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OUR
FINANCIERS: THEIR
IGNORANCE, USURPATIONS, ______ BY
LYSANDER SPOONER. __________ REPRINTED
FROM “THE RADICAL REVIEW.” BOSTON:
[*3] OUR
FINANCIERS: AND THEIR IGNORANCE,
THE
great battle in Ohio for more
money, - by which is here meant
the political canvass for the
year 1875, - in which the whole
country participated, is still
worthy of notice, not only
because there is doubtless a
widespread determination to
fight it over again, but also
because it affords a ludicrous,
but much needed, illustration,
as well as an irrefutable proof,
of the prevailing ignorance on
the subject of money.
That that
violent, but ridiculous, contest
may serve as a caution to the
people against being drawn into
the same, or any similar one, in
future, is one purpose of this
article. Its other purposes are
to expose the usurpations and
frauds by which the people are
deprived of money, and to
vindicate, as far as its limits
will permit, the right of the
people, by the use of their own
property and credit, to supply
themselves with such money as
they can, and as much of it as
they please, free of all
dictation or interference from
the government.
The
question at issue in Ohio, in
1875, was the 3.65 interconvertible
bond scheme; a scheme, of the
practical operation of which the
writers and speakers, on neither
side, seemed to have the least
real knowledge whatever. It
would have had neither the good
effects which its friends
expected, nor the bad effects
which its enemies predicted.
That is to say, it would neither
have provided “a currency
equal to the wants of trade,”
as claimed by
its
friends, nor would it have
flooded the country with a
depreciated currency, as
predicted by its opposers. As a
system for furnishing a permanent
currency, either good or
bad, it would have fallen
utterly dead. Worse than that,
instead of furnishing a
permanent currency in place of
that we now have, [*4] it would
have deprived us of the one we
now have, without fur. fishing
any substitute at all.
That such
would have been its effect is
evident from these
considerations, namely:
-
It is a
settled principle that a paper
currency depends, for its true
and natural market value, wholly
upon the redemption that is
provided for it. It has, and it
can have, no more true or
natural market value than the
property with which it is to be
redeemed. A paper currency,
therefore, that has no other redemption
than that of being convertible
into interest-bearing bonds, can
be worth no more in the market
than are the bonds themselves,
and, consequently, no more than
it is worth for conversion
into the bonds. And it is
worth nothing for conversion
into bonds, unless there are
some one or more persons who
wish thus to convert it. In
other words, it is this demand
for the bonds, as
investments, that alone
gives the currency any
value in the market. A
convertible note of this kind,
therefore, circulates as money
only because some one or more
persons want
it
for conversion. And it
circulates only until it falls
into the hands of such a person.
When it falls into his
hands, he converts it, and
thus takes it out of
circulation.
The
destiny, therefore, of all such
convertible paper, that is in
circulation as money, is finally
to be converted into bonds, and
I/ins taken out of circulation. And
there is then an end of it, so
far as its being currency is
concerned.
We saw the
operation of this principle so
long as the greenbacks were
convertible into bonds. The
conversion went on so rapidly
that we should soon have had no
greenbacks at all in circulation,
had not the conversion of them
into bonds been stopped by law.
And our greenbacks now remain in
circulation only because they
are not convertible into
bonds.
For the
reasons now given, if our whole
national debt were today in
circulation as currency, having
no other redemption than that of
being convertible into 3.65 bonds,
it would be worth for circulation
no more than it would be worth
for such conversion; and, as a
natural consequence, it would
rapidly, though not instantly,
be converted, and thus taken
out of circulation; and we
should then have entirely lost
it as a currency. And, as
the scheme [*5] proposes to
prohibit all other currency, we
should then be left with no
currency at all.
The 3.65
bond scheme, therefore, instead
of being a scheme for providing
the country with a currency, is
perfectly suicidal, so far as
furnishing a currency is
concerned. It is simply a scheme
for providing a paper currency
for circulation by withdrawing
all sue/i currency from
circulation! It is absurdity
run mad. II.
