ADDRESS

 

 

OF THE

 

 

FREE CONSTITUTIONALISTS

 

 

 

TO

 

 

THE PEOPLE OP TUE UNITED STATES.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BOSTON:

PUBLISHED BY THAYER & ELDRIDGE,

116 WASHINGTON STREET.

[*2]

 

 

A few friends of freedom, who believe the Constitution of the United States to be a sufficient warrant for giving liberty to all the people of the United States, make the following appeal against any support being given to the Republican Party at the ensuing election.

Boston, September, 1860.

 

 

 

NOTE TO SECOND EDITION.

 

 

ALTHOUGH this address was published previous to the late presidential election, and was designed to have an effect upon it, it nevertheless contains constitutional opinions, which are deemed of permanent importance, and worthy of preservation. The opinions it expresses in regard to the Repub­lican party will also be pertinent so long as that party shall occupy the grounds it has hitherto done.

Boston November, 1860.

 

 

 

[*3]

ADDRESS.

I.

THE real question, that is now convulsing the nation, is not - as the Republican party would have us believe - whether slaves shall be carried from the States into the Territories? but whether anywhere, within the limits of the Union, one man shall be the property of another?

Whether a man, who is confessedly to be held as property, shall be so held in one place, rather than in another? in a State, rather than in a Territory? is a frivolous and impertinent question, in which the man himself can have no interest, and which is un­worthy of a moment’s consideration at this time, if not at all times. If he is to be a slave at all, the locality in which he is to be held, is a matter of no importance to him, and of little or no importance to the nation at large, or any of its people.

If there are to be slaves in the country, a humane man, instead of feeling himself degraded by their presence, would desire to have them in his neighborhood, that ho might give them his sym­pathy, and if possible ameliorate their condition. And the man, who, like the Republican party, consents to the existence of slavery, so long as the slaves are but kept out of his sight, is at heart a tyrant and a brute. And if, at the same time, like the more conspicuous members of that party, he makes loud profes­sions of devotion to liberty and humanity, he thereby just as loudly proclaims himself a hypocrite. And those Republican politicians, who, instead of insisting upon the liberation of the slaves, maintain, under the name of State Rights, the inviola- [*4] bility of the slaveholder’s right of property in his slaves, in the States, and yet claim to be friends of liberty, because they cry, “Keep the slaves where they are;” “No removal of them into the Territories;” “Bring them not into our neighborhood,” - are either smitten with stupidity, as with a disease, or, what is more probable, are nothing else than selfish, cowardly, hypocritical, and unprincipled men, who, for tile sake of gaining or retaining power, are simply making a useless noise about nothing, with the purpose of diverting men’s minds from the true issue, and of thus postponing the inevitable contest, which every honest and brave man ought to be ready and eager to meet at once.

II.

We repeat, that the true issue before the country - the one which sooner or later must be met - is nothing less than this:

Shall any portion of the people of the United States be hold as property at all?

So far as the practical solution of this question depends upon existing political institutions, it depends mainly upon the consti­tution of the United States.

If the constitution of the United States - “the supreme law of the land” - declares A to be a citizen of the United States (we use the term citizen in its technical sense) then, constitution­ally speaking, he is a citizen of the United States everywhere throughout the United States, - “any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding;” and no State law or constitution can depose him from that state, or deprive him of the enjoyment of the least of those rights, which the national constitution guarantees to the citizens of the United States.

If, on the other hand, that same “supreme law” declares him to be property, then, constitutionally speaking, he is property everywhere under that law; - and his owner may, by virtue of that law, carry him, as property, into any and every State in the Union, and there hold him as a slave forever, - “any thing in the constitutions or laws of such States to the contrary notwith­standing.” [*5]

There can, therefore, be no such distinction made between the States, as that of free and slave States. All are alike free, or all are alike slave, States. They must all necessarily be either the one or the other; since the constitution of the United States, being “the supreme law” over all alike, must necessarily de­termine, in all alike, the status of each individual therein, rela­tive to that “supreme law.” In other words, the constitution of the United States, and not any constitutions or laws of the States, must determine, in the case of each and every individual, whether he be a citizen of the United States, and entitled to the benefits and protection of the national government, or not. If it determines that any particular person is a citizen of the United States, entitled to the benefits and protection of the national government, then certainly he cannot be deprived of such citizen­ship, or of the protection and benefits which that citizenship implies, by any subordinate or State government; for, in that case, the constitution of the United States would not be “the supreme law of the land.” If, on the contrary, the constitution of the United States determines that any particular individual (native or naturalized) is not a citizen of the United States, nor entitled to the benefits and protection of the national government, it can do so only because it has itself declared him to be property; since that is the only cause that can prevent his being a citizen of the United States, and entitled, as such citizen, to the benefits and protection of the government of the United States. The declaration of no subordinate law, that he is property, can break the force of that “supreme law,” which declares everybody (native and naturalized) a citizen, whom it does not itself declare to be a slave.

The government of the United States cannot act directly upon the State governments, as governments, requiring them to do this, and forbidding them to do that. It must, therefore, act directly upon individuals; else it cannot act at all. it. is practically a gov­ernment only so far as it does operate upon individuals. It must necessarily know, by virtue of the United States constitution, the individuals upon whom it is to operate ; otherwise it would be in the situation of a government not knowing its own citizens. and consequently not knowing to whom its own duties were due. [*6]

The rights, which the general government secures to the people, are as much personal rights, and come home to each separate individual as directly and fully as do the rights secured to them by the State governments. And the rights secured to the people by the national government, as much imply personal liberty, on the part of the people, as (10 the rights secured to them by the State governments; for, without personal liberty, the former rights can no more be enjoyed than the latter. hence the indispensable necessity that the general government should know, for itself, independently of the State governments, who are, and who are not (if any are not) citizens of the United States; for otherwise, we repeat, it cannot know to whom its own duties are due.

