THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY- OBJECTIONS ANSWERED. CHAPTER II. OBJECTIONS ANSWERED. SECTION VI.
Objection Sixth.
A sixth objection is, that since "the course of events, and the general progress of knowledge, science, and art, suggest, point to, contribute to, and aid
the production of, certain inventions," as mentioned in the preceding section, it is to be presumed that, if a particular invention were not produced by one blind, it soon would be by another; and that, because one man happens to
be the first inventor, is no reason why he should have an exclusive and perpetual property in a device, or idea, which would have been brought forth, before a very long the, by some other mind, if it had not been done by him.
Admitting, for the sake of the argument, that B would have [*65] produced a certain idea, if A had not done it before him, the objection is of no more weight, in
the case of intellectual property, than in the case of material property. If A had not taken possession of a certain tract of wild land, and converted it into a farm, some one would have come after him, and done it. But that is no
reason wily the farm does not now belong to A. If A had not produced certain commodities for the market agricultural commodities, for example- the market would
have been supplied by some one else. But that plainly is no reason why the commodities produced by the labor of A, should not be held to be his property. If a man
is to be denied any right of property in the fruits of his labor, merely because it is presumed that, if he had not performed the labor, some other person would, no man would be entitled to property in the fruits of his labor; for
in few cases, if any, could he prove that no other person would ever have performed the labor, if he had left it undone.
The same principle, that applies to material things, in this respect, applies to ideas. The
principle goes to the destruction of all rights of property in the fruits of man's labor, because if A, as first producer, is to be deprived of the fruits of his labor, merely for the reason that B would have produced the same
things, if A had not, then B certainly, as second producer, ought to have no property in them, for the reason that, if he had not produced them, C would have done so. Admitting that B would have produced the same things that A has
done, he could have no better right to them than A now has. So that the principle goes to the destruction of all right of property in nearly or quite all material, as well as intellectual, things.
But is it at all true, or at all to be presumed, that if A had not produced a certain invention, B would have done it? It may, in a few cases, seem highly
probable, though it cannot in the nature of things be certain, that particular inventions would have been made, within a short period, if they had not been made at the [*66] times they were. Nevertheless, these things are,
in general,
matters resting wholly in vague conjecture, and not at all on proof. It may be reasonably certain that, under favorable conditions, mankind at large will progress in the arts and sciences; that many new and valuable inventions will be made
by somebody. But what those inventions will be, cannot be known beforehand. It surely is not easy, even if it be possible, to determine that any given invention would have been produced in a hundred, or a thousand years, if
it had not been produced by the particular individual, who actually produced it. Hundreds and thousands of years have rolled away without
its being produced; and how can it be known, or even confidently asserted, that hundreds and thousands more might not have rolled away, without its being produced, had it not been for the existence of the single mind that actually brought it into existence? Who can suppose that the poems of Homer, Shakespeare, and Milton, or the orations of Demosthenes, Cicero, and Burke, would ever have seen the light, had not Homer, Shakespeare, Milton, Demosthenes, Cicero and Burke themselves existed? Certainly no one can imagine such things to have been within the range of any rational probability. Each mind produces its own work; and who can say that any other mind would have produced the same work that one mind has produced, if the latter had not preoccupied the field?
The same theory no doubt holds good to a considerable extent, (who can say it does not hold good to all extent?) in all other fields of intellectual labor, as
well as in poetry and eloquence? Perhaps it will be said that some devices are so simple, and lie so on the surface of things, that they must soon have been discovered by somebody, if the actual discoverer had never existed.
But simple ideas, that seemed to have lain on the surface of things, almost within the sight of every one, have been passed by unseen for ages. Who can say that they would not have continued to be passed by for ages more, but for
the fortunate, ingenious, or keen-sighted discoverers, who actually first laid their eyes directly upon them? It certainly seems to be the general [*67] order of nature, in regard to intellectual productions, that each
individual of the human race has his peculiar work allotted to him; not that one is created to do what another has left undone.
Who can say, or believe, that if Alexander, and Caesar, and Napoleon had not played the parts
they did in human affairs, there was another Alexander, another Caesar, another Napoleon, standing ready to step into their places, and do their work? Who can believe that the works of Raphael and Angelo could have been performed
by other hands than theirs? Who can affirm
that any one but Franklin would ever have drawn the lightnings from the clouds? Yet who can say that what is true of Alexander, and Caesar, and Napoleon, and Raphael, and Angelo, and Franklin, is not equally true of Arkwright, and Watt, and Fulton, and Morse? Surely no one.
It is no doubt both easy and truthful to say, that certain events point the way to, and prepare the way for, certain other events- to discoveries, as to
all other things. But it is also no doubt equally true that the course of events, and the progress of knowledge have, through all the, pointed the way to, and prepared the way for, countless thousands of other inventions that have
never been made; inventions, that have not been made, simply because the right man was not there to make them; or he had not the proper facilities, or the necessary inducements, to make them. If ten thousand times as
many discoveries had been made, as have been actually made, we should have said, with equal reason, and with equal truth, that the course of events, and the progress of knowledge, had pointed the way to them
, and prepared the way for them, as we now say that the course of events, and the progress of knowledge, pointed the way to, and prepared the way for, the discoveries already made; and that, if they had not been made at the
time they were, they would no doubt soon have been [*68] made by others? What, then, is the value of any such objection as this, to the rights of authors and inventors?
But even if a second man would have made a certain invention, if the first had not- what of it? May not the invention as well be the property of the first man, as
of the second? The first man having done the work, the second man has no need to do it; but is left free to perform some other labor, of which he will enjoy
the fruits, in the same way that the first enjoys the fruits of his labor. Where, then, is the injustice? SECTION VII. Objection Seventh.
It is said that two men sometimes make the same invention; and that it would therefore be wrong to give the whole invention to one.
The answer to this objection is, that the fact that two men produce the same invention, is a very good reason why the invention should belong to both; but it is no
reason at all why both should be deprived of it. If two men produce the same invention, each has an equal right to it; because each has an equal right to
the fruits of his labor. Neither can deny the right of the other, without denying also his own. The consequence is, that they must either use and sell the invention in competition with each other, or unite their rights, and share
the invention between them. These are the only alternatives, which their relations to each other admit of. And it is for the parties themselves, and not for the government, to determine which of these alternatives they will elect.
Each holds the whole invention by the same title- that of having produced it by his labor. Neither can say that the title of the other is defective, or in any way imperfect. Neither party has [*69] any right, therefore, to object
to the other's using or selling the invention at discretion. And each, therefore, can lawfully and freely use and sell the invention, (and give a good title to the purchaser,) without any liability to answer to the other as an
infringer. In short, the parties stand in the relation of competitors
to each other; each having an equal and perfect right to use and sell the invention, in competition with, and in defiance of, the other. But as such competition would probably not be so profitable to either of the parties, as a union of their competing rights, such a union would doubtless generally be agreed upon by the parties themselves, without any interference from the government.
SECTION VIII. Objection Eighth. It may be urged that, however just may be the principle of the right of property in
ideas, still the difficulty of determining who is the true author of an invention, or idea, after that invention or idea has become extensively known to mankind, interposes a practical
obstacle to the maintenance of any individual right of property in any thing so subtle, intangible, and widely diffused, as such an invention, or idea. This was
unquestionably a very weighty and serious objection, in ruder times, when letters were unknown to the mass of the people, and when a thought was carried from mind to mind, unaccompanied by any reliable proof of the first
originator. The facilities and inducements thus afforded to fraudulent claims in opposition to those of the true owner, and the difficulty of combating such frauds, by the production of authentic and satisfactory proofs, must
have made it nearly or quite impossible to maintain, in practice, the principle that a man was the owner of the thoughts he had produced, after lie bad once divulged them [*70] to the world. And this, doubtless, is the
great reason, perhaps the only reason, why the right of property in ideas was not established, in whole, or in part, thousands of years ago. But this
obstacle is now removed by the invention of records, whereby a man can have his discovery registered, before he makes it public, and thus establish his proprietorship, and make it known, both to the people, and the judicial
tribunals. SECTION IX. Objection Ninth.