But the advocates of the scheme
will say that it provides that
these bonds may be
reconverted into currency. Yes,
it does indeed provide that they
may, but not that they must,
be thus reconverted. And
it offers no inducements
whatever for such reconversion;
because, if reconverted, the
currency will then be worth no
more in the market than the
bonds are worth as investments;
Since all that will give the
currency any value at all in the
market will then, as before, be
the simple fact that it (the
currency) is convertible back
into the same bonds from which
it has just been reconverted
The bonds are to be holden by
men who preferred the bonds to
the currency, when both had
the same value in the market. And
now the scheme contemplates that
the country will go without any
currency at all, until these
same bondholders shall change
their minds, and prefer the
currency to the bonds, when
boils have still the same value
in the market! Who can tell
when the bondholders will do
that? The bonds are their
estates, their investments, on
which they rely for their daily
bread. They arc the estates
which they have preferred to all
others, as a means of living. To
presume that they will reconvert
them into currency is just as
absurd as it would be to presume
that a man who has just bought a
farm, and relies upon it for his
living; will sell it for money
that will enable him to do
nothing else so good for himself
as to buy back the same farm
that he parts with. III.
But General Butler, who, I
believe, claims to have been the
author of
this scheme, says that, “in
case of a scarcity of money,” [*6]
“a demand for money by a
high rate of interest will
call forth these bonds.” <fn1>
He means by
this that, in times of
“scarcity of money,” “a
high rate of interest”- that
is, a higher rate than the bonds
themselves bear-will induce a
holder of these bonds to reconvert
them into legal tender notes, in
order to lend them!
This is
certainly furnishing “more
money” with a vengeance. The
real value of the notes
corresponds precisely to the
value of a 3.65 interest-bearing
bond, and General Butler would
allow the people to have no
money at all, except in some
rare emergency, when the
“scarcity” is so great as to
induce them to give a higher
rate of interest than the money
is really worth, - enough higher
to induce the bondholder to
surrender his investments, and
‘become a money lender
instead.
This is
equivalent to saying that nobody
shall be permitted to borrow
money, except in those
emergencies when he will submit
to be fleeced for the sake of
getting it!
And to make
it impossible for any body to
borrow money, except at this
extortionate rate, he would “prohibit
by the severest penalties
every other person, corporation,
or institution from issuing any
thing that might appear in the
semblance of money!”
And this proposition comes from
a man who proposes to furnish
the people with “more
money,” and thus save them
from the extortions of the
present money dealers!
However
such an extortion might
occasionally relieve an individual,
who was so sorely pressed as to
consent to be fleeced, it would
do nothing towards supplying the
people at large with money;
because the money thus issued to
an individual would not continue
in circulation, unless it should
constantly pass from hand to
hand at a price beyond its
true value; that is, at a
price beyond its value for
conversion. The result would be
that the people could have no
money at all, except upon the
condition of their constantly
giving more for the money than
it was worth! [*7] IV.
Another
device of General Butler, by
which he appears to think he
could keep at least some of the
currency in circulation, is
this: He would make it “the
legal tender of the United
States for all debts due to or
by the government or
individuals.”
But this
would add nothing at all to its
real value ; and it would have
no appreciable, or certainly no
important, effect in preventing
the conversion of the currency
into bonds; or, what is the same
thing, in preventing a
withdrawal of the currency from
circulation; for the currency
would still have no more real or
true value for circulation than
it would for conversion.
General
Butler’s plan, therefore,
amounts practically to this:
He would allow the people no
money at all, except on rare
occasions, when, as he thinks,
the “scarcity” would be so
severe as to induce them to pay
an extortionate price for it!
But, under
such a system, there would
really be no such thing as a rare
and occasional “scarcity
;” there
would be nothing but constant,
perpetual, and utter
destitution. At
least such would be the case, so
soon as all the notes should
have been converted into bonds.