To say that it rests with the State governments to decide upon whom the United States government shall act, or upon whom it shall confer its protection or benefits, is equivalent to saying that “the supreme law” is dependent upon the arbitrary will of subordinate laws, for permission to operate at all as a law. It is consequently equivalent to saying that the subordinate law may nullify the supreme law, and exclude it from a State altogether, by simply declaring that no persons whatever, within the State, shall be citizens of the United States; and consequently that there shall be no persons, within the State, upon whom the supreme law can operate, or upon whom it shall confer its bene­fits.

We repeat the proposition, that, if the State constitutions or laws can determine who may, and who may not, be citizens of the United States, and enjoy the benefits of the United States government, each State may nullify the constitution, government, and laws of the United States, within such State, by declaring that there shall be, within the State, no citizens of the United States, to enjoy those benefits, or upon whom the laws of the United States shall operate.

It is, therefore, indispensable to the existence and operation of the government of the United States, that the constitution of the United States shall itself determine upon whom the United States government shall operate, and who are its citizens, “any [*7] thing in the constitutions or laws of the States to the contrary notwithstanding;” and that the State laws and constitutions shall be allowed to have nothing to do with the matter.

To say that a State can make a man a slave, is only another mode of saying that a State can deprive the United States of a citizen, and abolish the government of the United States, so far as that citizen is concerned. And to say that a State can deprive the United States of one citizen, is equivalent to saying that a State can deprive the government of the United States of all its citizens, within the State. And to say that a State can deprive the government; of the United States of all its citizens, within the State, is equivalent to saying that the State can entirely abolish the United States government, within such State. This is the necessary conclusion of the doctrine, that the States can make a slave of any individual, who would otherwise be a citizen of the United States.

If all the people of the States were made slaves, plainly the United States government would have no citizens, upon whom it could operate; and it would, therefore, be virtually abolished. And, in just so far as the people of the United States are made slaves, in lust so far is the United States government abolished.

This whole theory, therefore, that the States have a right to make slaves of the people of the United States, is nothing less than a theory that the States have the right to abolish the government of the United States, by withdrawing individuals from the operation of its laws.

To say, as is constantly done, that the United States consti­tution “recognizes,” as slaves, those whom the States may de­clare to be slaves, is equivalent to charging the constitution with the absurdity of recognizing the right of the States to make slaves of the citizens of the United States. And to say that the constitution of the United States recognizes the right of the States to make slaves of the citizens of the United States, is equivalent to charging it with the absurdity of actually recogniz­ing the right of each separate State to abolish the government of the United States, within such State.

It therefore results that the constitution of the United States, [*8] “the supreme law of the land,” must necessarily fix the status of every individual relatively to that law; and that, in fixing the status of each and every individual, relatively to that law - that is, in determining whether an individual shall be a citizen of the United States or not, - it necessarily fixes his status as a freeman, or a slave.

And it necessarily does this independently of, and in defiance of, any subordinate or State law; for otherwise it could not be supreme.’’

To say that the national constitution is “the supreme law of the land,” and yet that it depends upon each of thirty-three State governments to say upon whom that supreme law shall operate, or whom it shall protect, is as absurd as it would be to say that one man is an absolute monarch over thirty-three States, and yet that he is wholly dependent upon the consent of thirty­-three subordinate princes, for permission to rule over his own subjects.

If the constitution, laws, and government of the United States are to be limited, in their operation within each State, to such individuals as the States respectively may designate, then each State may, so far as its own territory is concerned, determine who may, and who may not, send and receive letters by the United States mail; who may, and who may not, go into a United States custom-house for purposes of commerce ; who may, and who may not, go into a United States court-house; and so on. If this were the true relation between our general and State governments, then the United States constitution, instead of declaring that “this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or in laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding,” ought to have declared that this constitution, and the laws and treaties made by the United States in pursuance thereof, shall have effect, within each State, oily so far as such State shall consent, or only upon such individuals as such State shall delegate. [*9]

III.

Another proof that the general government must determine for itself, independently of the State governments, who are, and who are not, citizens of the United States, is found in that provision of the constitution, which declares that “the United States shall guarantee to every State of this Union ‘a republican form of government.”

Although the constitution presumes that the State governments will be representative governments, yet this provision for “a re­publican form of government” certainly requires that the United States shall guarantee to the States something more than a mere representative government; for a government may be a repre­sentative government, and yet the constituent body - or the body enjoying the right of suffrage - be so small, and the principles of the government so exclusive and arbitrary, as to make the go­vernment a perfect tyranny, as to the great body of the people. A guaranty, therefore, of a representative government simply, would have been of no practical value to the people.

It is plain, too, from another part of the constitution, that the constitution does not mean to imply that a representative form of government is necessarily a republican form of government; be­cause if it did, it would have made some specific provision as to the extent of the suffrage to be enjoyed by the constituent body. Whereas it leaves that matter to be regulated at the discretion of the States respectively. <fn1>

It is certain, therefore, that the “republican form of govern­ment,” which the United States are bound to guarantee to the States, is something essentially different from, and more than, a representative government, representing such portions only of the whole people as may chance to get the power of a State into their hands, wielding it arbitrarily for their own purposes.

What, then, is implied in this “republican form of govern-[*10] ment?” This certainly, is no more, is implied - for this must necessarily be implied in the very terms, “a republican form of government,” - viz., that at least all the members of the republic shall enjoy the protection of the laws.

Whatever other disagreements there may be in men’s minds, as to the essential requisites of “a republican form of govern­ment,” certainly no man in his senses can deny so self-evident a proposition as this, - that such a government necessarily implies that all the acknowledged members of the republic must be under the protection of the laws.

This being admitted, it follows that the United States must guarantee to each State a government, that shall give the protec­tion of the laws to all the acknowledged members or citizens of the State.

But who are the acknowledged members or citizens of a State? We answer, that, whomsoever else they may, or may not, include, they must certainly include all the citizens of the United States, within the State. This must necessarily be so; because it would be absurd to suppose that those people, in the various States, who united to form the national government, and thereby made them­selves citizens of the United States, would also unite to guarantee a republican form of government for each of the separate States, unless they f/tern se/ties were personally to have the benefit of this guaranty. It; certainly cannot be supposed that they would be so foolish and suicidal as to unite to guarantee to others a govern­ment within the States, the benefits of which could be denied to themselves, or the power of which could be turned against them­selves for purposes of oppression.