It is generally, if not universally, conceded that an inventor has a good moral claim for compensation for his invention; that he ought to be
suitably, and even liberally, paid for his labor. At the same the, many, who make this concession, will say that to allow him an exclusive and perpetual property in his invention, would be transcending all reason in the
way of compensation. This view of the case, it will be seen, denies to the inventor all exclusive right of property
in his invention. It asserts that the invention really belongs to the public, and not to himself And it only advocates the morality and equity of allowing him such compensation for his the and labor as is reasonable.
And it maintains that such compensation should be determined, in some measure at least, by the compensation which other men than inventors obtain for their the and labor. And this is the view on which patent laws generally
are founded. The objection to this theory is, that it strikes at all rights of property whatsoever, by denying a man's right to the products of his labor.
It asserts that government has the right, at its own discretion, to take from any man the fruits of his labor, giving him in return such compensation only, for his labor, as the government deems reasonable. [*71]
If this principle be a sound one, it should be carried out towards all other persons, as well as inventors. A man, who has converted wild land into a productive
farm, should be allowed to enjoy that farm only until the government thinks he is reasonably paid for his labor. Then it should be taken from him. There is no reason why the greatest benefactors of mankind should be made the
victims of an arbitrary discretion, destructive of their natural rights to the fruits of their labor, when the rule is applied to no one else. Other men, who have never added one thousandth part so much to the general stock of
wealth, are allowed to amass large fortunes, without the liability of having it all taken from them, except so much as the government may chance to think will be a reasonable compensation
for the labor expended in acquiring it. What right has government to make any such distinction as that? But what is "reasonable compensation" for a man's
labor? It is what the labor is really worth, is it not? Most certainly it is. And what is any and all labor worth? It is worth just what it produces, and no more.
This is the precise value of all labor. Labor that produces nothing, is worth nothing. Labor that produces much, is worth much. The labor, which it costs a man to pick up a pebble, is just worth a pebble, and no more. The labor, which it costs a man to pick up a diamond, is worth the diamond, by the same rule that the other labor was worth the pebble, and only a pebble. Each kind of labor is worth the thing it produces,
because it produces that thing.
There is no other way of determining the value of labor. There is no arbitrary standard of the value of labor; although when labor itself is sold in the market, (instead of the products of labor,) an arbitrary price is fixed upon it, either because the necessities of the laborer compel him to sell his labor at man arbitrary price, or because it is not known beforehand how much his labor will be worth. In such case, the purchaser of the labor takes his risk whether the labor will prove to be worth more or less than the price he pays for it. If it produced more than lie pays for it, he [*72] makes a profit. If it produce less, he makes a loss. But this price that he pays has nothing to do in fixing the real value of the labor. The
exact value of the labor cannot be known until its products are known. Then the true value of the labor is determined and measured by the value of its products.
Labor has no value of itself. If it produced nothing, it would be worth nothing. Of necessity, therefore, every separate act of labor is worth precisely what it
produces- be it little or much. A man, therefore, does not receive the full value of his labor, unless he receive the whole of its products.
Those, who talk about the justice of the government's allowing an inventor reasonable compensation for his labor, talk as if the government had
employed
the inventor to labor for it for wages- the government taking the risk whether he invented any thing of value, or not. In such a case, the government would be entitled to the invention, on paying the inventor his stipulated, or reasonable wages. But the government does not
employ an inventor to invent a steamboat, or a telegraph, He invents it while laboring on his own account. If he succeed, therefore, the whole fruits of his labor are rightfully his. If he fail, he
bears the loss. He never calls upon the government to pay him for his labor that was unsuccessful;
and the government never yet undertook to pay for the labor of the hundreds and thousands of unfortunate men, who attempted inventions, and failed. With what force, then, can it claim to seize the fruits of their successful
labor, leaving them only what it pleases to call a reasonable compensation, or reasonable wages,
for their labor? If the government were to do thus towards other men generally than inventors, there would he a revolution instantly. Such a government would universally regarded as the most audacious and monstrous of tyrannies.
If a man, while laboring for himself, and at his own risk, have produced much wealth, with little labor, it is his good fortune, or the result
of his good judgment, and superior powers. No one [*73] but himself has any claim upon the products of his labor; and it is the sheerest robbery to take them from him without his consent. SECTION X. Objection Tenth. Another theory, advocated by some persons, is, that abstractly, and on principles of natural justice, men have the
same right of property in their ideas, that they have in any other products of their labor; but that this property requires peculiar and extra ordinary protection; and that the present laws on the subject are in the nature of a
compromise between the government and the inventor; the government giving extraordinary protection for a time, and the inventor, in consideration of that protection, giving up his property at the end of that time.
There is plainly no foundation for this theory. In the first place, the government, instead of giving extraordinary protection, does not give even ordinary
protection, to intellectual property, during the time for which it pretends to protect it. The only protection, that can be claimed to be extraordinary, is the benefit of records. But this certainly is not extraordinary, for it is
enjoyed in common with landed property universally. Besides, the expenses of these records are paid, not by the government, but by those who are to derive a benefit from them. They are therefore no boon, no privilege, no token of
extraordinary favor, on the part of the government. But even if intellectual property were allowed extraordinary protection, that would be no excuse for
taking from the owners the property itself, at the end of a limited period. Merchandise in cities is allowed an extraordinary protection, in the shape of a night police. But no one ever conceived that that was any reason why the
owners should not have a perpetual prolerty in that [*74] kind of wealth. Merchandise on the ocean also enjoys an extraordinary protection, in the shape of a navy to guard it against pirates and other enemies. But no one ever
deemed that to be any reason for making such property free plunder, after the owners had enjoyed it for fourteen years. Yet there would be as much reason and justice in outlawing such property, after a specified the, as there are
in outlawing intellectual property. Various kinds of property, such as cotton and woollen manufactures, coal, iron, sugar, hemp, wool, breadstuffs, &c.,
&c., have, at different times, enjoyed not only all the ordinary protection against wrongdoers, but also an extraordinary protection against competition, by means of tariffs on imported commodities of like nature; whereby their
prices were raised ten, twenty, thirty, and fifty per cent above what would otherwise have been the regular market rates. The government has thus made it necessary that these advanced prices should be paid, by the people at large,
to the holders of these kinds of property. Yet nobody ever proposed that, as a consideration for this extraordinary and unequal protection, the property itself, or a dollar of the capital invested in the production of it, should
ever be confiscated to the government or people, at the end of fourteen years, or any other specified time. American merchant ships, in addition to being protected by an armed navy against pirates and other enemies have been
protected against the competition of foreign vessels, by laws designed to give them the monopoly of the coasting trade, and some other branches of navigation. Yet no one ever proposed that, as an offset for this extraordinary,
protection, all these ships should become public property at the end of fourteen years. Combustible property of all kinds is allowed an extraordinary protection, in the shape of fire companies maintained at the public expense. Yet
no one ever suggested that as a consideration for this extraordinary protection, the property should be forfeited at a the fixed by law. All the property, that floats on the ocean, is allowed an extraordinary protection against
shipwreck, in the shape of lighthouses and buoys, established [*75] and maintained at the public expense, also of coast surveys and charts made at the public charge. But no one ever claimed that these were any reasons why the
property itself should ever be forfeited by its owners. Yet intellectual property, which never enjoyed, for a moment, the slightest extraordinary protection whatsoever, is
confiscated to the public, after being enjoyed for only a brief period by its honest owners and producers.
But, in the second place, intellectual property is not allowed even ordinary protection, during the the for which the government pretends to protect it. It
is not allowed, like other property, the protection of criminal laws, under which the government not only pays the expense of prosecutions, but punishes violators by imprisonment. All property, except intellectual, is allowed the
benefit of these criminal laws. But intellectual property is permitted the protection only of civil suits, in which the parties pay their own expenses, and in which, if judgment be obtained, it must often be against irresponsible
men, who can make no satisfaction for their wrongs. In this case, the injured party has expended his money, without either obtaining redress against the individual wrongdoer, or procuring the infliction of any punishment to operate
as a warning to others. Intellectual property neither enjoys, nor requires, extraordinary protection. It asks simply to be placed on the same footing with
other property, and to be allowed the benefit of any and all those ordinary contrivances for the protection of property, which are adapted to its needs, and calculated to give it security. SECTION XI. Objection Eleventh. It is said that ideas are unlike corporeal commodities in this respect, namely, that a corporeal commodity cannot be
completely and fully possessed and used by two persons at once, without [*76]collision between them; and that it must therefore necessarily be recognized as the property of one only, in order that it may be possessed and used in
peace; but that an idea may be completely and fully possessed and used by many persons at once, without collision with each other; and therefore no one should be allowed to monopolize it.