The idea of
allowing the people no money at
all, except occasionally in
times of “scarcity,”
corresponds to one that should
forbid the people to have any
food at all, except occasionally
in times of famine. Under such a
system, it is plain there would
never be a rare or occasional
famine; but there would be, instead
of it, a constant and perpetual
one. So, under Butler’s
scheme, there would never be any
rare or occasional “scarcity
of money ;”
but
there would be a constant and
perpetual destitution of it.
Yet lie
calls it a scheme for providing
the people with more money! In
reality, it is merely a scheme
for depriving them of money
altogether. V.
Such being
the real character of this 3.65
scheme, we are enabled to see
the true character of the late
battle in Ohio for and against
it. And it is important to
consider that, although the [*8]
battle
was nominally fought in Ohio,
the whole country took part in
it. The whole country took part
in it, because it was considered
that the result in Ohio would
very likely decide the result in
the whole country.
Thus we had the ludicrous and
humiliating spectacle of forty
millions of people fighting a
fierce and bitter contest for
and against a scheme, of the
real nature of which neither
party knew any thing! One
party thought it was a scheme
for furnishing the
money really needed for industry
and trade. The other party
thought it was a scheme for
overwhelming the country with a
depreciated currency. In
reality, it was a scheme to deprive
the country of money altogether!
If any body had any thing to fear
from this system, it was the
very party that advocated it;
for they wanted more money and not
less. And if any body had any
thing to hope from the
system, it was the party that
opposed it; for they wanted less
money and not more.
Here, then, were two opposing
armies, each fighting with all
fury against itself, under the
belief that it was fighting its antagonist! VI.
The question now arises: If
all
the statesmen (so-called), all
the financiers and bankers, all
the editors, all the violent
writers and speakers, who took
part in this contest, know no
more about finance than to take
such parts as they did either
for or against this
ridiculous and absurd scheme, how
much do they know about the
system which the industry and
prosperity of the country really
require?
And if we shall conclude that
they do not know any thing,
perhaps we may conclude that
they should not quite so arrogantly
assume to dictate to us what, or
how much, money we shall, or
shall not, have; nor,
consequently, to decide (as it
is their purpose to do) what, or
how much, money all other property
shall be sold for.
Perhaps we may even conclude
that men who have demonstrated
their ignorance beyond all cavil
or controversy, as they have,
and who, by their ignorance, or
something worse, have brought
upon forty millions of people
such ruin and misery as [*9] they
have, ought to be exceedingly
modest for the rest of their lives,
especially on the subject of
money.
Perhaps we may conclude that to paralyze
the industry of the country for
four, five, or
six years together, at a loss of
three, four, or
five thousand millions of
dollars per annum, -say, twenty
thousand millions in all,- under
pretence that it is necessary in
order
to raise, by five, ten, or
fifteen per cent., the market
value of
eight hundred millions, - that
is, to raise their value, say,
one hundred
millions in all, - perhaps, I
say, we may conclude that to
thus impoverish a people to the
extent of twenty thousand
millions, under pretence of
saving or giving to somebody one
hundred millions, is neither
good financiering, good morals,
nor good
government; and that it
indicates that there is
something a great deal worse
than sheer ignorance at work in
the plans of the
government.
Perhaps we may conclude that a
dollar, in order to be a standard of
value, must have something like
a fixed value itself, which it
will maintain against all
competition; that, if it
has any thing
like such a fixed value, then
ten, a hundred, a thousand, or a
million of dollars must
necessarily have ten, a hundred,
a thousand, or a million
times more value than one dollar
has; and to say that, by the
prohibition of all other money,
one dollar can be made to have
as much “purchasing power”
as ten, a hundred, a thousand,
or a million dollars, is only to
say that, by the prohibition of
all other money, the holder of
the one dollar will be
enabled to extort, in exchange
for it, ten, a hundred,
a thousand, or a
million times more of other
men’s property than the money
is worth.