This guaranty, then, on the part of the United States, of a republican form of government” for each State, is a guaranty of a government, under which at least all the citizens of the United States, within the State, shall have the protect ion of the laws.

From this supposition it follows inevitably that the United States government must determine, independently of the State government, who are the citizens of the United States, within a State; for, otherwise, it could not know when it had fulfilled this guaranty to them of the protection of a republican form of go- [*11] vernment. The guaranty itself might be wholly or partially de­feated, at the pleasure of the State government, if it were left to the State government itself to determine who were, and who were not, among those citizens of the United States, within the State, for whose benefit; this guaranty had been made: And the State government might very likely have great motive to defeat the guaranty, either in whole or in part.

It must be borne in mind that this guaranty of a republican form of government to the citizens of the United States, within a State, is a guaranty against the oppressions of any anti-republican form of government, that may succeed in obtaining power in a State. Yet clearly the United States could not protect; its own citizens against such anti-republican government within the States, unless it could determine, independently of the State governments, who its own citizens, within the States, were.

We insist that this argument is entirely conclusive to prove that the United States Government must determine, for itself, who are its own citizens within the respective States; and that the constitutions and laws of the States themselves can have nothing whatever to do with the matter.

IV.

Still further proof that the constitution of the United States, and not; the constitution or laws of the States, controls the citizen­ship of every person born in the country, is found in the fact that a simple act of congress is acknowledged by all to be sufficient, in defiance of all State laws and constitutions, to confer the privi­lege of United States citizenship upon persons of foreign birth. It would certainly be very absurd to give to congress such a power in regard to foreigners, if neither the United States con­stitution, nor the United States government had any similar power in regard to the natives of the country; for, in that case, the constitution would do more for foreigners than for natives.

V.

We therefore hold it demonstrable, at least, if not self-evi­dent, that the constitution of the United States, “the supreme [*12] law of the land,” must, simply by virtue of the supremacy, fix the status of every individual in the United States, independently of the State governments; that it must operate directly upon each and every individual, native or naturalized, declaring him entitled, as a citizen of the United States, to the protection and bene­fits of the national government, or declaring him to be property, subject only to the will of his owner, and therefore entitled to no personal protection at all, either from the general or State governments.

VI.

If it rests with the State governments to say whether the natives of the country shall be citizens of the United States, and have the protection of the national government, or be property, subject only to the will of their owners, then certainly it rests equally with the State governments to say whether naturalized persons shall be citizens or slaves; for naturalization by the United States government can at most but put the persons naturalized on a level with the natives. And that is all that the principle of naturalization implies.

This question therefore, as to the power of the States to con­vert men into property, is not one that concerns the natives of the country alone. It concerns all immigrants as well; since the general government can certainly have no more power to protect immigrants against being reduced to property, than it has to pro­tect those born on the soil.

VII.

There are, then, three decisive proofs that the United States government must determine for itself, independently of the State governments, who are, and who are not (if any are not) citizens of the United States.

The first of these proofs is, that otherwise the United States government could not know its own citizens, or consequently know to whom its own proper and ordinary duties were due. [*13]

The second proof is, that otherwise the United States govern­ment could not know when it had fulfilled its guaranty of “a re­publican form of government” to the citizens of the United States, within the States respectively.

The third proof is, that otherwise the United States con­stitution and laws could either do more for foreigners (by natu­ralization) than they can do for those born on the soil; or else naturalization itself, by the United States government, would be an utterly useless process for protecting the persons naturalized against being reduced to property by the State government.

VIII.

Assuming it now to be settled, that the constitution of the United States fixes the state of every person, as a citizen or a slave; and that it does so, “any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding;” let us ascertain what its decision on this point is. To do so, we have only to ascertain by and for whom the constitution of the United States was established. This the instrument itself has explicitly in­formed us. It declares itself to have been established by “the people of the United States,” for the benefit of “themselves and their posterity.” From this declaration of the constitution itself there can be no appeal. And the instrument is to be in­terpreted throughout consistently with this declaration. Thus interpreted, it implies that all the then “people of the United States,” with their “ posterity,” were to be citizens of the United States, and, as such, to have the benefit and protection of the general government; and consequently that none of them could be lawfully reduced to the condition of property. It also authorizes congress to naturalize all persons of foreign birth, coming into the country, without discriminating between those that may come in voluntarily, and those that may be brought in against their will. It also authorizes Congress “to punish offences against the law of nations;” and thus authorizes the punishment of all attempts to enslave the people of other nations, whether they come here voluntarily, or are brought here [*14] by force. It also, without making any discrimination as to per­sons, authorizes the writ of habeas corpus, which denies the right of property in man. It also requires the United States to “guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government; under which at least all the citizens of the United States, within the State, shall have the protection of the laws. In these various ways, the constitution of the United States, “ the supreme law of the land,” has made the principle of property in man impossible anywhere within the United States; and has empowered the general government to maintain that principle, in opposition to any subordinate or State government.

We are aware that the supreme court of the United States, in the Dred Scott case, have asserted that the phrase, “ the people of the United States,” did not mean all the people, but only all the white people, of the United States. And they attempt to fortify this opinion by saying that the Declaration of Independence itself did not mean to assert that “all men were created equal,” but only that all white men were created equal. To this view of the case we will, at this time, offer no other an­swer than this: that, if this famous clause of the Declaration of Independence is to be interpreted according to this opinion of the supreme court, the whole instrument must also be interpreted in accordance with it; and the necessary consequence would then be, that the Declaration of Independence absolved only the white people of the country from their allegiance to the English crown, leaving the black people still subject to that alle­giance, and entitled to corresponding protection. Thus Queen Victoria would have now, in our midst, four millions of subjects, whose rights she ought at once to take care of, as she would un­doubtedly be very willing to do.

