the interests of the
people, in the matter of
currency, as much as in the
commodities bought and sold with
and for it. And it would be as
legitimate for the merchants,
instead of supplying the people
with such commodities as the
latter desire, to dictate to
them what they may, and may not,
buy, as it is for them (the
merchants) to dictate to the
people what currency the latter
shall use. It
is the legitimate function of
merchants to buy such commodities
as the people have to sell, and
to sell such as the people wish
to buy. So far as merchants do
this, they are a useful class.
And the principle applies as
well to the currency, that is to
be bought and sold, as to any
other commodities. And, as
matter of fact, whatever this
principle requires of merchants,
they readily acquiesce in. They
adapt themselves at once to any
system of currency, that happens
to prevail for the time being.
And certainly no class will more
eagerly welcome any system of
banking, that will furnish them,
at all times, with abundant
credit, and abundant currency,
and cash payments in trade; for
such a system would be a
guaranty, to them, of a safe,
constant, and profitable
traffic, in the place of the
present fitful, chaotic, and
perilous one, in which so many
of their number are being
continually wrecked. So
far as the export of specie is
concerned, probably not one
merchant in a hundred - perhaps
not one in a thousand - has the
least interest in it. A
currency, that will pay their
bank notes, is substantially all
that, as a class, they demand,
or desire. [*46] But,
in truth, the system would
favor, instead of injuring, the
interests even of those few
merchants who occasionally do
export specie; for it would put
at their disposal nearly all the
gold and silver of the country,
for exportation, or any other
purpose. That is to say, the
merchants could export nearly
all the gold and silver, without
affecting our home currency; and
consequently without
disturbing industry and trade.
And this is one of the great
merits of the system. The
presence or absence of specie in
the country would not be known
by its effects upon the general
body of currency. If
the paper currency, now
proposed, were introduced
throughout the world, gold and
silver would enter very little
into the internal commerce of
nations. They would go back and
forth between nations, to settle
balances; and would be found, in
large quantities, in seaports as
merchandize. And merchants would
purchase them for export, as
they would any other
commodities. 7.
The system proposed would
obviously tend to the concentration
of specie, in large quantities,
in the seaports. This would
enable the banks, in the
seaports, to pay specie, if it
should be at all necessary. And
this would enable the banks, in
the seaports, to furnish a
specie paying currency for
the interior of the country, when
the banks themselves, in the
interior, would not pay it. The
advantage of circulation, which
the seaport banks might thus
obtain over the banks of
the interior, would ho great
enough to compensate for any
little trouble it might be for
the former to pay specie. In
fact, this interior circulation
might very probably become so
extensive, as to be a source of
great profit to the seaport
banks. If
the seaport banks should send
their currency, in large
quantities, into the interior,
the banks
of the interior would have
little need to redeem their
currency with specie. It would
be sufficient for them to redeem
it with the seaport currency. 8.
The system is practicable for
the further reason, that it can
be introduced without the aid of
bank charters, or special
legislation of any kind. It
stands wholly on common law
principles; [*47] and
companies
can go into business under it - as
they go into mercantile,
manufacturing, or any other
business -
when
it suits their interest or
pleasure, without asking the
consent of a body of ignorant,
conceited, tyrannical
legislators, who assume to know
what business it is, and what
business it is not, best for men
to engage in; instead of leaving
the wants of mankind to give
direction to their industry and
capital. The
banks, too, when established,
would be free of all special
control, oversight, taxation, or
interference by the government.
As the banks would ask no favors
of the government, in the way of
charters, monopolies, or
otherwise, the government would
have no more excuse for
specially taxing them, or for
sending Commissioners to pry
into, investigate, or report
their affairs, than it now has
for specially taxing the
capital, or for sending Commissioners
to pry into, investigate, or
report the affairs, of
merchants, manufacturers, or any
other class of persons. The
fact, that the existing system
requires special legislation in
favor of the banks, (in the
shape of charters and
monopolies,) and special
legislation against them, (in
the shape of restrictions of
various kinds, the espionage of
Commissioners, &c.,
&c.,) - in short, the fact,
that the banking business cannot
be left subject only to those
general laws, which are
applicable to all other kinds of
business, is sufficient evidence
that the system is a vicious
one, and ought to be abolished.