Perhaps we may conclude that the
holders of the present stock of
money, whose cardinal financial
principle is that, by the
prohibition of
all other money, any small
amount becomes invested
with a “purchasing power”
indefinitely greater than its
true and natural market value,
and who openly avow that that is
their reason for insisting that
all money shall be suppressed,
except that small amount which
they themselves hold, thereby
virtually proclaim their purpose
to be to so use their money as
to extort, in
exchange
for it, an indefinite amount
more of other men’s property
than the money is worth. And
perhaps
we may
conclude that a government
which, on this [*10] ground, as
avowed by its
most
conspicuous members and partisans,
maintains a hard monopoly of
money, thereby virtually
acknowledges itself to be a mere
instrument in the hands of these
extortioners, for accomplishing
the purposes they have in view.
Perhaps we may conclude that it
is indispensable to all honest
and equitable traffic that the
money that is paid for any other
property should have the same
amount of true and natural market
value as the property that is
given in exchange for it; and
that the moment this principle
is acknowledged, all
justification for the
interference of the government
ceases; since it is the sole
right of the parties to
contracts to decide for
themselves, in each case, what
money, and what amount of money,
is, and
is not, a bonafide
equivalent
for the property that is to be
given in exchange for it.
Perhaps, also, we may conclude
that the notes of private
persons or private companies,
who have property with which to
pay their notes, and who can be
sued and compelled to pay them,
with interest and costs from the
time of demand, are quite as
likely to give us a
specie-paying currency, and are
quite as deserving of the name
of “honest money,” as are
the notes of a government that
has no property to pay with;
that cannot be sued or compelled
to pay; and that has no intention
of paying, unless,
or until, it can do so without
relaxing the monopoly it is
determined to maintain.
Perhaps we may conclude that a
government, which, for ten years
together, prohibits, by a ten
per cent. tax, all specie-paying
notes, and at the same time, by
the grossest usurpation, makes
its own irredeemable,
depreciated, non-specie-paying
notes a legal tender in payment
of all private debts, cannot
reasonably be credited
(however loud may be its
professions) with any burning
desire either for “specie
payments,” or for “honest
money.”
Perhaps we may conclude that any
privileged money whatever,
whether issued by a government
or by individuals, is
necessarily a dishonest
money;
just as a privileged man is
necessarily a dishonest
man; and just as any other
privileged thing is necessarily
a dishonest thing. For this
reason we may perhaps conclude
that a government that
constantly cries out for
“honest money,”
when it all the while means and
maintains, and insists [*11]
upon maintaining, a privileged
money, acts the part only of a blockhead or a cheat.
Perhaps we
may conclude that, when the
fraudulent pretences by which
the monopoly of money has been
thus far maintained, and the
fraudulent purposes for which it
has been maintained, have been
so fully demonstrated that they
can no longer be concealed or
denied, and after the effects of
the monopoly have been to
impoverish the country to an
amount at least twenty times
greater than the whole amount of
the privileged money, - perhaps
we may conclude that, after all
these results, the responsibility
of the authors of the monopoly
is not to be evaded, nor their
motives justified, by any such
mock freedom in banking as is
offered to us, provided we will
use only government bonds as
banking capital, and come under
all such regulations and conditions
as the government may prescribe,
and thus give up all right to
bank upon any portion of the
thirty thousand millions of
other property which we have (or
once had, and may have again);
at least twenty thousand
millions of which are better
banking capital
than any
government bonds can be; and
which we have a perfect right to
use as
banking capital, without asking
any permission
of the government, or coming
under any of its regulations
or conditions.