We are also aware, that, although “the idea that there could be property in man” was studiously excluded from the constitu­tion itself, it is nevertheless historically known that an under­standing existed, outside of the constitution, among some of the framers, and other politicians of that day, that, if the honest cha­racter of the instrument itself should be successful in securing its adoption by the people, these framers and others would then use [*15] their influence to give to the instrument an interpretation favora­ble to the maintenance of slavery. And we are aware that it is now claimed that this outside understanding ought to be substi­tuted, as it hitherto has been, for the instrument itself, and acknowledged as the real constitution, so far as slavery is con­cerned.

Our answer on this point is, - that this outside understanding could have existed among but a small portion of the whole people; that they dared not incorporate it in the constitution itself; that, instead of being any part of the constitution itself, it was but a traitorous conspiracy against the very constitution, which they, with others, induced the people of the United States to adopt; that it could have had no legal effect or validity, even among those who were actually parties to it; and that we, of this day, would not only be slaves, but idiots, if we were to allow the criminal purposes of these men to be substituted for the constitution; and thus suffer ourselves, in effect, to be governed by a set of dead traitors and tyrants, who no longer have any rights in this world; who, when living, dared put only honest purposes into the constitution; and who, if now living, would de­serve to be punished for their treason and their crimes, rather than reverenced as patriots and statesmen, and taken as authori­ty as to the true meaning of the constitution.

The fraudulent interpretation given to the constitution at large, in respect to slavery, has been accomplished mainly by means of the fraudulent interpretation given to the one word “ free,” in the clause relative to representation and direct taxation. The conspirators against freedom, with their dupes, have, from the foundation of the government, claimed that this word was used to describe a free person, as distinguished from a slave. Where. as it had been used in England for centuries, and in this country from its first settlement, to describe a native or natural­ized person, as distinguished from an alien. Thus our colonial charters guaranteed that persons born in the colonies should “be free and natural subjects, as if born in the realm of England.” When the troubles arose between this and the mother country, in regard to taxation, our fathers insisted that they were “free [*16] required the legislation of the colonies to “ be consonant to reason, and conformable, as nearly as circumstances would allow, to the laws, customs, and rights of the realm of England.” This made slavery illegal up to the time of the Revolution.

2. Of all the State constitutions established and existing in 1787 or 1789, when the constitution of the United States was framed and adopted, not one established or authorized slavery. It was, therefore, impossible that the slavery then existing could have been legal.

3. Even of the statute law of the States, on the subject of slavery, in 1787 and 1789 (admitting such statute law to be, as it really was not, constitutional), none described the persons to be enslaved with such accuracy as that many, if indeed any, individuals could ever have been identified by it as slaves.

On the 19th of August, 1850, Senator Mason, of Virginia, confessed, in the Senate of the United States, that, so far as he knew, slavery had never been established by positive law in a single State in the Union. And in the United States house of Representatives, on the 14th day of March last, Mr. Curry, of Alabama, said, - “No law, I believe, is found on our statute books authorizing the intro­duction of slavery; and, if positive precept is essential to the valid exis­tence of slavery, the tenure by which our slaves are held is illegal and uncertain.”

He also, in the same speech, said, -“It has been frequently stated iii congress, that slavery was not intro­duced into a single British colony by authority of law; and that there is not a statute in any slaveholding State legalizing African slavery, or ‘con­stituting the original basis and foundation of title to slave property.’”

And he made no denial of the truth of this statement.

Thus we have abundant evidence that slavery had never had any legal existence in the country, up to the adoption of the constitution of the United States. And, if it had no legal existence at the time of the adoption of the United States constitution, that constitution necessarily made citizens of all the then people of the United States; for there can be no question that it made citi­zens of all, unless of such as were then legally held in bondage. [*19]

But, even if the constitutions and statute-books of every State had legalized slavery in the most unequivocal manner, the con­stitution of the United States would nevertheless have given freedom to all ; because it made “ the people of the United States,” without discrimination, citizens of the United States; and was thenceforth to be “ the supreme law of the land,” “any thing” then existing in, as well as ever afterwards to be incorporated into, “the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”

The adoption of a new constitution is a revolution; and the object of revolutions is to get rid of, and not to perpetuate, old abuses and wrongs. All new constitutions, therefore, should be construed as favorably as possible for the accomplishment of that end. For this reason, in construing the constitution of the United States, no notice can be taken of (with the view of perpetuating) any abuses or crimes tolerated, or even authorized, by the then existing State governments.

What excuse, then, has any one for saying, that, constitution. ally speaking, our country is not a free one? free for the whole human race? and especially for all born on the soil?

IX.

The palpable truth is, that the four millions of human beings now held in bondage in this country are, in the view of the con­stitution of the United States, full citizens of the United States, entitled, without any qualification, abatement, or discrimination whatever, to all the rights, privileges, and protection which that constitution guarantees to the white citizens of the United States, and that their citizenship has been withheld from them only by ignorance, and fraud, and force.

Such being the truth in regard to this portion of the citizens of the United States, it is the constitutional duty of both the general and State governments to protect them in their personal liberty, and in all the other rights which those governments secure to the other citizens of the United States.

It is as much the constitutional duty of the general govern- [*20] ment, as of the State governments, to protect the citizens of the United States in their personal liberty; for if it cannot secure to them their personal liberty, it can secure to them no other of the rights or privileges which it is bound to secure to them.

To enable the general government to secure to the people their personal liberty, it is supplied with all necessary powers. It is authorized to use the writ of habeas corpus, which of itself is sufficient to set at liberty all persons illegally restrained. It is authorized to arm and discipline the people as militia, and thus enable them to do something towards defending their own liberty. It is authorized “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution” the powers specifically enu­merated. That is to say, it is authorized “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying” home to each individual every right and every privilege which the constitution designs to secure to him; and the United States courts are required to take cognizance “of all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.” In other words, they are authorized to take cognizance of all cases in which the question to be tried is the right which any individual has under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. The United States are also bound to guarantee to all the citizens of the United States, within the States, the benefits of a republican form of government. There is, then, obviously no lack of powers delegated to the general government, to secure the personal liberty of all its citizens.