[*48] CHAPTER
V. LEGALITY
OF THE SYSTEM. ADMITTING,
for
the sake of the argument - what
is not true in fact - that
the State governments have
constitutional power to forbid
private banking, their statutes for
that purpose, being contrary
to natural right, must be
construed to the letter; and the
letter of few, if any, of them
is such as to prohibit the
system here proposed. Thus
Maine prohibits “any drafts,
bills, or promissory notes, or
other evidences of debt.” New
Hampshire prohibits “bills,
notes, checks, drafts, or
obligations.” Massachusetts
prohibits “any note, bill,
order, or check.” Rhode
Island prohibits “any note,
bill, order, or check.” Connecticut
prohibits “any bill of credit,
bond, promissory writing, or
note, bill of exchange, or
order.” New
York prohibits “notes, or
other evidences of debt.” New
Jersey prohibits
“bills,
notes, or other evidences of
debt.” Pennsylvania
prohibits “ally promissory
note, ticket or engagement of
credit in the nature of a bank
note.” Ohio
prohibits “any note, bill, or
other evidence of debt.” Michigan
prohibits “any bills, notes,
due bills, drafts, or other
evidences of debt.” Illinois
prohibits “any note, or
bill.” Wisconsin
prohibits “any bills, or
promissory notes, or other
evidences of debt.” Mississippi
prohibits “notes, bills,
certificates of deposit, or
evidences of debt.” [*49] Georgia
prohibits “any bills, or
promissory notes of private
bankers.” The
currency proposed -
the
Circulating Stock -
comes
within the letter of none of
these prohibitions. It consists
neither of “notes,”
“promissory notes,”
“orders,” “checks,”
“drafts,” “bonds,”
“certificates of deposit,”
“bills of credit,” “bills
of exchange,” “due bills,”
nor “tickets or engagements of
credit in the nature of bank
notes.” Although,
if it should come into
circulation, it may, very
likely, in common parlance, and
from motives of convenience, be
denominated “bills,” yet it
is not “bills,” in any legal
sense,
in
which that word was used at the
times these statutes were
enacted. It
cannot be called “evidences of
debt” - that is, of personal
indebtedness -
in the
sense, in which this description
is evidently used in these statutes. It
is not an “obligation,” in
the sense, in which that word is
legally used. That is to say, it
is not a personal
“obligation,”
in the nature of a debt, as the
term debt is now understood. It
is, in law, simply bona fide certificates
of bona fide stocks; as
really so as are any
certificates of railroad stocks,
or of any other stocks whatever.