Perhaps we may conclude that
this attempt of the government
to delude us into the idea that
we can have perfect freedom in
banking, while deprived of our
right to use the twenty or
thirty thousand millions of
banking capital we already have,
and while restricted to the
contemptible amount of capital
we can have, or can afford to
have, under the system proposed by
the government,
is very much like a proposal to
establish, perfect freedom in
farming by requiring men to give
up all the farms they now have,
and buy some of the government
lands in Oregon or Alaska, and
there come under all such
regulations and conditions as
the government may prescribe.
Perhaps we may conclude that the
establishment of a monopoly of
money is equivalent to the
establishment of monopolies in
all the businesses that are
carried on by means of money, -
to wit, all businesses that are
carried on at all in civilized
society; and that to establish
such monopolies as these is
equivalent to condemning all
persons, except those holding
the [*12] monopolies, to the
condition of tributaries,
dependents, servants, paupers,
beggars, or slaves. Perhaps we
may conclude that the establishment
of a monopoly of money is also
equivalent to a prohibition upon
all businesses, except such as
the monopolists of money may
choose to license. And perhaps
we may conclude that, if
government were to prohibit
directly all businesses, except
such as it should choose to
license, and, by direct grants,
were to make all these licensed
businesses subjects of monopoly,
its acts, in so doing, would be
no more flagrant tyrannies, and
no more flagrant violations of
men’s natural rights, than are
its acts in establishing the
single monopoly of money.
Perhaps, after we shall have
been insulted and impoverished
by a few more such cheats as the
“specie payment” cheat, the
“honest money” cheat, the
“free banking” cheat, and
all the other cheats to which
the government has resorted, for
the one sole purpose of
maintaining that monopoly of
money on which the last
administration relied for its
support, and which the present
administration is evidently
determined to maintain, we may
conclude that it is time for the
people to take the matter of
money into their own hands, and
assert their right to provide
their own money, in their own
way, free of all dictation or
interference from the
government.
Perhaps we may conclude that the
right to live, and to provide
ourselves with food,, clothing,
shelter, and all the other
necessaries and comforts of
life, necessarily includes the
right to provide ourselves with
money; inasmuch as, in civilized
life, money is the immediate and
indispensable instrumentality
for procuring all these things.
Hence we may perhaps conclude
that a people who surrender
their natural right to provide
themselves with money,
practically surrender their
right to provide for their own
subsistence; and that a
government that demands such a
stir-render, or attempts to take
from them that right, and give
it as a monopoly to a few, is as
necessarily and as plainly the
mere instrument of that few, as
it would be if it were to
require the people to surrender
their right to follow their
occupations as farmers,
mechanics, and merchants, and
give all these occupations as
monopolies into the hands of the
same few to whom it now
gives the
monopoly of money. [*13]
Perhaps we may conclude that we
want no special laws whatever,
either of license, prohibition,
or regulation, on the subject of
banking; that bankers, like
other men, should be free to
make their own contracts, and
then, like other men, be
compelled to fulfil them; and
that their private property,
like the private property of all
other men, should be holden to
pay their debts.
Perhaps we
may conclude that it is the
natural right, of every man,
who has a dollar’s worth of
property that can be taken by
legal process and applied to the
payment of a promissory note, to
offer his note for that amount
in the market; and that it is
the natural right of every body
that pleases, to accept that
note in
exchange for other property; and
that it is also a natural right
of every subsequent holder of
that note to offer it again in
the market, and exchange it for
other property with whomsoever
may choose to accept it.
And since, in this way, it is
not only theoretically possible,
but absolutely
practicable, that, to say the
least, a very large amount of
the material property of the
country should be represented by
promissory notes, and thus made
to aid in furnishing a solvent and
legitimate currency; and since
nobody can be required to accept such
a currency
unless he pleases; and since
nobody who
chooses to accept it can either
say that he is wronged, or be
said to wrong any body else, by
accepting it, - perhaps we may
conclude that such a currency as
this-if the people, or any
portion of them, prefer it to
any other that is offered
them-can not rightfully be
prohibited.