This objection lays wholly out of consideration the fact, that the idea has been produced by one man's labor, and not by the labor of all men; as if that were a
fact of no legal consequence; whereas it is of decisive consequence; else there can be no exclusive right of property, in any of the productions or acquisitions of human labor. If one commodity, the product of one man's labor, can
be made free to all mankind, without his consent, then, by the same rule, every other commodity, the product of individual labor, may be made free to all mankind, without the consent of the producers. And this is equivalent to a
denial of all individual property whatsoever, in commodities produced or acquired by human labor.
In truth, the objection plainly denies that any exclusive rights of property whatsoever, can be acquired by labor or production;
because it says that a man, who produces an idea- (and the same principle would apply equally well to any other commodity)- has no better right of property in it, or of dominion over it, than any and all the rest of mankind. That is, that he has no rights in it at all,
by virtue of having produced it; but has only equal rights in it with men who did not produce it. This certainly is equivalent to denying, that any exclusive right of property,
can be acquired by labor or production. It is equivalent to asserting, that all our rights, to the use of commodities, depend simply upon the fact that we are men; because it asserts that all men
have equal rights to use a particular commodity, no matter who may have been the producer.
This doctrine, therefore, goes fully to the extent of denying all rights of property whatsoever, even in material things
(exterior to one's person); because all rights of property in such [*77] material things, have their origin
in labor; (that is, either in the labor of production, or the labor of taking possession of the products of nature;) not necessarily in the labor of the present possessor; but either in his labor, or the labor of some one from whom he has, mediately or immediately, derived it, by gift, purchase, or inheritance.
The doctrine of the objection, therefore, by denying that any right of property can originate in labor or production, virtually denies all rights of property
whatsoever, not merely in ideas, but in all material things, exterior to one's body; because if no rights of property in such things can be derived from labor or production, there can be no rights of property in them at all.
The ground, on which a man is entitled to the products and acquisitions of his labor, is, that otherwise he would lose 'the benefit of his own labor. lie is
therefore entitled to hold these products and acquisitions, in order to, hold the labor, or the benefit of the labor, he has expended in producing and acquiring them.
The right of property, therefore, originates
in the natural right of every man to the benefit of his own labor. If this principle be a sound one, it necessarily follows that every man has a natural right to all
the productions and acquisitions of his own labor, be they intellectual or material. If the principle be not a sound one, then it follows, necessarily, that there are no rights of property at all in the productions or acquisitions of human labor.
The principle of the objection, therefore, goes fully and plainly to the destruction of all rights of property whatsoever, in the productions or acquisitions of
human labor. The right of property, then, being destroyed, what principle does the objection offer, as a substitute, by which to regulate the conduct of
men, in their possession and use of all those commodities, which are now subjects of property? It substitutes only this, viz.: that men must not come in collision with each other, in the actual possession and use of things.
On this principle a man has a right to take possession of, and freely use, any thing and every thing he sees and desires, which other men may have produced
by their labor- provided he can do it without coming in collision with, or committing any violence upon, the persons of other men. This is the principle
, and the only principle, which the objection offers, as a rule for the government of the conduct of mankind towards each other, in the possession and use of material commodities. And it seriously does offer this
principle, as a substitute for the right of individual and exclusive property, in the products and acquisitions of individual labor. The principle, thus offered, is really communism, and nothing else.
If this principle be a sound one, in regard to material commodities, it is undoubtedly equally sound in relation to ideas. But if it be preposterous and
monstrous, in reference to material commodities, it is equally preposterous and monstrous in relation to ideas; for, if applied to ideas, it as effectually denies the right [*79] of exclusive property in the products of one's
labor, as it would if applied to material commodities. It is plain that the principle of the objection would apply, just as strongly, against any right of
exclusive property in corporeal commodities, as it does against a right of exclusive property in ideas; because, lst, many corporeal commodities, as roads, canals, railroad cars, bathing places, churches, theatres, &c., can be
used by many persons at once, without collision with each other; and, 2d, all those commodities- as axes and hammers, for example- which can be used only by one person at a time without collision, may nevertheless be used by
different persons at different times without collision. Now, if it be a true principle, that labor and production give no exclusive right of property, and that every commodity, by whomsoever produced, should, without the consent of
the producer, be made to serve as many persons as it can, without bringing them in collision with each other, that principle as clearly requires that a hammer should be free to different persons at different times, and that a road,
or canal should be free to as many persons at once, as can use it without collision, as it does that an idea should be free to as rnny persons at once as choose to use it.
On the other hand, if it be acknowledged that a man have an exclusive right of property in the products of his labor, because they are the products
of his labor, it clearly makes no difference to this right, whether the commodity he has produced be, in its nature, capable of being possessed and used by a thousand persons at once, or only by one at a time. That
is a wholly immaterial matter, so far as his right of property is concerned; because his right of property
is derived from his labor in producing the commodity; and not from the nature of the commodity when produced.
If there could be any difference in, the two cases, his right would be stronger, in the case of a commodity, that could be used by a thousand persons at once, than in the case of a commodity, that could be used only by one person at a time; because a man is entitled to be rewarded for his labor, according to the [*80] intrinsic value of its products; and, other things being equal, a commodity, that call be used by many persons at once, is intrinsically more valuable, than a commodity, that can be used only by one person at a time.
Again. The principle of the objection is, that all things should be free to all men, so far as they can be, without men's coming in collision with each other, in
the actual possession and use of them and, consequently, that no one person can have any rightful control over a thing, any longer than he retains it in his actual possession; that he has no right to forbid others to possess
and use it, whenever they can do so without personal collision with himself; and that he has no right to demand any equivalent for such possession and use of it by others. From these propositions it would seem to follow
further, that for a man to withhold the possession or use of a thing from others, for the purpose
of inducing them, or making it necessary for them, to buy it, or rent it, and pay him an equivalent, is an infringement upon their rights.
The principle of property is directly the reverse of this. The principle of property is, that the owner of a thing has absolute dominion over it,
whether he have it in actual possession or not, and whether he himself wish to use it or not; that no one has a right to take possession of it, or use it, without his consent; and that he has a perfect right to
withhold both the possession and use of it from others, from no other motive than to induce them, or make it necessary for them, to buy it, or rent it, and pay him an equivalent for it, or for its use.
Now it is plain that the question, whether a thing be susceptible of being used by one only, or by more persons, at once, without collision, has nothing to do with
the principle of property; nor with the owner's right of dominion over it; nor with his right to forbid others to take possession of it, or use it. If he have a right to forbid one man to take possession of or use, a
certain commodity, he has the same right to forbid a thousand, or the whole world. And if he have a right to forbid a man to take [*81] possession of, or use, a commodity, that is susceptible of being possessed and used
by one person only at a the, he has the same right to forbid him to take possession of, or use, a commodity, that is susceptible of being possessed and used by a hundred, or a thousand, persons at once. The fact that men
would, or would not, come in collision with each other, in their attempts to possess and use a commodity, if
he were to surrender his dominion over it, and leave all equally free to possess and use it, is clearly a matter which does not at all concern his present right of dominion over it; nor in any way affect his present
right to forbid any and all of them to possess or use it. It is, therefore, wholly impossible that the circumstance, that one commodity- as a hammer,
for example- is in its nature susceptible of being possessed and used by but one person at a time without collision, and that another commodity- as a road, a canal, a railroad car, a ship, a bathing place, a church, a theatre, or
an idea- is susceptible of being possessed (i.e. occupied), and used by many persons at once without collision, can affect a man's right to have complete dominion over the fruits of his labor. A man's exclusive right
of property in- or, in other words, his right of absolute dominion over- any one of these various commodities, depends entirely upon the fact, that such commodity was either a product or acquisition of his own labor, (or of the
labor of someone, from whom, either mediately, or immediately, he has derived it, by purchase, gift, or inheritance;) and not at all upon the fact, that such commodity- can, or cannot, be possessed and used by more than one person
at a time, without collision. The right of property, or dominion, does not depend, as the objection supposes, upon either the political or moral necessity of
men's avoiding collision with each other, in the possession and use of commodities; for if it did, it would be lawful, as has already been shown, for men to seize and use all manner of corporeal
commodities, whenever it could be done without coming in personal collision with the persons of other men. But the right [*82] of property, or dominion, depends upon the necessity and right of each man's providing for his own subsistence and happiness; and upon the consequent necessity and right of every man's exercising exclusive and absolute dominion over the fruits of his labor.