It is bona fide certificates
of~ or evidences of title to,
veritable property in land, as
really so, as are deeds,
mortgages, leases, or any other
written instruments for the
conveyance of title to, or
rights in, real estate. As such,
it obviously comes within the
letter of none of the preceding
prohibitions. The holders of the
certificates are the bona
fide owners of the stocks,
or property represented; and in
selling the stocks themselves,
they pass the certificates, or
evidences of title. And this is
the whole matter. in a legal point
of view. The
statutes, however, of some of
the States are in somewhat
different terms from those
already cited. Thus
Vermont prohibits “any bill of
credit, bond, promissory writing
or note, bill of exchange,
order, or other paper.” Whether
this prohibition of “any
other paper,” as a
currency, [*50] can, in law, be
held to prohibit the sale of bona
fide stocks, or property in
land, and passing the
certificates thereof, or the
titles thereto, is, to say the
least, very doubtful. New
Jersey, in addition to the
preceding prohibition of
“bills, notes, or other
evidences of debt,” prohibits
“any ticket of any
denomination whatever, intended
to circulate for the payment of
debts, dues, or demands, in lieu
of; or as a substitute for, bank
notes or bills, or other lawful
currency of the State.” What
may be the legal meaning of a “ticket,”
we will not now undertake to
settle; nor whether this
prohibition interdicts the sale
of bona
fide
stocks,
and the transfer of the paper
titles thereto. Virginia
prohibits “any note, or other
security, purporting that money
or other thing of value is payable
by, or on behalf of, such
person” (the person issuing). This
statute clearly would not
interdict the currency proposed. The
letter of the statutes of
Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee,
Alabama, North Carolina, and of
the constitution of Texas, his, perhaps,
comprehensive enough to
prohibit the proposed currency. In
the statutes of Indiana, Iowa,
Arkansas, Maryland, and
Delaware, I have found nothing,
that seemed to me to prohibit
the proposed currency. If
this currency should evade the
interdict of these statutes
against private banking, it
would also evade the interdict
of the State laws against usury;
for the issue of the currency by
the banks, in exchange for the
promissory notes of individuals,
is, in law, a mere sale of bona
fide stocks, or property, on
credit, like the sale of any
other stocks, or property, on
credit, and at a price agreed
on. And if these stocks should
happen to sell for more than
their nominal value, that would
be a matter of no more legal
importance than for railroad
shares to sell for more than
their par or nominal value. But,
admitting that the language of all
the foregoing prohibitions
are sufficiently
comprehensive to embrace the
currency [*51] proposed, the
statutes themselves, so far as
they should be applied to that
currency, would nearly all of
them be unconstitutional and
void, as being in conflict with
the “natural right to acquire
and dispose of property;” a
right, that is either expressly
or impliedly recognized and
guaranteed by most, or all, of
the State constitutions, and
bills of rights. This “natural
right to acquire and dispose of
property,” includes a right to
buy and sell, as well as to
produce and give away, property.
The issuing of the currency
proposed, and the passing of it,
from hand to band, as a
currency, would, in law, be
merely a buying and selling of
the property it should represent
-
that is to
say, the buying and selling of bona
fide
property
in land -
like
any other property. The only
difference between it and other
property, would be, that it
would be bought and sold more
frequently than other property. But
not only all these State laws
against private banking, but all
State laws against usury, and
all other laws whatsoever, that
assume either to prohibit,
invalidate, or impair any
contract whatsoever, that is naturally
just and obligatory, are
unconstitutional and void, as
being in conflict with that
provision of the constitution
of the United States, which
declares that “no State shall
pass any law impairing the
obligation of contracts.” This
provision does not designate
what contracts have, and what
have not, an “obligation.”
It leaves that point to be ascertained,
as it necessarily must ho, by
the judicial tribunals, in the
case of each contract that comes
before them. But it clearly
implies that there are contracts
that have an
“obligation.” Any State law,
therefore, which declares that
such contracts shall have no
obligation, is plainly in
conflict with this provision of
the constitution of the United
States. This
provision also, by implying that
there are contracts, that have
an “obligation,” implies
that men have a right to enter
into them; for if men had no
right to enter into the
contracts, the contracts
themselves would have no
obligation. This
provision, then, of the
constitution of the United
States, [*52] not only implies
that certain contracts have an
obligation, but it also implies
that the people have the right
to enter into all such
contracts, and have the benefit
of them. And any State law,
conflicting with either of these
implications, is necessarily
unconstitutional and void. Furthermore,
the language of this provision
of the constitution, to wit:
“the obligation [singular] of
contracts” [plural], implies