Perhaps we may conclude that no
considerable accumulations of
coin are necessary to maintain
specie payments; that, where
banking is free, and the private
property of the bankers is
holden for the debts of the
banks, the business of banking
naturally and necessarily falls
into the hands of men of known
wealth, whose notes challenge
the scrutiny, and command the
confidence, of the whole
community;
that, as these men, if
permitted to do it, are
always ready to supply the
market with the greatest amount
of notes that can be kept in
circulation, the public have no
temptation to accept any
doubtful notes, and doubtful
notes can consequently get no circulation;
that, when the public arc thus
satisfied of the solvency of the
notes they hold, they prefer
them to coin, and the bankers
rarely have any occasion to
redeem them other- [*14] wise
than by receiving them in
payment of the notes they discount;
that, as all the bank notes
issued are wanted to pay the
notes discounted, and are, at
short intervals after their
issue,- say in two, three, or
four months, on an
average,-returned to the banks
in payment of notes discounted,
the bankers, as a general rule,
have no need to provide for any
other redemption; and that,
consequently, coin, unless in
very small amounts, is merely
dead capital, for which the
bankers have no use whatever.
And, if the
practicability or utility of
this system should be doubted,
perhaps we may refer the
doubters to the example of
Scotland, where, for eighty
years, - from 1765 to 1845,-all
the banks of Scotland, with two
or three exceptions, stood upon
the principle of the individual
liability of their stockholders;
enjoying perfect freedom in the
issue of their notes, subject
only to these restrictions,
namely, that they should issue
no notes below one pound, and
none except those made payable
on demand. <fn2>
The result was that Scotland had
the best system of banks, or at
least the best association of
banks, for solvency, stability,
and utility, that was ever known
in Europe. <fn3>
During all that period of eighty
years, while the banks of
England were failing by the
hundreds, and many of them
proving utterly rotten, and
while all that did not prove
rotten repeatedly suspended
specie payments,-at one time
for more than twenty years, - the
banks
of Scotland never suspended
specie payments, and their notes
were always equal to coin. And,
by introducing manufactures,
they raised Scotland, within
that period, from a miserable
poverty-stricken condition (the
effect of her cold climate and
barren soil) to a condition of
prosperity and wealth second to
that of no other people in
Europe. These facts, and others
that cannot here be enumerated
at length, demonstrate that,
where banks rest upon the
individual liability of
stockholders, or upon any
other basis that gives to the
public an absolute guarantee of
the solvency of the banks, banking may
be made perfectly free, and the
amount of currency as great as
can be kept in circulation, and
yet
that it will always be equal to
coin. And
they prove also that all the
[*15] arguments that are now
used to justify restraints upon
banking, and limitations upon
the amount of currency, in order
to maintain specie payments,
proceed wholly’ from gross
ignorance or fraud. <fn4>
Perhaps we
may conclude that money is
simply property that is cut up,
or divided, into such pieces or
parcels as are convenient and
acceptable to be given and
received in exchange for other
property; and that any man who
has any property whatever that
can be cut up, or divided, into
such pieces or parcels, has a
perfect legal and moral right
thus to cut it up, and then
freely offer it in the market,
in competition with all other
money, and in exchange for any
other commodity, that may there
be offered in competition
with, or in exchange for, it.
Perhaps we may conclude that the
simple fact of these pieces or
parcels being called money, or
not called money, - of their
bearing the stamp or license of
the government, or not bearing
it, - has nothing to do with his
right to offer them in the
market, or to sell them,
or lend
them, or exchange them, on such
terms as the parties to the
contracts may mutually agree
upon; that the simple facts
that they are property,
-property that is naturally vendible,-and
that they are his property,
entitle him to sell them, or
lend them, to whomsoever may
wish to buy, or to borrow, them;
and to do all this on such terms
as the parties, free of all
interference from the
government, may agree upon. And
perhaps we
may
conclude that these pieces or
parcels may as right. fully be
bought, sold, and exchanged (if
the parties so agree) by means
of contracts on paper-notes,
checks, drafts, bills of exchange,
or whatever else-promising to
deliver them on demand, or at
times agreed on, as by actual
delivery of the parcels themselves,
at the time of the contract.