Now, this right of exercising exclusive and absolute dominion over the fruits of one's labor, is not, as the objection assumes, a mere
right of possessing and using them, in peace, and without collision with other men; but it includes also the right of making them subservient to his happiness in every other possible way
, (not inconsistent with the equal right of other men, to a like dominion over whatever is theirs,) as well as by possessing and using them.
Now a man may make a commodity subservient to his welfare, in a variety of ways, other than that of himself possessing and using it- provided always his
absolute dominion over it be first establislted. For example, if his absolute dominion over it be first established, so that he can forbid other men to use it, except with his consent, he can then sell it, or rent it, to those
who wish to use it, and thus obtain from them, in exchange, other commodities which he desires; or he can confer it, or its use, as a favor, upon some one whose happiness be wishes to promote. But unless he be first secured
in his absolute dominion over it, so as to be able to forbid other men using it, except with his consent, he is dejwived of all power to make it subservient to his happiness, by selling it, or renting it, in exchange for other
commodities; because, if other men can use it without his consent, they will have no motive to buy it, or rent it, paying him any thing valuable in exchange. He cannot even give it, as a favor, to any one, because it is no
favor, on his part to give to another a commodity, which that other already has without his consent. The right of property, therefore, is a right of absolute
dominion over a commodity, whether the owner wish to retain it in his own actual possession and use, or not. It is a right to forbid others to use it, without his consent. If it were not so, men could never sell, rent, or
give away those commodities, which [*83] they do not themselves wish to keep or use- but would lose their right of property in them- that is, their right of dominion over them - the moment they suspended their personal possession
and use of them. It is because a man has this right of absolute dominion over the fruits of his labor, and can forbid other men to use them without his
consent, whether he himself retain his actual possession and use of them or not,
that nearly all men are engaged in the production of commodities, which they themselves have no use for, and cannot retain any actual possession of, and which they produce solely for purposes of sale, or rent. In fact, there is no article of corporeal property whatever, exterior to one's person, which owners are in the habit of keeping in such actual and constant possession or use, as would be necessary in order to secure it to themselves,
if the right of property, originally derived from labor, did not remain in the absence of possession. But further. The question, whether a particular
commodity can be used by two or more persons at once, without collision with each other, is obviously wholly immaterial- to that right of absolute dominion, which the producer of the commodity has over it by virtue of his having
produced it; and to his consequent right to forbid any and all other men to use it, without his consent.
A man's right of property in the fruits of his labor, is -an absolute right of controlling them- so far as the nature of things will admit of it- so as to
make them subservient to his welfare in every possible way that he can do it, without obstructing other men in the equally free and absolute control of every thing that is theirs. Now, the nature of things offers no more obstacles,
to a mans exclusive proprietorship and control of a commodity, which is, in its nature, capable of being possessed and used by many at once without collision, than it does to his exclusive proprietorship and control of a commodity,
which is, in its nature, incapable of being possessed and used by more than one at a the without collision. His right of property, therefore, is [*84] just as good, in the case of one commodity, as in the case of the other.
The absurdity of any other doctrine than this is so nearly apparent, as hardly to deserve to be seriously reasoned against. One man produces a commodity- a hammer,
for example- which can be used but by one person at a time without collision; and this commodity is his exclusively, because he produced it by his labor. Another man produces another commodity- as a road, a canal, or an
idea, for example- which can be used by thousands at once without collision; and this commodity, forsooth, is not
his exclusively, although he produced it solely by his own labor! Of what possible consequence is this difference, in the nature of the two commodities, that it should affect the producer's exclusive right of property in either one or the other? Manifestly it is not of the least conceivable importance.
As a matter of abstract natural justice, there is no difference whatever, in a mans demanding and receiving pay for a commodity, or the use of a commodity, which
can be used by thousands at once without collision, and his demanding and receiving pay for a commodity, or the use of a comnmodity, which can be used by but one person a time. In the first case, he as much gives an equivalent for
what he receives, as he does in the latter; an equivalent too, that is as purely a product of labor, as is the commodity he receives in exchange. As a matter of
abstract natural justice too, a man is as much entitled to be paid for his labor in producing commodities, that can be used by many persons at once without collision, as he is to be paid for producing commodities, that can be used
by but one at a time. For example, one man produces an idea, which is worth, for use, a dollar to each one of a thousand different men. Another man produces a thousand axes, worth a dollar each for the use of a
thousand different men. Is there any difference in the intrinsic merit or value of the labor of these two producers? Or is there any difference, in their abstract right to demand pay of those who use the products of their
labor?
If there be no difference in the justice of these two cases, is there any way, in which the producer of the idea can get his thousand dollars for it,
other than that, by which the producer of the axes gets his thousand dollars for them, to wit, by first securing to him his absolute dominion over it, or absolute property in it, and thus enabling him to forbid others to
use it except on the condition of their paying him his price for it? If there be no other way, by which he can get pay for his idea, then he is as well entitled to an absolute property in it, and dominion over it, as the producer
of the axes is entitled to an absolute property in, or dominion over, them. Still further. A thousand separate individuals, can as well afford
to pay a thousand dollars, (one dollar each,) for the use of a single
commodity, that can be used by them all at once without collision, as they can to pay a thousand dollars, (one [*86] dollar each,) for the use of a thousand different commodities, each of which can be used only by one
person at a time. A man can just as well afford to pay a dollar for an idea, that is worth a dollar to him, for use, though it be used also by others,
as he can to pay a dollar for an axe, that is worth but a dollar to him for use, though it be not used by others. Its being used by others, or not, makes no difference at all in his capacity to pay for whatever value it is
really of to himself. A thousand different men can also as well afford to pay a dollar each, for the use of a commodity, which they can all use at once
without collision, as they can to pay a dollar each for the use of a single commodity, which can be used only by one person at a time, and which can therefore be used by them all, only by their using it singly, successively, and at
different times. For example. A thousand men can as well afford to pay a thousand dollars, (one dollar each,) for the use of a vessel, which will carry them all at once, as they can to pay a thousand dollars, (one dollar each,) for
the use of a boat so small as to carry but one person at a time, and which must therefore make a thousand different trips to carry them all. How absurd it would be to say that the owner of the large boat had no right to
charge a dollar each for his thousand passengers, merely because his vessel was so large that it could carry them all at once, without collision with each other, or with himself; and yet that the owner of the small boat
had a right to charge a dollar each, to a thousand successive passengers, merely because his boat was so small that it could carry but one at a time.
The same principle clearly applies to an idea. Because it can be used by thousands and millions at a time, without collision, it is none the less the
exclusive property of the producer; and he has none the less right to charge pay for the use of it, than if it could be used by but one person at a time.
There is, therefore, no ground whatever, of justice or reason, on which, the producer of the idea can lie denied the right to demand pay for it,
according to its market value, any more than [*87] the producer of any other commodity can be denied the right to demand pay for it, according to its
market value. And the market value of every commodity is that price, which men will pay for it, rather than not have it, when it is forbidden to them by one who has an absolute property in it, and dominion over it.