that there is one and the
same “obligation”
to all “contracts”
whatsoever, that have any legal
obligation at all. And there
obviously must be some one
principle, that gives validity
to all contracts alike, that
have any validity. The
law, then, of this whole
country, as established by the
constitution of the United
States, is, that all contracts,
in which this one principle of
validity or “obligation?’ is
found, shall be held valid; and
that the States shall impose no
restraints upon the people’s
entering into all such
contracts. All,
therefore, which courts have to
do, in order to determine
whether any particular contract,
or class of contracts, are
valid, and whether the people
have a right to enter into them,
is simply to determine whether
the contracts themselves have,
or have not, this one principle
of validity, or obligation,
which the constitution of the
United States declares shall not
be impaired. State
legislation can obviously have
nothing whatever to do with the
solution of this question. It
can neither create, nor destroy,
that “obligation of
contracts,” which the
constitution forbids it to
impair. It can neither give, nor
take away, the right to enter
into any contract whatever, that
has that “obligation.” But
here a formidable difficulty
arises. It is no less a one than
this, viz. : that neither
legislatures, lawyers, nor
courts, know, nor even pretend
to know, what “the obligation
of contracts” is. That is to
say, there is no one
principle, known or
recognized among them, by
reference to which the validity
or invalidity of all contracts
is determined. Consequently it
is not known, in the case of any
single contract whatever, that
is either [*53] enforced or
annulled, in a court of justice,
whether the adjudication has
really been in accordance with
“the obligation” of the
contract, or not. Startling, and
almost terrifying, as this statement
is, in view of the number and
importance of the contracts, in
which men’s rights are
involved, and which courts are
continually annulling or
enforcing, the statement is
nevertheless true. The
question -
what
is “the obligation of
contracts?” has been several
times before the Supreme Court
of the United States; but has
never received any satisfactory
answer. The last time (so far as
I know) that it was brought
before that court, was in 1827,
in the case of Ogden vs.
Saunders (12 Wheaton, 213).
Several among the most eminent
lawyers in the country, to wit:
Webster, Wirt, Wheaton,
Livingston, Ogden, Jones, and
Sampson, were engaged in the
cause. But they all failed to
enlighten the court. The
court consisted, at that time,
of seven judges. Among these seven
judges, four different
opinions prevailed as to what
“the obligation of
contracts” was. Three of the
judges said it was one thing;
two of them said it was another;
one said it was another; and one
said it was another. No one
opinion commanded the assent
even of a majority of the court.
And thus the court virtually
confessed that, as a court, they
did not know what “the
obligation of contracts” was. The
reasonable presumption is, that
no one of these opinions was
correct; for if either had been
correct, it would have been
likely to secure the assent of
the whole court, or at least of
a majority. But,
although the court could not
agree as to what the obligation
of contracts was, four of the
justices did agree in declaring
that the insolvent law of New
York did not impair the
obligation of any contracts,
that were made, in New York,
subsequently to the passage of
the law. To appreciate the
farcical character of this
conclusion, we have only to
consider that, among these four
justices, three different
opinions prevailed as to what
“the obli [*54] gation”
was, which they said the law did
not impair. And from that time
until now, this ridiculous
opinion of these four justices,
who virtually confessed that
they knew nothing of the
question they assumed to decide,
has stood as law throughout the
country, and been received by
legislatures and courts, as
sufficient authority for the
State legislatures to fix,
prescribe, alter, nullify, or
impair, at their discretion, the
obligation of any anti all contracts
entered into subsequently to the
passage of their laws. This fact
is sufficient to show that the
ignorance of the Supreme Court
of the United States, as to the
obligation of contracts, is
abundantly participated in by
the legislatures and courts of
the States. The
writer of this will not attempt,
at this time - although
he may, perhaps, at some future
time -
to define
this constitutional
“obligation of, contracts,”
any further than to say that it
must necessarily be the natural
obligation. That is, it must
be the obligation, which
contracts have, on principles of
natural law, and natural right,
as distinguished from any
arbitrary, partial, or
conditional obligation, which
legislatures may assume to
create, and attach to contracts. This
constitutional prohibition upon
any law impairing the obligation
of contracts, is analogous to
those provisions, in both the
State and National
constitutions, which forbid any
laws infringing “(lie freedom
of speech or the press,”
“the free exercise of
religion,” and “the right to
keep and bear arms.” “The
freedom of speech and the
press,” which is here forbidden
to be infringed, is not any
merely arbitrary freedom, which
legislatures may assume to
create and define by statute.