Perhaps we
may conclude that, instead of
Congress having the right, in
General Butler’s phrase, to
“prohibit, by the severest
penalties, every other person,
corporation, or institution
[than the government itself, or
those whom it licenses] from
issuing any [*16] thing that
might appear in the semblance of
money,” it has no such right
whatever, nor any semblance of
such a right; that it has no
color of right in the matter,
beyond the simple “power to
provide for the punishment of
counterfeiting the securities
and current coin of the United
States;” that, so far from
their having any such right, it
is one of the first and most
sacred of all the duties of any
and every government (that has any
duties at
all) to protect every man in his
natural right to offer in the
market every vendible or
loanable commodity he has to
sell, or to lend; and to sell
it, or lend it, to any and every
man who wishes to buy it, or
borrow it; and that it is the
duty of the government to
protect him in his liberty to do
this by any and every possible
form of contract - whether
check, note, draft, bill of
exchange, or whatever else -
that is
naturally and intrinsically just
and obligatory.
Perhaps we
may conclude that it is as much
the duty of government to
protect each and every man, who
has any thing deserving the name
of money, or that men may choose
to call money,
in his right
to sell or lend it to any and
every other man who may choose to accept it
as money, as it is to protect
him in his right to sell or lend
any other property whatever,
which he may wish to sell or
lend, and which other men may
wish to buy or borrow.
Perhaps we
may conclude that the simple
fact that men may, or may not,
choose to call any particular
commodity money, makes
no difference whatever in the
nature, character, quality, or
value of the commodity itself;
and therefore cannot affect the right
of men to buy, or sell, or lend,
or borrow it; or to
give it in
exchange for any other property,
on such terms as the parties
(without fraud) may mutually
agree upon.
Perhaps
we may
conclude that all men, who
are
presumed competent to make
reasonable and obligatory
contracts, must also be
presumed to be just as competent
to judge of
the value of
any money that may be offered
them, as the men who offer it are
to judge of the value of the
commodities they are to receive in
exchange for it.
Perhaps,
in short, we may conclude that
it is one of the natural
rights of men to sell their
property for such money, and as
[*17] much of it, as is offered
to them for it, and as they
choose to accept.
Perhaps we may also conclude
that the idea of providing the people with
money by prohibiting all money
except such as the government
itself may specially provide or
license, is just as absurd,
preposterous, and tyrannical as
would be the idea of providing
the people with food, clothing,
or shelter, by prohibiting all
food, clothing, or shelter,
except such as the government
itself may specially provide or
license.
Perhaps we
may conclude that, as it
is with all other commodities,
so it is
with money, namely, that free
competition in producing
it and offering it
in the market is the sure, and
only sure, way of
guaranteeing to us the greatest
supply, the best article, and on
the
best terms;
that, inasmuch as banking is but
a very recent invention,
- but one on which all industry
and all other inventions
depend mainly for their
efficiency, - it is just as
absurd to suppose
that we
have already attained perfection
in it, as it would be to suppose
we had attained perfection in
any or all the other arts by
which industry is carried on ;
that it is, therefore, just as
absurd and suicidal to prohibit,
all new experiments and
inventions in banking, as it
would be to prohibit all new
experiments and inventions in
agriculture, mechanics, or any
of the other arts of life; and
that, to be consistent, those
who would prohibit all new
experiments and inventions in
banking ought also to insist
that the patent office be
closed, and that all new
experiments and inventions in
any and every
art and science whatsoever be prohibited.
Perhaps
we may
conclude that, however much
money, or however many kinds of
money, may be offered in the
market, there is no danger that
the holders will give any more
of it in ex. change for other
men’s property or labor, than
such property or labor is worth;
and that, therefore, there is no
danger that the prices of either
property or labor will ever be
too high; or, what is the same
thing, that property or labor
will ever bring any more money
than it is worth.