The objection, now under consideration, is based solely upon the absurd idea, that the producer of a commodity has no right of property in it, nor of dominion
over it, beyond the simple right of using it himself
without molestation; that he has therefore no right to forbid others to use it, whenever they can get possession of and use it, without collision with himself; that he must depend solely upon his own use of it to get compensated for his labor in producing it; that he can never be entitled to demand or receive any compensation whatever
from others, for the use of it, or for his labor in producing it, however much they may use it, or enrich themselves by so doing; and that he therefore has no right to withhold its use from others, with any view to
induce or compel them to buy it, or rent it, or make him any compensation for, the labor it cost him to produce it. In short, the principle of the objection is, that when a man has produced a commodity by his own sole labor, he has
no right of dominion over it whatever, except the naked right to use it; and that all other men have a perfect right to use
it, without his consent, and without rendering him any compensation, whenever he is not using it, or whenever the nature of the thing is such as to enable both him and them to use it at the same time, without collision.
The objection clearly goes to this extent, because the whole principle of it consists in this single idea, viz.: that men must avoid collision with each other in
the possession and use of commodities. This is principle wodd not allow the producer so much even as a preference over other men, in the possession and use
of a commodity, unless he preserved his first actual possession unbroken. To illustrate. If, when he was not using it, he should let go his [*88] hold of it, and thus suffer another to get possession of it, he could not reclaim it,
even when he should want it for actual use. To allow him thus to demand it of another, for actual use, on the ground that he was the producer of it, would be acknowledging that labor and production did give him at least
some rights to it over other man. And if it be once conceded, that labor and production do give him any rights to it, over other men, then it must be conceded, that they give him all rights to it, over other men; for if he have
any
rights to it, over other men, then no limit can be fixed to his rights, and they are of necessity absolute. And these absolute rights to it, as against all other men, are what constitute the right of exclusive property and dominion. So that there is no middle ground between the principle, that labor and production give the producer
no
rights at all, over other men, in the commodity he produces; and the principle, that they give him absolute rights over all other men, to wit, the right of exclusive property or dominion. There is, therefore, no middle ground between absolute communism, on the one hand, which holds that a man has a right to lay his hands on any thing, which has no other man's hands upon it, no matter who may have been the producer; and the principle of individual property, on the other hand, which says that each man has an absolute dominion, as against all other men, over the products and acquisitions of his own labor, whether he retain them in his actual possession, or not.
Finally. The objection we have now been considering, seems to have had its origin in some loose notion or other, that the works of man should be, like certain
works of nature- as the ocean, the atmosphere, and the light, for example- free to be used by all, so far as they can be used by all without collision. There is
no analogy between the two cases. The ocean, the atmosphere, and the light, so far as they are free to all mankind, are free simply because the author of nature, their maker and owner, is not, like man, dependent upon the products
of his labor for his subsistence and happiness; he therefore offers them freely to all mankind: neither asking nor needing any compensation for [*89] the use of them, nor for his labor in creating them. But if the ocean, the
atmosphere, and the light had been the productions of men- of beings dependent upon their labor for the means of subsistence and happiness- the producers would have had absolute dominion over them, to make them subservient
to their happiness; and would have had a right to forbid other men either to use them at all, or use them only on the condition of paying for the use of them. And it would have been no answer to this argument, to say, that
mankind at large could use these commodities, without coming in collision with the owners; that there were enough for all; and that therefore they should be free to all. The answer to such an argument would be, that those, who had
created these commodities, had the natural right to supreme dominion over them, as products of their labor; that they had a right to make them subservient to their own happiness in every possible way, not inconsistent
with the equal right of other men, to a like dominion over whatever was theirs; that they could get: no adequate compensation for their labor in creating them, unless they could control thiem, forbid other men to use them, and thus
induce, or make it necessary for, other men to pay for the use of them; that they had created them principally, if not solely, for the purpose of selling or renting them to others, and not merely for their own use; and that to
allow others to use them freely, and against the will of the owners, on the simple condition of avoiding personal collision with them, would be virtually robbing the owners of their property, and depriving them of the benefits of
their labor, and of their right to get paid for it, by demanding pay of all who used its products for their own benefit. This would have been the legal answer; and it would have been all-sufficient to justify the owners of
these commodities, in forbidding other men to use them, except with their consent, and on paying such toll or rent as they saw fit to demand. The principle is the
same in the case of an idea. An idea, produced by one man, is enough for the use of all mankind (for the purposes for which it is to be used). It is as sufficient for [*90] the actual use of all mankind, as for the actual use of
the producer. It may be used by all mankind at once, without collision with each other. But all that is no argument against the right of the producer to absolute dominion over an idea, which he has produced by his own labor; nor,
consequently, is it any argument against his right to forbid any and all other men to use that idea, except on the condition of first obtaining his consent, by paying him such price for the use of it as he demands.
But for this principle, the builders of roads and canals, which may be passed over by thousands of persons at once, without collision, could maintain no control
over them, nor get any pay for their labor in constructing them, otherwise than by simply passing over them themselves. Every other person would be free to pass over them, without the consent of the owners, and without paying any
equivalent for the use of them, provided only they did not come in personal collision with the owners, or each other. Do those, who say that an idea
should be free to all who can use it, without collision with the producer, say that the builders of roads and canals have no rights of property in them, nor any right of dominion over them, except the simple right of themselves passing over them unmolested ? That they have no right to forbid others to pass over them, without first purchasing their (the owners') consent, by the payment of toll, or otherwise? No one, who acknowledges the right of property at all, will say this. Yet, to be consistent, he should say it.
But the analogy, which the objector would draw, between the works of nature and the works of man, in order to prove that the latter should be as free to
all mankind as the former, is defective, not only in disregarding the essential difference between the works of man and the works of nature, to wit, that the former are produced by a being who labors for himself, and not for
others; and who needs
the fruits of his labor as a means of subsistence and happiness; while the latter are produced by a Being, who neither needs nor asks any compensation for his labor; but it is defective in still another particular, to wit, that it disregards [*91] the fact, that the works of nature themselves are no longer free to all mankind, after they have once been taken possession of by an individual. It is not necessary that he should
retain his actual possession of them, in order to retain his right of property in them, and his right of dominion over them; but it is sufficient that he has once taken possession of them. They are then forever
his against all the world, unless he consent to part, not merely with his possession, but with his right of property, or dominion, also. They are his, on the principle, and for the reason, that otherwise he
would lose the labor he had expended in taking possession
of them. Even this labor, however slight it may be, in proportion to the value of the commodity, is sufficient to give him an absolute title to the commodity, against all the world. And he may then part with his possession
of it at pleasure, without at all impairing his right of dominion over it.
If, then, a man's labor, in simply taking possession of those works of nature, which no man had produced, and which were therefore free to all mankind,
be sufficient to give him such an absolute dominion over them, against all the world; who can pretend that his labor, in actually creating commodities- as ideas, for example- which before had no existence, does not give him
at least an equal, if not a superior, right to an absolute dominion over them? SECTION XII. Objection Twelfth.
It is said that a man, by giving his ideas to others, does not thereby part with them himself, nor lose the use of them, as in the case of material property; that he only adds to other men's wealth, without diminishing his own;
that his giving knowledge to other men is only lighting their candles by his, thereby giving [*92] them the benefit of light, without any loss of light to himself; and that therefore he should not be allowed any exclusive property
in his ideas, nor any right to demand a price for that, which it is no loss to him to give to others. This objection is really the same as the next
preceeding one; and is only stated in a different form. The answers given to that objection, will apply with equal force to this.
The fallacy of both objections consist, primarily, in this- that they deny the fundamental principle, on which all rights of property are founded, namely,
that labor and production give, to the laborer and producer, a right of exclusive property in, and of exclusive and absolute dominion over, the acquisitions and products of his labor.