But it is the natural freedom
or that freedom, to which all
mankind are entitled of natural
right. In other words, it is
such as each and every man can
exercise, without invading the
rights of others, and
consistently with an equal
freedom on the part of others. If
“the freedom,” here
forbidden to be infringed, were
only such freedom as
legislatures might, in their
pleasure or discretion, [*55]
see fit to institute, the
prohibition, instead of
protecting any “freedom
of speech or the press,” would
of itself imply an authority for
the entire destruction of all
such “freedom.” The
same is true of
“the free
exercise of religion,” and
“the right to keep and bear
arms.” All the rights, which,
under these names, are
constitutionally protected,
instead of being the natural
rights, which belong to all
mankind, were only such rights
as legislatures, in their
pleasure or discretion, might
assume to create, and grant to
the people, the prohibitions
themselves would impliedly
authorize legislatures to
destroy those very rights, which
they now are commanded to hold
sacred. So,
too, “the obligation of
contracts,” which the States
are forbidden to impair, is the natural
obligation; that obligation,
which contracts have of natural
right, and in conformity with
natural justice; and not any
merely arbitrary, fantastic,
absurd, or unjust obligation,
which ignorant, corrupt, or
tyrannical legislatures may
assume to create, and attach to
contracts. Otherwise this very
prohibition against “any law
impairing the obligation of
contracts,” would allow
legislatures, in their pleasure
or discretion, to destroy the
obligation of all contracts
whatsoever. That
this constitutional
“obligation of contracts” is
the natural obligation,
is proved by the language of the
provision itself; which, as has
already been said, implies that
“the obligation [singular] of
contracts” [plural] is one
and the same obligation for all
contracts whatsoever, that have
any legal obligation at all. This
obligation, which is the same in
all obligatory contracts, must
necessarily be the natural
obligation, and not any
artificial one prescribed by
legislatures; because it would
obviously be impossible for
legislatures to create any one
obligation, different from the
natural one, and prescribe it
for, or attach it to, all
contracts whatsoever. Certainly
no such thing was ever
attempted, or thought of. This
obligation, which the States are
forbidden to impair, is proved
to be the natural one, by still
another fact, viz.: that it is,
and necessarily must be, the same
in
every State in the [*56] Union;
forasmuch as the prohibition
mentions but one obligation,
which the States are forbidden
to impair; and the prohibition
to impair that one obligation
is imposed alike upon all the
States. If this “obligation”
were an artificial one, to be
created by State legislatures,
it would be liable to be
different in every State, since
the constitution does not
authorize any one State, nor
even Congress, to create any one
artificial obligation, and
prescribe it as a rule for all
the States. This
obligation, which the States are
forbidden to impair, must be the
natural one, for the still
further reason, that otherwise
that large class of contracts -
by
far
the
largest part of all the contracts,
which men enter into, and which
courts recognize as valid, but
in regard to
which
no special “obligation” has
ever been prescribed by
legislation -
would, in
the view of the constitution,
have no validity or obligation
at all. Still
further. Inasmuch as the natural
obligation is necessarily the
only real obligation,
which, in the nature of things,
contracts can possibly have; and
inasmuch as all artificial or
unnatural obligations are
inevitably spurious, false, and
unjust, that paramount rule of
legal interpretation, which
requires that a meaning
favorable to justice, rather
than injustice, shall be given
to the words of all instruments,
that will bear such a meaning,
requires that “the
obligation,” which the
constitution forbids to be impaired,
should be held to
be
the natural and true obligation,
rather than any one of those
innumerable false obligations,
which legislatures are in the
habit of prescribing in its
stead. Finally.