That it is as much the duty of the general, as of the State, governments to secure the personal liberty of the people of the United States, will be obvious from the following considera­tions : - The people of the United States live under, and are citizens of two governments, the general and the State governments. These two governments are mainly independent of each other; having, for the most part, distinct powers, distinct spheres of action, and owing distinct duties to the citizen. The purpose of the general [*21] government is to secure to the individual the enjoyment of a certain enumerated class of rights and privileges; and the object of the State governments is to secure him in the enjoyment of certain other rights and privileges. But both governments have at least one duty in common, viz, that of securing personal liberty to the citizen. This must necessarily be a duty common to both governments, because the enjoyment of each of the classes of rights and privileges before mentioned, to wit, those that are to be secured by the general government, and those that are to be secured by the State governments, necessarily im­ply the possession of personal liberty on his part; since without this liberty, none of the other rights or privileges to be secured to him by either government, can be enjoyed. It is necessary, therefore, that each government should have the right to secure his liberty to him, else it cannot secure to him the other rights and privileges which it is bound to secure to him. It is as necessary that the general government should have power to secure to him personal liberty, in order that he may enjoy all the other rights and privileges which the general government is bound to secure to him, as it is that the State governments should have power to secure his personal liberty, in order that he may enjoy all the other rights and privileges which it is the duty of the State governments to secure to him. It would be absurd to say that the general government is bound to secure to him certain rights and privileges, which implied the possession of personal liberty on his part, as an indispensable pre-requisite to his enjoyment of them, and yet that it had no power of its own to secure his liberty; for that would be equivalent to saying that the general government could not perform its own duties to the citizen, unless the State governments should have first placed him in a condition to have those duties performed, - a thing which the State governments might neglect or refuse to do.

The State governments have evidently no more right to interfere to prevent the citizen’s enjoyment of the rights and privileges intended to be secured to him by the general govern­ment, than the general government has to interfere to prevent his enjoyment of the rights and privileges intended to be secured [*22] to him by the State governments. For example, the State gov­ernments have no more right to prevent his going into the post-offices, custom-houses, and courthouses, which the general government has provided for his benefit, than the general gov­ernment has to prevent his travelling on the highways, or going into the schools, or court-houses, which the State governments have provided for his benefit.

This proposition seems to us so manifestly true as to need no elaboration. And yet, if either of these governments can reduce him to slavery, it can deprive him of all the rights and privileges which the other government is designed to secure to him. In other words, it can deprive that other government of a citizen, and thus abolish that other government itself, so far as that citizen is concerned. Certainly a State government has no more power to do this wrong towards the national government, than the national government baa to do a similar wrong towards a State government. In short, neither government has any con­stitutional power to deprive the other of a citizen, by making him a slave.

Furthermore, each of these two governments has an equal right to defend their common citizens against being enslaved by the other. If, for example, the general government were to attempt to enslave its citizens within a State, the State govern­ment would clear1y have the right to defend them against such enslavement; because they are its citizens as well as citizens of the United States. And, for the same reason, if a State govern­ment attempt to enslave its citizens within the United States, the general government clearly has the same right to resist such enslavement, that the State government would have in the other case; because they are citizens of the United States, as well as of the State.

This power of each government to resist the enslavement of their common citizens by the other, is clearly a power necessary for its self-preservation; a power that must, of necessity, belong to every government that has the power of maintaining its own existence. It must, therefore, as much belong to the general as to the State governments.

Still further: The principal, if riot the sole object of our having [*23] two governments for the same citizen, would be entirely defeated, if each government had not an equal right to defend him against enslavement by the other. What is the grand object of having two governments over the same citizen? It is, that, if either government prove oppressive, he may fly for protection to the other. This right of flying from the oppression of one govern. merit to the protection of the other, makes it more difficult for him to be oppressed, than if he had no alternative but submission to a single government. This certainly is the only im­portant, if not the only possible, advantage of our double system of government. Yet if either of these two governments can enslave their common citizen, and the other has no right to interfere for his protection, the principal, if not the only, benefit of our having two governments, is moot.

But our governments, instead of regarding this great and pri­mary motive for their separate existence, have hitherto ignored it, and acted upon the theory, that it is the duty of each to go to the assistance of the other, when the latter finds its own strength inadequate to the accomplishment of its tyrannical purposes. This we see in the case of fugitive slaves. When a citizen of the United States, reduced to slavery by a State government, or by a private individual with the consent and co-operation of the State government, makes his escape beyond the jurisdiction and power of the State government, the United States government pursues him, recaptures him, and restores him to his tyrants. Thus the citizen, instead of finding his security in the double system of government under which he lives, finds in it only a double power of’ oppression united against him. What grosser violation of all the rational and legitimate purposes of our double system of government can be conceived of than this?

If these views are correct, it is just as much the constitu­tional duty, and just as clearly the constitutional right, of the general government to protect; the people of the United States against enslavement by the State governments, as it is the consti­tutional duty and right of the State governments, to protect the same people against enslavement by the general government. [*24]

The general government is as much set as a guard and a shield against enslavement by the State governments, as the latter are as guards and shields against enslavement by the former.

This view, too, of the object to be accomplished by our double system of government, - viz., the greater security of the citizen against the oppression of his government,- presents, more clearly perhaps than has before been done, the necessity that the gene­ral government should determine for itself, independently of the State governments, who are its own citizens, and who are entitled to its protection ; for otherwise the general government could have power to protect against a State government only those whom the State government should consent to have thus protected against it­self. It would be an absurdity to say that the general government was established to protect the people against the State govern­ments, and yet that it is left to the State governments them. selves to say whom the general government may thus protect. To allow the State governments the power to say whom the gene­ral government may, and whom it may not, protect against themselves (the State governments), would be depriving the gene­ral government of all power to protect any. It would be like allowing a man to protect, against a wolf, alt lambs except those whom the wolf should choose to devour.

The conclusion necessarily is, that the general, government must determine for itself, independently of the State govern­ments, who are its citizens, and whom it will protect; and, if the general government makes this determination, it can, under the constitution of the United States, make no other determination than that all the native and naturalized inhabitants of the United States are its citizens, and entitled to its protection.

X.