The fallacy of both objections consists, secondarily, in this- that they deny to the laborer the right and power of obtaining any compensation
for his labor, other than such as he may chance to obtain, from his own personal possession and use of the commodities, which he produces or acquires by his labor. They assert the right of all other men to use those commodities,
without his consent, and without making him any compensation- provided only that they can do it without coming in personal collision with him. They thus deny that he has any right to forbid other men to use the commodities he
has produced, or to demand pay of them for such use. They thus virtually deny his right to sell or rent the products of his labor, or to obtain in exchange for them such other commodities as he desires. They assert that,
after a man has himself incurred the whole labor and expense of producing a commodity- a commodity that is capable of accommodating others, as well as himself; and that will be of as much, perhaps more, value, for use, to
others, than to himself- he is bound to give them as free use of it, as he has himself, without requiring them to, bear any part of the burden, or compensate him for any portion of the labor and expense, incurred by him in
producing it. They thus virtually assert that labor, once performed, is no longer entitled to be rewarded, however [*93] beneficial it may be to others than the laborer; that commodities, once produced,
are no longer entitled to be paid for, by those who use them, (other than the producers,) however valuable they may really be to them; that a man, therefore, has no such right of property in, nor of control over, the products of his labor, as will enable him to forbid other men to use them, or to demand pay of other men, for them, or for the use of them; that all men, consequently, have a perfect right to seize, and appropriate to their own use, the products of each other's labor, without the consent of the producers, and without making any compensation, provided only that they do it without coming in personal collision with the producers; that if a man have produced enough of any particular commodity, (as wheat, for example,) to supply the world, he can rightfully control only so much of it, as he needs for his own consumption, and can maintain his actual possession of; that he can withhold the surplus from no one, with a view to getting an equivalent for it; that every man's surplus, of any particular commodity, is not his property, to be exchanged for the surplus commodities of other men, by voluntary contract, but is rightfully free to be seized, by any one, to the extent of his particular needs for his own consumption; consequently that the exchanges, which take place among men, of their respective surpluses of the different commodities they severally produce, all proceed upon false notions of men's separate rights of property in the products of their separate labor, and upon a false denial of the right of all men to participate equally with each man in the products of his particular labor; that men have no right to produce any thing
for sale, or rent, but only to consume;
and that if any one man be so foolish as to produce more, of any specific commodity, than he himself can use- as for example, more food than he himself can eat, more clothes than he himself can wear, more houses than he himself can live in, more books than he himself can read, and so on to the end of the catalogue- such folly is his own, committed with his eyes open, and he has no right to complain if all such surpluses be taken from him, against [*94] his will, and without compensation, by those who
can consume them; that it is not the labor of producing commodities, but the will and power to consume them, that gives the right of property in, and dominion over, them; that the right of property, therefore,
depends, not upon production, but upon men's appetites, desires, wants, and capacities for consumption; and consequently that all men have equal rights to every thing they desire for consumption, whoever may have been
This is clearly the true meaning of the objections; because the same principle would apply as well to a surplus of food, clothing, or any other commodity, as
to a surplus of ideas, or- what is the same thing- to the surplus capacity
of a single idea, beyond the personal use of the producer- by which I mean the capacity of a single idea to be used by other persons simultaneously with the producer, without collision with him. The capacity of a single idea to supply a large number of persons at once without collision, is, in
principle,
precisely like the capacity of a large quantity of food to supply a large number of persons at once, without collision. In the case of the food, as in the case of the idea, there is more than one can use, and is enough for all; and that is the reason given, why the idea should not be monopolized by the prolucer, but be made free to all who can use it advantageously for themselves. If this argument be good, in the case of the idea, it is equally good in the case of the food; for there is more of
that than the producer can consume, and therefore the surplus should be free to others. The argument is the same, in one case as in the other; and if it- be good in one case, it is good also in the other.
The capacity of an idea to be used by many persons at once, is also the same, in principle,
as the capacity of a road, a canal, a steamboat, a theatre, or a church, to be used by many persons at once. And the producer or proprietor of the idea, has as clear a right to demand pay from all who use his idea, simultaneously [*95] with himself and with each other; as the producer or proprietor of a road, a canal, a steamboat, a. theatre, or a church, has, to demand pay of all who use one of those commodities, simultaneously with himself and with each other. How absurd it would be to deny the right of the proprietors of these last named commodities, to demand pay of the thou sand users of them, on the grounds that they all used them simultaneously! that there was room for all! that the users did not come in collision with each other! that the commodities were susceptible of being used by a thousand or more at a the! and that the use of them, by others, did not prevent the proprietors from using them also at the same time!
Is a passage on a steamboat of no value to a man, if there be other men on board? Is it not just as legitimate a subject for compensation, when he enjoys
it simultaneously with others, as when he enjoys it alone? Are not the performances in a theatre, a church, or a concert room, just as legitimate subjects for compensation, by each person who enjoys them, though they be enjoyed
simultaneously by a thousand others beside himself as they would be if enjoyed by himself alone? Certainly they are. And on the same principle, the use of an idea, which may be used by the whole world at once, without collision
with each other, is just as legitimate a subject for compensation to the producer, as though the idea were capable of being used by but one person at a the.
But further. Why is it claimed
that a man is bound, in the case of an idea, any more than in any other case, to give a- product of his labor to others, without requiring them either to compensate him for his labor in producing it, or pay him any equivalent for
its value to them? He has produced, at his own cost, a commodity, which can be used by others, as well as by himself; and the use of which, by others, will bring as much wealth to them, as his own use of it will bring to
himself. Why has he no right, in this case, as in all others, to say to other men,you shall not use, for your
profit, a commodity produced by my labor, [*96] unless you will pay me my price for it, or- what is the same thing- for my labor in producing it? Can any rational answer be given to such a question as that? What claim have they upon a product of his labor, that they should seize it without paying for it? Is it theirs? If so, by what right, when they did not produce it? and have never bought it? and the producer has miever freely given it to them? Self-evidently it can be theirs by no right whatever.
On the principle of these objections, Fulton could get no compensation for his labor and expense, in inventing the steam engine other than such as he might
derive from actually operating one of his own engines in competition with all other persons, who might choose also to operate them. If he did not choose himself to operate an engine for a living, the world would get the whole
benefit of his invention for nothing, and he go wholly unrewarded for his labor in producing it. On the same principle, Morse could get no pay for the labor and expense incurred by him in inventing the telegraph, other than such as
he could obtain by himself operating a telegraph, in competition with all other persons who should choose to do the like. If he did not choose to operate a telegraph for a living, or could not make a living by so doing, the world
would get the whole benefit of his invention for nothing, and he go wholly unrewarded for his labor in producing it. On the same principle, a man, who should build, at his own cost, a road, or a canal, would have no right to
forbid others to pass over it, nor to demand pay of them for passing over it; and could consequently get no pay for his labor in constructing it, other than such as lie could obtain by simply passing over it himself. If he did not
wish to pass over it, he would wholly lose his labor in constructing it; and the world would get the whole benefit of it for nothing. On the same principle too, if a man should build and run, at his own charge, a steamboat, large
enough to carry a thousand passengers beside himself, lie could neither forbid the thousand to come on board, nor demand pay of them for their passage. He could get no pay [*97] for his outlay, in building and running the boat,
otherwise than by simply taking a passage on board of it himself. If this should not be an adequate compensation, he would have to submit to the loss, while the other thousand passengers would enjoy a free passage, on his
boat, at his cost, and without his consent, simply because the boat was large enough to carry him and them too, and because their passage on it did not prevent him from taking passage on it also, simultaneously
with themselves! But it is said that giving knowledge to a man, is simply lighting his candle by ours; whereby we give him the benefit of light, without any
loss of light to ourselves. And because we are not in the habit of demanding pay, for so momentary a labor, or so trivial a service, as that of simply lighting a man's candle, it is inferred that we have no right
to demand pay of a man, for our intellectual light, to be used as an instrumentality in labor, though it be such, that he will derive great pecuniary profit from it.
Admitting, for the sake of the argument, that the cases are analogous, the illustration wholly fails to prove what is designed to be proved by it; because,
legally speaking, we have as perfect a right to the absolute control of our candles, as of any other property whatever, and as perfect a right to refuse to light another man's candle, as to refuse to feed or clothe
his body. We have also as perfect a right to forbid him to light his candle by ours, or in any way to use our light, as we have to forbid him to use our horse, or our house. And the only reason we do not,
in practice, demand a price for lighting a man's candle, is, that the lighting of a single
candle is so slight a labor, and is so easily done by any body, and every body, timat it will comnilmnd no price in the market; since every man would sooner light his own candle, than pay even the smallest sum to another for doing it. But whenever the number of candles to be lighted is so large, as to enable the service to command a price in the market, men as habitually demandd pay for lighting candles, as for any other service of the same market value. For example, those who light [*98] the lamps, in the streets of cities, in churches, theatres, and other large buildings, as uniformly demand pay for so doing, as for army other service done by one man for another. And no lawyer was ever yet astute enough to discover that such lamnplighters were entitled to no pay, either for the reason that they parted with none of their own light, or for the reason that they enjoyed, in common with others, the light given forth by the candles they lighted.