Inasmuch as the artificial
obligations of contracts are
innumerable; and inasmuch as
this constitutional provision
does not
particularly
describe (lie obligation it
designs to protect, that
obligation must be presumed to
be the natural one, or else the
provision itself; on account of
its indefiniteness, must utterly
fail of protecting any
obligation at all. The
natural obligation of a
contract, then, being the only
one, which courts are at liberty
to regard, their first duty, on
this subject, obviously is to
ascertain what the natural obligation
of [*57] contracts is. When they
shall have done this, they will
have discovered an universal law
for all contracts; a law, that
must nullify all those State
laws - absurd,
vexatious, tyrannical, and
unjust -
with which
the statute books of the States
are filled, having for their
objects to destroy or impair
men’s natural right of making
obligatory contracts, and to
prescribe what obligations,
different from the natural and
true one, men’s contracts
shall have. Strictly
speaking, courts have no
rightful authority either to
enforce or annul a single
contract, of any name or nature
whatever, until they shall
have ascertained what
this
constitutional, or natural, obligation
of contracts is. But, if they
will continue to do so, it is
manifestly sheer mendacity, or
sheer stupidity, for them to
declare that the contracts of
private bankers, and contracts
now termed usurious -
contracts
naturally obligatory as
any that men ever enter into, or
as any that courts ever enforce -
have
no obligation; or that, anybody
can be lawfully punished for
entering into such contracts. Furthermore,
if the natural obligation
of contracts is the only
obligation, which courts are at
liberty to regard, they are
bound to disregard all those
State laws, or acts of
incorporation, of any and every
kind, whether for banking
purposes or any other, which
attempt to limit the liability
of stockholders to any thing
less than the natural obligation
of their contracts. In
short, the only constitutional
power, now existing in this
country, to prohibit any
contract whatever, that is
naturally obligatory, or to
impair the natural obligation of
any contract whatever, is the
single power given to Congress
“to establish uniform laws on
the subject of bankruptcies,
throughout the United States.”
<fn8>
[*58] There
is, therefore, no legal obstacle
in the way of the immediate
adoption of the banking system
now proposed; nor any occasion
to consult the State
legislatures, or ask their
permission, in the matter. Nor,
in loaning the currency, will
there be any occasion to pay any
regard to usury laws. NOTES 1.
With
a single exception, (provided
for in Article XXVII, of the
Articles of Association,) not
affecting the general rule.
Return 2.
See Article XIX, of the Articles
of Association.
Return 3.
Even if the rate of dividend,
fixed for the Secondary
Stockholders to receive,
were such as to make their Stock
worth more than par of specie,
that would not be likely to make
the bills worth more than
par of specie; because a person,
by returning his bills for
redemption, would not be sure of
getting PRODUCTIVE STOCK for
them. He might be paid
in specie, instead of PRODUCTIVE
STOCK. 4.
The New York bank would not
redeem them by paying specie for
them, but by receiving them in
payment of debts, and by giving
its own bills in exchange. Return 5.
The author does not concede the
constitutional power of the
State governments to prohibit
any kind of banking, that is naturally
just and lawful. And he
fully believes all existing
restraints upon private banking
to be unconstitutional. But, be
they so, or not, it seems plain
enough that government has
constitutionally no more power
to forbid men’s selling an invested
dollar, than it has to
forbid the selling of a specie
dollar. It ins
constitutionally no more power
to forbid the Sale of it
single dollar, invested in a
farm, than it has to forbid the
sale of the whole farm. 6.
Diamonds would not answer well
as a currency, because, although
they have a market value, that
value is known only to a few. Return 7.
The sale of them, as a
currency, is not a use
of them; any more than the sale
of a horse is a use of the
horse.
Return 8.
Independently of the injustice
of all laws impairing the
natural “obligation of
contracts,” there was a very
weighty reason why the States
should have no power to
enact bankrupt laws. If they had
this power, each State might
have the motive to pass such a
law for the purpose of
liberating her own citizens from
their obligations to the
citizens of other States; when,
if the law were to operate only
as between her own citizens, she
aught not choose to pass the
law. This power of passing
bankrupt laws was, therefore,
confided solely to the general
government; and its laws were
required to be “uniform
throughout the United States.” |