There is still another point of great practical importance to be considered. It is this: If those now held in bondage in this country are, in the view of “the supreme law of the land,” citi­zens of the United States, entitled to the lull privileges of citizenship equally with all the other citizens of the United States, [*25] then it is not only the constitutional right and duty of both the general and State governments to protect them in the enjoyment of all their rights as citizens, but it is also not merely a moral duty, but a strictly legal and constitutional right, of all the other citizens of the country to go, in their private capacity as indivi­duals, to the rescue of those enslaved.

It is as much a legal right of one citizen to rescue another from the hands of a kidnapper, as to rescue him or her from a rob­ber, ravisher, or assassin. And all the force necessary for the accomplishment of the object may be lawfully used.

When the government fails to protect the people against rob­bers, kidnappers, ravishers, and murderers, it is not only a legal right, but an imperative moral duty, of the people to take their mutual defense into their own hands. And the constitution re­cognizes this right, when it declares that “ the right of the peo­ple to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed;” for “the right of the people to keep and bear arms” implies their right to use them when necessary for their protection.<fn2>

We claim it as a legal and constitutional right to travel in all parts of our common country, and to perform the common offices of humanity towards all whom we may find needing them. And if, in our travels, we chance to see a fellow-man in the hands of a kidnapper or slaveholder, we claim the right to rescue him, at any necessary cost to the kidnapper. And, if any part of our country be unsafe for single travellers, or small companies of travellers, we claim the right to go in companies numerous enough to make ourselves safe, and to enable us to rescue all whom we may find needing our assistance.

And it is the legal duty of both the United States and all [*26] State courts -judges and juries - to protect us in the exercise of these rights.

XI.

We call particular attention to the duties of juries in this matter. We believe in that noblest, and incomparably most valuable, of all the judicial opinions ever rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States, in which they declared, by the mouth of John Jay, the first, and great, and honest Chief-Justice, that even in civil suits (as well as criminal) juries have a right to judge of the law as well as the fact.<fn3>

We also believe with the United States House of Representa­tives, who, in 1804, by a vote of 73 yeas to 82 nays, resolved to impeach Samuel Chase, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, for, as they said, “ endeavoring [in the trial of John Fries for treason] to wrest from the jury their indisputable right to hear argument, and determine upon the question of law, as well as the question of fact, involved in the verdict, which they were required to give,” and declared such conduct “irregular,” and “as dangerous to our liberties as [*27] it is novel to our laws and usages;” and that on “the rights of juries [to determine the law, as well as the fact] ultimately rest the liberty and safety of the American people.”

We believe more than this. We believe that jurors, under our constitution, not only have the right to judge what the laws are, and whether they are consistent with the constitution, but that they have all the ancient and common-law right of jurors to judge of the justice of all laws whatsoever, which they are called upon to assist in enforcing, and to hold all of them invalid which conflict with their own ideas of justice. And that they are under no legal or moral obligation to hold valid every iniquitous statute, which they may suppose the letter of the constitution can possibly be interpreted to cover. It is their duty, as it is the duty of congresses and judges, to strive to see how much justice, and not how much injustice, the constitution can be made to authorize.

We believe that juries, and not congresses and judges, are the palladium of our liberties. We do not at all admit, as is now almost universally assumed to be the fact, that the people of this nation have ever given their rights and liberties into the sole keeping of legislators and judges. We hold that the assumption of the supreme court of the United States to decide, authoritatively for the people of this country, what their rights and liberties are, and what ‘is the true meaning of the constitu­tion, is an assumption of absolute power - an entire and flagrant usurpation - authorized by no word or syllable of the constitu­tion; and that it should not be submitted to for a moment, unless we all of us design to be slaves.

We believe, too, that the practice of selecting jurors by judges and marshals, the servile and corrupt instruments of the government, who will of course select only those known to be favorable to the tyrannical measures of the government, ie as utterly unconstitutional, as it necessarily must be destructive of liberty. We believe that juries should be, in fact, what they are in theory, viz., a fair epitome or representation of “the country,” or people at large; and that to make them so, they must be selected by lot, or otherwise, from the whole body of [*28] male adults, without any choice or interference by the government, or any of its officers; and that when selected, no judge or other officer of the government can have any authority to ques­tion them as to whether they are in favor of, or opposed to, the laws that are to be put in issue.

In short, we believe it to be the purpose of our systems of government to maintain in force only those principles of justice which the people generally can understand, and in which they are agreed; and not to invest one portion of the people, either minority or majority, with unlimited power over the others.

Evidently the only tribunal known to our constitution, and to be relied on for the maintenance of such principles, is the jury.

We, therefore, hold that all legislative enactments and judicial opinions should be held subordinate to that general public con­science, which is presumed to be represented in the jury-box, by twelve men, taken indiscriminately from the whole people, and capable of giving judgments against persons or property only when they act with entire unanimity. And we believe it to be the primary and capital object of our constitutions thus “to get twelve honest men into a jury-box,” to do justice, according to their own notions of it, between man and man, and to see that only such measures of government shall be enforced as they shall all deem just and proper.

We believe that, under this system of trial by jury, it will be safe for one human being to go to the rescue of another from the hands of kidnapers, ravishers, and slaveholders. We believe, also, that a government, so powerful and so tyrannical as to restrain men from the performance of these primary duties of humanity and justice, ought not to be suffered to exist.

XII.