We do not now demand pay for lighting a single
candle, simply because the service is too trivial to command a price worth demanding. But if the production of a light, in the first instance, were- like the invention of a valuable idea- a work of great labor and difficulty, such as few persons could accomplish, and those few only by a great expenditure of money, time, and study, the producers of a light would then demand pay for lighting even a
single
candle by it, the same as they now do for the use of an idea by a single individual. And it would be no argument against their right to do so, to say, that they part with no light themselves; that they have as much light left as they had before, or as they can use in their own business, &c., &c. The answer would be, that the light was the product of their labor, and as such was rightfully their exclusive property, and subject to their exclusive control; that therefore no one had a right to use it without their consent; that they had as good right to produce a light, with a view to sell it to others, or to light other men's candles by it for pay, as to produce it for their own use in labor; that if they were to give the benefits of their light to others gratuitously, or if others could avail themselves of it, without making compensation, the producers would get no adequate compensation for the labor of producing it; that the light was valuable to others, as well as to the producers, and therefore others, if they wished to use the light, could afford, and should be required, to bear a part of the cost of producing it; and that if they refused to bear any part of the cost of the light, they ought not to participate in the benefits of it. [*99]
But the case of lighting another man's candle by ours, is not strictly analogous to the case of our furnishing him a valuable idea,
for his permanent use and profit. There is indeed a sort of analogy, between giving a man light for his eyes, and light for his mind; especially if he use both kinds of light in his labor. But the important difference between lighting a candle, and furnishing an idea, is this. When we simply light a man's candle for him, we do not supply him,
at our own cost, with a permanent light for use. We only ignite certain combustible materials of his own; and from them alone he derives the permanent light, which he uses in labor. It is
therefore only from the combustion of his own property, that he obtains that permanent
light, which alone will suffice for his uses. All the service, therefore, which we render him, is the exceedingly trivial one of simply igniting those materials by a momentary contact withour flame. We supply none
of the materials themselves, from the combustion of which his permanent and useful light is derived. But in the case of the idea, we do furnish him with the permanent light itself, by the aid of which alone he
performs his labor. We do not, as in the other case, simply ignite his combustible materials. We furnish the permanent light, and the whole light, at our own sole cost.
Now the simple ignition of his combustible materials, as in the case of the candle, is too trivial a service to be worth demanding pay for it; and too trivial
also to command a price, if it were demanded. But the furnishing him a perpetual light, as in the case of the idea, is a service sufficiently important to be worth demanding a price for it; and also sufficiently important to
command a price in the market. And this is the difference, or at least one of the differences, between the two cases.
To make the case of the material light analogous to that of the intellectual light, it would be necessary that we produce, at our own cost, a permanent
material light, such as will be of practical utility in labor. Having done this, a stranger, who had no share in the production of the light, claims the right to come into our [*100] light
, and to use it for the purposes of his
labor, without our consent, against our will, and without making us any compensation. We deny his right to do so; we tell him the light is our property, the product of our labor; that, as such, we have a right to control it, and its use; that we produced it with a view to sell so much of it as we did not wish to use; and that we will permit him to use it only on his paying us such a price as we see fit to demand. But he replies, that within the sphere of our light, there is room, which we do not occupy, and where the light goes to waste; that his occupying this vacant space, and using this waste light, will not interfere with the light we are using; that the light will be just as strong,
where we are at work, as it was before; that he denies our right to demand pay for the use of our surplus light; and that therefore he will use it, and pay us nothing for it.
Which party here has the law on his side, the producers of the light, or the intruder? Certainly there can be no doubt that the light is the property of the
producers, and that no one can claim the right to use it, for the purposes of his labor, without their consent. And the principle is the same in the case of the intellectual light.
To make the analogy still closer, between the cases of the material and the intellectual light, and especially to make the wrong of the intruder more
palpable, we must suppose that we imave produced a peculiar material light; and that this peculiar light is indispensable
for the manufacture of a peculiar commodity, that is of value in the market. We, being the sole producers and possessors of this peculiar light, enjoy a monopoly of the manufacture and sale of the peculiar commodities mnanufactured by the aid of it. The intruder now claims the right, with out our consent, to come into our light, and use it for the manufacture of the same kind of commodities, which we are manufacturing, and which can be manufactured only by our light; and then to offer those commodities in the market in competition with ours. He thus claims, not only to use our light, against our [*101] will, and without making us any compensation, but also to use it for a purpose which is prejudicial to us, by, reducing the market value of the commodities, which we ourselves manufacture by it. He thus does us a double wrong; for he not only uses, without our consent, and without making us any compensation, the light which we alone have produced; but he also reduces the practical value of the light to us,
for our own uses, by selling, in comnpetition with ours, the commodities he manufactures by its aid. Is there no injustice, no intrusion, no
usurpation, in such conduct as this? Most clearly there is. If, I being an innholder, a stranger were to come into my house, seize upon my stores of provisions, cook them by my fire, and then sell them to my customers, in
competition with those which I have provided for them, the intrusion, usurpation, injustice, and robbery would be no more flagrant than in the case supposed. Yet neither of these cases is any more than a parallel to that of a man,
who, without my consent, uses my invention, my intellectual light, and manufactures commodities by it, which he otherwise could not manufacture, and then sells them in competition with mine.
Finally. If the doctrine be true, that a man should have no pay for imparting knowledge to others, because he retains the same knowledge himself, then a lawyer
should have no pay for the knowledge he imparts to his client, to a jury, or to a judge; a physician should have no pay for the knowledge he imparts to his patient, or to his patient's nurse; a preacher should have no pay for the
knowledge he imparts to his congregation; a lecturer should have no pay for the knowledge he imparts to his audience; a teacher should have no pay for the knowledge he imparts to his scholars; a master should have no pay for the
knowledge he imparts to his apprentice; a legislator should have no pay for the knowledge he imparts to his fellow legislators, or to the country, by his speeches; a judge should have no pay for the knowledge he imparts by his
judicial opinions or decisions; authors and editors should have no pay for the knowledge they impart by their writings; and so on indefinitely. [*102] By the same
principle too, a musician should charge nothing for his music, because he loses none of it himself. He hears it all, and enjoys it all, the same as if no one else were hearing it, or enjoying it. A painter should have no pay for a
view of his picture, because he does not thereby lose the view of it himself. A sculptor should have no pay for exhibiting a statue, because he does not thereby lose the sight of it himself A soldier should have no pay for
achieving the liberties of his country, because he enjoys all those liberties himself, and none the less because his fellow countrymen, who stayed at home while he was fighting, enjoy them too. Such are some of the absurdities to
which the doctrine leads. The argument on this point might be extended still farther. But I apprehend it has already been extended farther than was really
necessary. The objections have no soundness in them; yet they have probably as much plausibility as any of the objections that were ever brought against one's right of property in his ideas. And this is the reason I have felt it
excusable to expend so many words upon them. SECTION XIII. Objection Thirteenth. It is said that society have
rights in ideas, that have been once made known to them; that a perpetual monopoly in the producer, destroys the rights of society; and that society have a right to perpetuate ideas once made known.
Hence it is inferred that society have a right to confiscate ideas, and make them free to all, in order to prevent the producer's withholding them from the
public, and thus causing them to perish unused. The primary assumption here is, "that society have rights in [*103] ideas once made known to them."
From this assumption, the other assumptions and the inference naturally follow. They depend solely upon it, and are nothing without it. If, then, the first assumption be baseless, the others and the inference are equally so.