Perhaps
we may
conclude that it is time that
those men who claim that gold
and silver coins, by the
monopoly now given to them as
money, arc kept at a price far
above their true and [*18]
natural value as metals, and who
claim that they should still be
kept at that price by
restrictions upon all other
money, were taught that all
honest and equitable commerce
requires that each and every
commodity that may be sold at
all - whether it be called
money, or by any other
name-should be sold only at the
price it will bear in free and
open market, and subject to the
free. competition of every other
commodity that may there be
offered in competition with, or
in exchange for, it; that the
free and open market is as much
the true and only test of the
true and natural market value of
every thing that can be called
money, as it is of the true and
natural market value of every
thing that is exchanged for
money.
Perhaps we may conclude that,
since industry is an animal, so
to speak, that feeds and lives
on money; since its strength,
activity, and growth depend
mainly upon the amount of money
that is furnished to it; since
we as yet know of no limits to
its increase in power, except
the limits set by the money that
is supplied to it - since, when
it is fully supplied with money,
it will create two, five, ten,.
a hundred, often thousands,
sometimes millions, and even
hundreds and thousands of
millions, of dollars of wealth,
for every dollar that it
consumes, <fn5>
but, when stinted or deprived of
money, necessarily languishes or
dies; and since, when it
languishes or dies, mankind
languish or die with it, -
perhaps, in view of these facts,
we may conclude that to stint or
deprive it of money is not
merely bad economy, but fatuity
and suicide. <fn6>
And, finally, perhaps we may
conclude that a government that
sacrifices a million of lives to
maintain its power, and then
uses that power to trample in
the dust all the natural rights
of the survivors, and to cheat,
plunder, and starve them, for
the mere profit of the holders
of eight hundred millions of
money, is not a government that
should be tolerated for any
great length of time. LYSANDER
SPOONER.
NOTES 1.
See his speech in New York,
October 14, 1875, reported in the
New York “Daily Graphic” of
October 15. Return 2. The first of these restrictions only impaired the usefulness of the banks, without adding any thing to their solvency. Return 3. And better than any ever known in the United States, unless, possibly, those in Rhode Island and one or two other States. Return 4.
We can have a much better system
even than the Scotch; better than
the system of promissory notes;
one that will furnish more money
(if more can be used), and be more
easy and convenient for the
bankers and better for the public.
But freedom to make experiments
with any and all systems that men
may choose to experiment with is
what is necessary to give
assurance, at all times, that we
have the best possible system.
Return 5.
The estimate in the text is no
extravagance. Suppose we could
ascertain the precise number of
dollars and cents, or of pounds,
shillings, and pence, expended by
such men as Watt, and Arkwright,
and Stephenson, and Morse, and
Whitney, and Fulton, and
Woodworth, and Hoe, and McCormick,
and so many others, in making and
perfecting their inventions,-what
proportion would those figures
bear to those that should even
attempt to measure the
immeasurable value of the inventions
themselves? And what must we think
of the folly, absurdity, and
tyranny of that dearth of money
which our monopolists of money
would have maintained if they
could; which would have made these
inventions impossible; and which
now withholds them from
four-fifths, perhaps from
nine-tenths, of mankind?
Return 6.
We have all heard of the bumpkin
who tried an experiment to
ascertain upon how little food his
horse could be made to subsist.
His experiment succeeded to his
entire satisfaction, until, from
some cause he could not
understand, hi~ horse happened to
die. Stupid as he was, he may
possibly have suspected that it
was from a want of food; for we do
not hear that he ever tried the
experiment again. But our
financial bumpkins (or something
worse) persist in trying, the same
experiment over and over again.
The industry upon which they try
it invariably dies; but they learn
no wisdom, or caution (or honesty)
from the results. Return |