Turning now from our constitution, as it is in theory, and looking at our government, as it is in practice, what do we find? Do we find our national government securing to all its citizens the right~ which it is constitutionally bound to secure to them? No. It does not know, nor even profess to know, for [*29] itself, who its own citizens are. It does not even profess to have any citizens, except such as the separate States may see fit to allow it to have. It dares not perform the first political duty towards the people of the United States individually, without first humbly asking the permission of the State governments. It ventures timidly, and hat in hand, within each State, as if fearful of being treated as an intruder, and obsequiously inquires if the State government will be pleased to allow “the supreme law of the land” the privilege of having a few citizens within the State, to save it from falling into contempt, and becoming a dead letter? Shamefacedly confessing its own barrenness, it simply offers itself as a dry nurse to any political children whom the States may see fit to commit partially to its care. Some of the States, confiding in its subserviency and desire to please, graciously suffer the forlorn and harmless creature to busy itself in various subordinate services, such as carrying letters, &c , for all their citizens. Others, less gracious towards it, or less disposed to allow their citizens the luxury of such a servant, give it strict orders to do nothing for these, those, and the others of their people - the exceptions amounting, in some States, to one half of the whole population. And the submissive creature follows these instruc­tions to the letter, living, as it does, in perpetual fear lest the slightest transgression, on its part, should be followed by its summary dismissal from the political household. The only dig­nity left it is its name. It still calls itself the United States Government; fancies it has citizens of its own, whom it protects; plumes itself, i1i the eyes of the world, on its greatness and strength; talks contemptuously, and even indignantly, of those governments that suffer their subjects to be oppressed; and ostentatiously proffers its protection to those of all lands who will accept it. Yet all the while the aifrighted and imbecile thing sees its own citizens snatched away from it, at the rate of a hundred thousand per annum, by the State governments, and dares neither lift its finger, nor raise its voice, to save one of them from the auctioneer’s block, the slave-driver’s whip, the ravisher’s lust, the kidnapper’s rapacity, or the ruffian’s violence. The number of its living citizens (to say nothing of the dead) of [*30] whom it has thus been robbed, amounts at this day to some four millions; and the number doubles in every twenty-five years. Nevertheless, its greatest anxiety still is lest its servility and acquiescence shall not be so complete as to satisfy these kidnap­pers of its citizens. The only symptom of courage it dares ever exhibit, as against a State, is when it attempts some rapacious or unequal taxation, or commits the unnatural crime of pursuing its own flying citizens, not to protect them, but to subject them again to the tyranny from which they have once escaped.

XIII.

While the government of the nation is thus prostrate and de­graded, the people of the nation - at least that portion of them who show themselves in political organizations - instead of being alive to the authority of “the supreme law of the land,” and the rights of the people under it, are divided into four wretched, in­famous factions, all of whom agree in the political absurdity, that the status of a man, relative to “the supreme law of the land,” is fixed by some subordinate law; that the rights of a man ‘under the constitution of the United States are fixed by the constitutions and laws of the separate States. All of them agree, therefore, that the States may convert at least four millions citizens of the United States into property, with their posterity through all time. All of them agree in, and proclaim, the inviolability of property in man, within the United State8, where alone the United States government has any jurisdiction of the question; and disagree with each other only as to the inviolability of property in man, outside of the United States, where the United States have no political jurisdic­tion at all.

XIV.

We repeat that the United States has no political jurisdiction at all, outside of the United States. By this we mean that it has no political jurisdiction over people inhabiting the new countries west of the United States, which the United States has hitherto [*31] assumed to govern, under the name of “Territories.” And we feel bound to make this assertion good.

Where does the constitution grant congress any power to govern any other people than those of the United States? Even the war-making power would not authorize us to hold a conquered people in subjection indefinitely, but only so long as they should remain enemies, or refuse to do justice. The treaty-making power is no power to make treaties adverse to the natural right~ of mankind. It, therefore, includes no power to buy and sell mankind, with the territories on which they live. It no more im­plies a power, on our part, to purchase foreign people, and govern them as subjects, than it implies a power to sell a part of our own people to another nation, to be governed as subjects.

The only other power which can be claimed as authorizing such a government, is granted in the following words:

“The congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting, the territory [land] ox other property, belonging to the United States.”

Here is no grant of general political power over people, either within or without the United States; but only a power to control and dispose of, as property, the land- for “territory” is but land - and other property, belonging to the United States.

To make this idea more evident, let us divide the provision into two parts, and read them separately as follows:

1. “The congress shall have power to dispose of the territory [land] or other property, belonging to the United States.”

Here plainly is no grant of political power over people.

2. “The congress shall have power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory [land] or other property belonging to the United States.”

Here is plainly no more grant of political power in connection with the land, than in Connection with any “other property” be­longing to the United States.

The power to “make all needful rules and regulations respect­ing land or other property belonging to the United States,” is no grant of general political power over people.

The power granted is only such a degree of power over land [*32] and other property belonging to the United States, as may be necessary to secure such land and other property to the uses of the United States.

That this power is not one to establish any organized govern­ment over people, is proved by the fact that the power is cer­tainly as ample in regard to “territory and other property,” within any of the United States, as to territory and other prop­erty, out side of the United States. If, therefore, the power in. chided a power to set up an organized government or territory outside of the United States, it would equally include a power to set up an organized government within each State, to the exclu­sion of the State authority, wherever the United States had “territory or other property” within a State. But nobody ever dreamed that the power authorized any such political monstrosity as this.

There is nothing in the language of the constitution, that implies that the land or other property spoken of, is outside of the United States. And as ours is distinctly a government of the United States, and not of other countries, the legal presumption is that the land and other property - more especially the land -belonging to the United States, is to be found within the United States, and not in other countries.

The United States have no rightful ownership of the unoccu­pied lands west of the United States. It is against the law of nature, and therefore impossible, that they should have any such ownership. Land is a part of the natural wealth of the world, created for the sustenance of mankind, and offered by the Cre­ator as a free gift to those, and those only, who take actual pos­session of it. And actual possession means either actually living upon it, or improving it, by cutting down the trees, breaking up the soil, throwing a fence around it, or bestowing other useful labor upon it. Nothing short of this actual possession can give any one a rightful ownership of wilderness lands, or justify him in withholding it from those who wish to occupy it. Governments, which are but associations of individuals, can no more acquire any rightful ownership in wild lands, without this actual possession, than single individuals can do so. Until such lands are wanted [*33] for actual use, they must remain free and open for anybody and everybody, who chooses, to take possession of, and occupy them. Governments have no more right to assume the ownership of these lands, and demand a price for them, than they have to assume the ownership of the atmosphere, or the sunshine, and demand a price for them. They have no more right to claim the ownership of such lands, than of the birds and quadrupeds that inhabit them; or than they have to claim property in the ocean, and to demand a price of all who either sail upon it, or take fish out of it.