What
rights society have, in ideas, which they did not produce, and have never purchased, it would probably be very difficult to define; and equally difficult to explain how
society became possessed of those rights. It certainly requires something more than assertion, to prove that by simply coming to a knowledge of certain ideas- the products of individual labor- society acquires any valid title to them, or, consequently, any
rights in them. There would clearly be just as much reason in saying that society have rights in material commodities- the products of individual
labor- because their existence had become known to the public, as there is in saying that they have rights in ideas- the products of individual labor- simply because their existence had become known to the public. There would, for
example, be just as much reason in saying, that society have rights in a thousand, or a hundred thousand, bushels of wheat- the product of individual labor- on the ground that the existence of this wheat had become known to them,
as there is in saying that they have rights in a mechanical invention- the product of individual labor on the ground that its existence has become known to them. And there would be just as much reason in saying, that society have a
right to confiscate this wheat, and distribute it gratuitously among the people, in order to prevent the producer's withholding it from market, and suffering it to rot,
as there is in saying that society have a right to confiscate a mechanical invention, and make it free to the public, in order to prevent the inventor's withholding it from market, and suffering it to be lost.
If, however, this doctrine be true, in favor of society, it must be equally true in favor of single individuals; for society is only a number of individuals, who
Imave no rights except as individuals. [*104] The consequence of the doctrine, therefore, would be, that every private individual would have rights in every commodity, the exisence of which should come to his knowledge!
He would also, of course, have the right, (now claimed for society,) of preserving such commodities from loss and decay. And this right would involve the still further right, (now claimed for society,) of taking such commodities out of the hands of the producers, and appropriating them to his own use,
in order to prevent the producer's withholding them from him, and suffering them to perish unused by him! This is the legitimate result of the principle contended for.
This doctrine, that society have rights in all commodities, in consequence of the commodities becoming known to them; and that they have a right to confiscate
them, and apply them to the public use, in order to prevent the producer's withholding them from market, and suffering them to perish unused, would certainly afford a very convenient and efficacious mode of destroying all private
property, and throwing every thing into common stock. But what other purpose it could serve, it is not easy to see. If the doctrine be a sound one, in regard to material commodities, it is undoubtedly sound also in regard to
intellectual commodities. But if it be the height of absurdity and tyranny, in regard to material commodities, it is equally absurd and tyrannical in regard to ideas.
The doctrine is also as unsound in policy, as it is in law; since it would cause a thousand commodities to perish unused, or prevent their ever being
produced, as often as it would save one from thus perishing. If a man be allowed an absolute property in the products of his labor; and can forbid others to use them, except with his consent, he then has a motive to preserve them,
and bring them to market; because, if they are valuable, they will command a price. Hence he will suffer few or none of them to be lost. But if the products of his labor are to be confiscated, he is, in the first place, dissuaded
from producing nearly as many as he otherwise would; and, secondly, such as he does produce, [*105] he will keep concealed as far as possible, in order to save them from confiscation; and the consequence will be that very many of
them will perish unused. SECTION XIV. Objection Fourteenth. Another objection is, that after the author of an idea has
once made it known to others, it is impossible for him ever to recover the exclusive possession of it.
This objection is of no validity - and why? Because it is wholly unnecessary that he should have the exclusive possession of his idea, in order to
practically exercise his right to the exclusive use of it. The objection assumes that it is practically impossible for a man to exercise
his right to the "exclusive use" of an idea, unless he also have the exclusive possession of it. The objection rests solely
on that assumption. Yet such an assumption is a self-evident absurdity; for the exclusive possession of an idea is not, in practice, at all necessary to the exclusive use of it. An idea,
unlike a corporeal commodity, can be as fully and completely used,
by a single individual, when it is possessed by all the world, in common with himself as when it is possessed by himself alone. Their possession of it, jointly with himself offers no natural impediment whatever to his exclusive use of it. The practical exercise of his right of exclusive use, is, therefore, in no manner whatever, naturally contingent or dependent upon his exclusive possession. And this fact alone is self-evidently an ample and unanswerable reason why,
in law, it is wholly unnecessary that he should retain his exclusive possession, in order to retain the right of exclusive use.
Here, no doubt, the argument, on this point, might be safely [*106] left. But, perhaps, some further illustration of it may be allowable.
The law never makes any requirements, that are practically
unnecessary to the exercise of one's rights. The only reason, why a man's right to the exclusive use of a corporeal commodity, is ever, in law, dependent upon his right to the exclusive possession of it, is, that the
practical exercise of his exclusive right of use, is naturally and necessarily dependent on his exclusive possession of the commodity. It is naturally impossible that he can use it- that is, the whole
of it, fully and completely- unless he have exclusive possession of it. But it is wholly otherwise in the case of an idea, which, from its immateriality, can be as fully and completely used, by a single individual, when it is possessed by all other men, in common with himself, as when possessed by himself alone.
Whenever the practical exercise of the exclusive right of use, is, naturally and necessarily, dependent on the exclusive possession, there a man
must have an exclusive right of possession, in order to have an exclusive right of use. But whenever the practical exercise of an exclusive right of use, is naturally possible, without
the exclusive possession, there the two may be separated, and a man may have an exclusive right of use, with only a common right of possession.
For the law to require an exclusive possession, to sustain the right of exclusive use, when a common possession is just as good for the practical
exercise of that right, would be interposing an unnecessary obstacle to the enjoyment of one's rights. When a man parts with the exclusive possession
of an idea, he parts with what it is naturally impossible he should ever recover. And if the practical exercise of his exclusive right of use, were, naturally and necessarily, dependent upon his exclusive
possession, his right of exclusive use would be forever lost, with his right of exclusive possession. But since the practical exercise of his exclusive right of use, is not in any way dependent upon his exclusive possession, the
question of exclusive possession has [*107] legally nothing to do with Imis right to the exclusive use; and the owner of an idea may, consequently, give to all mankind, a perpetual and irrevocable possession
of it, in common with himselfl without his own right to the exclusive use of it, being at all impaired thereby. The case of the owner of an idea, after he has
given to others a knowledge or possession of it, in common with himself, is nearly or quite similar to that of a man, who should grant to others the perpetual, but naked, right, to come personally upon his farm, and enjoy the
prospect, doing no damage, and offering no impediment to his labor; but without any right themselves to cultivate the farm, or to take the crops.
In this case, the individuals, so admitted upon the farm, would hold possession of it, in common with the owner, to the precise extent, and for the specific purpose, to which, and for which, he had granted it to them; and
they would hold it to no greater extent, and for no other purpose. Now, it certainly could never be said, in such a case, that the owner had lost his exclusive right to cultivate his farm
, and take the crops, because he could never recover the exclusive possession of it.
The principle is the same in the case of the idea. The owner admits other men to a simple knowledge of the idea- that is, to a naked possession
of it- in common with himself; but without any right to use it, for any industrial or pecuniary purpose. They receive the possession of it, subject to these limitations. Here plainly the owner's right to the
exclusive use of it, for industrial and pecuniary purposes, is no more impaired, than in the case of the farm.
Since, then, the owner of the idea has never parted with his own possession of it, nor witim his original right to the exclusive use of it, he has no need
to recover the exclusive possession of it; because the possession of it by others, in common with himself, ofFers no practical iihpediment to his exclusive use of it. The exclusive possession of the idea, being
practically unnecessary to his exclusive use of it, it is legally
unnecessary. Consequently [*108] the fact, that he can never recover it, is a fact of no legal importance whatever, as affecting his right to the exclusive use of it.\ SECTION XV.
Objection Fifteenth. Another objection is, that ideas cannot be seized, on any legal process.
Admitting, for the sake of the argument, what is probably true, that no way can be devised, by which a man's property, in ideas, can be taken on legal process, that
fact interposes no obstacle whatever to their being treated, by the law, as property. There are many kinds of property, which the law protects, but which nevertheless, the law cannot seize. For example. Reputation is property, and
is protected by the law; yet it cannot be seized and sold, to pay a fine, or satisfy a debt. A man's health, strength, and beauty are property; and the law punishes an injury done to them; yet they cannot be seized and sold, on
legal process. All a man's intellectual faculties and powers, are property; yet they cannot be taken for a debt, or confiscated for crime. Music is property; and a single hour's melody will often bring thousands of dollars in the
market. Yet it cannot be taken in execution for a debt. Labor, of all kinds, is property; but no kind of labor whatever can be seized by the law.
This objection, like all the others, is therefore without foundation. ______________________________________
I have thus answered, or attempted to answer, every objection, worthy of an answer, (except two- one to be noticed in the next, and the other in the succeeding,
chapter,) that I remember ever to have read or heard, against the right of a man, on principles of natural law, to an absolute and perpetual property in his