It is no answer to say that our government bought these lands of France or Mexico, for neither France nor Mexico had any rightful property in then, and could, therefore, convey no right­ful title to them. Even in lands purchased of the Indians, the United States acquire no rightful property, except only in such as the latter actually cultivated, or occupied as habitations. Those which they merely roamed over in search of game, they had no exclusive property in, and could accordingly convey none.

The United States, therefore, have no rightful property in wild lands, even within the United States. Still less, if possible, have they any such property in wild lands outside of the United States.

There is nothing in the constitution that implies that the United States have any property in wild lands, either within or without the United States. “The territory [land] or other property be. longing to the United States,” spoken of in the constitution, must be presumed to be such land and other property as the United States can rightfully own; and not such as they may simply as­sume to own, in violation of the law of nature, and the natural rights of mankind.

There is just as much authority given to congress, by the constitution, to assume the ownership of the atmosphere, both within and without the United States, and “to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting” it, as there is for their assuming such a power over wild lands, either within or without the United States.

This power granted to congress must be construed consist­ently, and only consistently, with the law of nature, if that be possible, and with the general purposes of the government. It [*34] must, therefore, if possible, be construed as applying to occupied, instead of wild lands, and to those lying within, rather than to those lying beyond, the geographical limits of the United States. And this is possible. “The power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory [land] and other property belonging to the United States,” and lying and being within the United States, is a power constantly needed in carrying on the daily operations of the government, it is needed in regard to every post-office, court-house, custom-house, or other real or personal property, whether absolutely owned, or tempora­rily occupied, by the United States. The power applies as well to lands and buildings temporarily leased, as to those absolutely owned; because a lease is a partial ownership.

The constitution specially provides that “over all pkwe8 pur­chased by the cOfl8eflt of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines,’ arsenals, dock- yards, and other needful buildings, congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation.” But inasmuch as the States might not give their consent - and could not even be expected to give their consent - to this “ exclusive legislation” over all the “places” which the United States might purchase (or lease) for post-offices, court-houses, and “other needful buildings,” it was necessary that congress, instead of a “power to exercise ex­clusive legislation” over such “places,” should have power -without excluding the general jurisdiction of the States-” to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory [land., “places “] or other property” thus owned or occupie4 by the United ;States, in order to secure them to the uses, for which the United States designed them. Without such a power, the United States could not establish even a post-office, without first getting the consent of the legislature of the State in which it was to be established.

We have, therefore, no need - in order to find “territory” [land, “places “] for this power to apply to - to assume that the United States, in violation of the law of nature, are the owners of wild lands, either within or without the United States. Still less have we need to assume that our government has power to [*35] exercise absolute political authority over peoples outside of the United States, in violation of the natural right of all men to go­vern themselves.

Peoples living outside of the United States, are, to us, for­eign nations, to all intents and purposes. And it is of no im­portance whether those peoples are many or few; whether those countries are thinly or densely populated; whether the countries are contiguous to, or distant from the United States. In either case they are alike independent of us. Whether they are well, or ill governed, or have no government at all, is, politically speaking, no concern of ours.

Peoples settling on the lands west of the United States, are therefore, so far as we are concerned, independent nations, over whom we have no more political jurisdiction, than over the peo­ple of Canada, or England, or France, or Japan. Whether they have any organized governments at all, is no affair of ours, any more than whether the Indian tribes have, or have not, organized governments.

The fact that and of these peoples were once citizens of the United States, does not affect the question. We acknowledge and maintain the natural right of all men to renounce their country. And when our people leave their country, by making their permanent homes beyond its limits, they do renounce it. And if they ever wish to come into the Union, they must be ad­mitted as States, the same as any other nation, that should wish to come into the Union, would have to do.

For these reasons we have, constitutionally, no political juris­diction whatever over those countries west of the United States, which we are in the habit of governing under the name of “Ter­ritories.”<fn4>

XV.

If any of our citizens are carried off by force into those countries, and there held as slaves, we have the right, by force of ‘arms, if need be, to compel their restoration, the same as if they [*37] had been carried into any other country. And that is all the political power which our constitution gives us over slavery in those countries. We have no more power to assume general [*38] political jurisdiction there, in order to prevent our people being carried there as slaves, than we have to assume similar jurisdic­tion over any other parts of the earth, in order to prevent our people being carried into them as slaves.

XV.

Whether, therefore, property in man be, or be not, lawful in the United States, we have no general political jurisdiction over it outside of the United States. And we have no more jurisdiction over it in the territories, or countries west of the United States, than we have in any other territories or countries in the world, outside of the United States.

XVI.

If any portion of our people are, in the view of our constitu­tion, lawful property within the United States, then, constitution­ally speaking, their owners have the right to carry them out of the United States into any other part of the world, and there hold them, or lose them, according to the laws that prevail there. If, on the other hand, no part of our people are, in the view of the constitution, lawful property within the United States, then, constitutionally speaking, we are bound to prevent any of them being carried out of the country as slaves, no matter what part of the world they may be carried to. And this is all we have to do with slavery outside of the United States.

XVII.

Neither has congress any authority to determine the question whether new States shall be admitted into the Union as slave­holding or as non-slaveholding States. All new States admitted into the Union must come into it subject to the constitution of the United States as “the supreme law.” If this “supreme law” declares one man to be the property of another, then, constitutionally speaking, he is and must be such property as [*39] much in the new States as in the old; and congress has no power to prevent it. If, on the other hand, that supreme law declares that there is no property in man, then congress has no power to set aside this supreme law in favor of any new State, any more than in favor of any of the old ones.

XIX.

Finally, even if it were admitted that congress has power under the constitution to govern countries outside of the United States, under the name of “territories,” still the law of property, as established by the constitution within the United States, would necessarily be the law of those territories ; for the constitution would be as much the supreme law of the territories as it is of the United States. If, therefore, the constitution makes a man property within the United States, it would necessarily make him property in the territories. If, on the other hand, the constitution makes every man free within the United States, it would necessarily make every man free in the territories.

XX.

Whether, therefore, we have or have not political jurisdiction over the “territories,” so called, the whole question of slavery, so far as our government is concerned, must b